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Introduction
It is widely recognized that in a dynamic, highly competitive economy, 
the displacement of workers from their jobs has been and continues to 
be an economic fact of life. An important source of this displacement 
during the postwar period has been the long-term shift in employment 
opportunities from manufacturing to services. Studies such as the report 
of the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force on Economic Adjustment and 
Worker Dislocation (1986) suggest, nevertheless, that the extent of 
displacement among American workers may have increased in recent 
years. In support of its conclusion, the Task Force points to the dramatic 
increase in import penetration of U.S. markets; the rising proportion 
of permanent separations among total job losses during the 1981-82 
recession relative to earlier postwar recessions; and the greater volatility 
since 1970 in exchange rates, interest rates, and energy prices. Stone 
and Sawhill (1987) document the incidence of difficult labor market 
adjustments arising from the increasing internationalization of the 
economy, and Hamermesh (1989) and Summers (1986) provide evidence 
indicating that the contribution of displaced workers to the nation©s 
overall unemployment rate has recently risen. 1
Displaced workers (also termed dislocated workers) are usually 
described as workers on layoff who possess a stable employment history 
with their predisplacement employer. In addition to their work ex 
perience, the main distinction between displaced workers and other laid- 
off workers is that the displaced typically have little chance of being 
recalled to jobs with their old employer or even in their old industry. 
At the time of layoff, however, displaced workers are likely to be 
unaware that their chances of recall are slim, although alternative 
employment opportunities exist elsewhere. The first step in the reemploy- 
ment process is recognition of the need to engage in job search, followed
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by a dusting off of job search skills which may have been unused for 
a number of years. Enhancing job search skills is important because 
of the very real possibility that a worker displaced by a major plant 
closure or mass layoff will face bleak reemployment prospects in his 
or her local labor market. Beyond gearing up for job search, it may 
also be necessary for some displaced workers to be retrained in the voca 
tional skills required to qualify for jobs in expanding industries.
Displaced workers thus tend to differ from other unemployed workers 
in that the duration of their unemployment is likely to be longer and 
that their reemployment is likely to require a change in occupation or 
industry. Reemployment may involve as well a willingness to accept 
employment at a lower wage. In the words of the Secretary of Labor©s 
Task Force report (1986:16), "[J]obs lost [by displaced workers] are 
often perceived as especially good jobs, for which the individual worked 
many years for one employer to achieve. Also, extraordinary emotional 
adjustments are required as life plans and goals are changed abruptly."
As experienced workers with stable work histories, displaced workers 
are usually eligible for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Indeed, 
the 26 weeks of income maintenance provided by UI in most states is 
often the only source of financial support available to them. The UI 
system has served for over 50 years as the first line of defense against 
temporary income losses due to unemployment. Nevertheless, a recur 
rent question about UI is whether income maintenance is the most ap 
propriate form of assistance to individuals who have lost jobs in which 
they had substantial human capital investments and for whom prospects 
of obtaining reemployment using these skills are dim. Critics such as 
Kuttner (1985b), for example, argue that the funds used to pay UI 
benefits could be better spent on alternative programs designed to speed 
up the reemployment of displaced workers. Reemployment programs 
discussed by Kuttner include retraining courses and wage subsidies in 
tended to create new job opportunities.
At the federal level, the specific adjustment problems of displaced 
workers have been recognized in the Trade Adjustment Assistance pro 
gram created in 1962 and 20 years later in the passage in 1982 of Title 
HI of the Job Training Partnership Act. The reemployment programs 
funded by these laws are summarized in useful reports provided by the
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U.S. Department of Labor (1986) and the Office of Technology Assess 
ment (1986). More recently, President Reagan proposed, in the fall of 
1987, a comprehensive program authorizing $980 million to be spent 
in retraining workers displaced by plant closings or technological change. 
This proposal became law in August 1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act.
At the state level also, a variety of reemployment initiatives are cur 
rently in operation in virtually every state. These programs are generally 
funded by state general tax revenues, but three states California, 
Delaware, and Washington are financing their initiatives by special 
earmarked payroll taxes. 2 Under the Reagan administration, the evolving 
philosophy of new federalism has made the states the key intergovern 
mental actor in the areas of education, economic development, welfare, 
and employment and training. But despite the ingenuity, diversity, and 
substantial investment of resources in displaced worker programs, no 
comprehensive study of proposed and ongoing state initiatives is available 
at present. The purpose of this monograph is to provide a description 
and evaluation of state initiatives dealing with the problem of worker 
displacement. These initiatives include the provision of programs to re 
tain jobs and encourage economic development, as well as reemploy 
ment assistance provided directly to workers in the form of retraining 
programs and job search workshops. The focus is on newer, more in 
novative state initiatives.
This chapter continues with an overview of some of the policy issues 
relating to worker displacement. Considered, in particular, are the ques 
tions of the incidence of displacement and whether government should 
be expected to provide displaced workers with special assistance (beyond 
or in place of UI). This section is followed by the introduction of half 
a dozen important questions which the monograph attempts to answer. 
The issue of how the various initiatives described in the study are to 
be evaluated is next considered. The chapter concludes with a brief 
description of how the remainder of the monograph is organized.
4 Introduction
Displaced Workers: How Many and Should They 
Receive Special Assistance?
The Magnitude of the Problem
While it is fairly easy to describe in general terms how displaced 
workers differ from other unemployed workers, it is more difficult to 
pin down these distinctions with enough precision to permit an accurate 
quantitative estimate of the displaced worker population. Examples of 
the kinds of questions that must be answered in attempting to measure 
the number of displaced workers include the following:
1. How long must an unemployed worker have held the previous job 
to be counted as a displaced worker?
2. Can length of unemployment, UI eligibility, or even exhaustion 
of UI benefits be used as a criterion to distinguish displaced workers 
from other unemployed workers?
3. Must laid-off workers suffer a sizable decrease in wages upon 
reemployment to be counted as displaced?
4. Can displaced workers be distinguished from other laid-off workers 
by the reason for their layoff, or perhaps by whether the industry from 
which they were laid off is declining or particularly sensitive to increased 
foreign competition?
Since the answers to these and other questions can and do differ among 
analysts, it is to be expected that estimates of the displaced worker 
population will vary. This is indeed the case. But while there is no con 
sensus in the literature on the number of displaced workers, there is 
agreement that the best source of data on displaced workers is the 
Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) first conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics as a supplement to the January 1984 Current Population Survey. 
A second DWS data set was made available to researchers in 1986. 
Both data sets are retrospective five-year surveys.
Flaim and Sehgal (1985) provide a benchmark analysis of 1984 DWS 
data. As described in their article, the DWS identifies a total of 13.9 
million workers 20 years of age and older as being separated from their 
jobs over the January 1979 to January 1984 period. The data distinguish 
the following reasons for a job separation: (1) plant or company closed 
down or moved, (2) slack work, (3) position or shift abolished, and
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(4) seasonal causes or other miscellaneous reasons not easily classified. 
Omitting workers on layoff for the fourth of these reasons, the estimated 
population of displaced workers drops to 11.5 million. Of these workers, 
Flaim and Sehgal note that a large proportion had been employed on 
their jobs for a relatively short time before they were laid off. Using 
three years of tenure as the cutoff point to distinguish displaced from 
other laid-off workers, the population of displaced workers falls to 5.1 
million. It is worth noting that the number of displaced workers is quite 
sensitive to the specified years of tenure. A more liberal cutoff of two 
years would raise the count to 6.9 million, while a five-year cutoff would 
lower the estimate of displaced workers to 3.2 million.
Focusing on the Flaim-Sehgal estimate of 5.1 million displaced 
workers, table 1.1 identifies a number of the characteristics of these 
individuals. Displaced workers are seen to be primarily prime-age males 
who lost blue-collar jobs in manufacturing, especially durable goods 
manufacturing. Almost half of the 5.1 million reported that they lost 
their jobs because their plant or business closed or moved. An interesting 
finding is the number of workers who reported that they were not caught 
by surprise when they received notice of layoff. About 56 percent of 
all displaced workers indicated that they had received advance notice 
of their dismissal, or that they had expected it. Nevertheless, only about 
11 percent of these workers left their employer before their job ended.
Table 1.1 also shows that more than two-thirds of the displaced 
workers drew UI benefits sometime during the five-year period covered 
by the survey, and that nearly half of the UI recipients were unemployed 
long enough to have exhausted their eligibility for benefits. Podgursky 
and Swaim (1987c) perform an econometric analysis of the duration 
of joblessness of DWS respondents displaced from full-time 
nonagricultural jobs between 1979 and 1981. Their results indicate that 
although nearly half of these workers found jobs within 14 weeks of 
displacement, there is a high risk that a displaced worker will experience 
a protracted period of joblessness. Especially noteworthy is their estimate 
that the probability an average male blue-collar worker displaced from 
his job would be jobless for more than one year exceeds 0.3.
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SOURCE: Flaim and Sehgal (1985).
a. Subtotals may not sum to total.
b. Subtotals refer only to respondents who worked full-time in their lost job.
c. Includes only displaced full-time workers reemployed in full-time wage and salary jobs
(N=2,045).
d. Percentages calculated in relation to number of respondents in each category who were covered
by group health insurance on their lost job.
What was the labor market status of displaced workers at the end 
of the survey period? Table 1.1 indicates that 60 percent were 
reemployed as of January 1984, while about 26 percent were still 
unemployed and 14 percent had dropped out of the labor force (mainly 
into retirement). Focusing on the 3.1 million workers who were 
reemployed, about 2.8 million were full-time employees in their 
predisplacement jobs. Of these, about 80 percent were again employed 
full time at the end of the survey period, while 12 percent were holding 
part-time jobs and 8 percent were found in other types of employment 
(mainly self-employment).
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Flaim and Sehgal point out that there are important differences by 
age, sex, and race in the proportions of displaced workers reemployed. 
In general, the younger the workers, the more likely they were to have 
obtained new jobs. Furthermore, displaced women were less likely than 
displaced men to have returned to work and were far more likely to 
have left the labor force. Finally, the proportions of black and Hispanic 
displaced workers reemployed (41.8 percent and 52.2 percent, respec 
tively) were considerably lower than the proportion of whites (62.6 
percent).
Another key finding concerns the number of displaced workers who 
moved to a new occupation or industry to obtain reemployment (not 
shown in table 1.1). Flaim and Sehgal (1985:10) point out, for exam 
ple, that of the 980,000 reemployed workers who had lost jobs in durable 
goods manufacturing, only about 40 percent obtained reemployment 
in the same industry. Similarly, only about 35 percent of 493,000 workers 
were reemployed in nondurable goods manufacturing. Despite this 
evidence of substantial interindustry mobility, it is interesting to note 
that only a small minority of the 5.1 million displaced workers (680,000 
individuals) moved to a different city or county to look for work or 
to take a new job.
The predisplacement and postdisplacement comparison of weekly earn 
ings shown in table 1.1 provides additional information on the economic 
well-being of displaced workers who obtained new jobs by the end of 
the survey period. The table indicates considerable dispersion in relative 
earnings for workers reemployed in full-time wage and salary jobs, with 
30 percent of workers suffering an earnings loss of 20 percent or more 
and another 26 percent of workers enjoying an increase in earnings in 
excess of 20 percent. In total, about 54 percent of reemployed workers 
landed on their feet in the sense that their new earnings equalled or ex 
ceeded their old earnings. This percentage is likely to be on the high 
side, however, since predisplacement earnings are not adjusted for the 
effects of inflation and increased labor productivity to make them com 
parable to postdisplacement earnings. It is almost a certainty, in addi 
tion, that displaced full-time workers who are reemployed in part-time 
jobs will suffer a sizable drop in earnings. Considering the situation 
of reemployed part-time as well as full-time workers, it appears
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reasonable to conclude that about one-half of the displaced workers 
reemployed in January 1984 were earning less than in their former jobs. 3 
Also worth noting is the finding that nearly one-quarter of reemployed 
workers failed to regain the group health insurance coverage they en 
joyed on their lost job.
During the fall of 1986, a second survey of displaced workers was 
released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As described by Horvath 
(1987), use of the Flaim-Sehgal criteria for distinguishing displaced 
workers from other laid-off workers resulted in exactly the same count 
of 5.1 million displaced individuals for the January 1981 to January 
1986 period as for the 1979-84 period. Most of the conclusions drawn 
for the earlier period also hold for 1981-86. In particular, about half 
of the displaced workers had lost jobs in manufacturing, mostly in 
durable goods manufacturing; and about 55 percent reported that the 
reason for their job loss was a plant closing or business failure. As in 
the earlier period, the largest concentration of displaced workers was 
found in the heavily industrialized states of the Upper Midwest. More 
than half of those reemployed changed their broadly defined occupation.
The cyclical upswing in the economy during 1984-86 resulted in a 
higher reemployment rate of about 67 percent in 1986 compared to 60 
percent in 1984, and a lower unemployment rate of 18 percent as com 
pared to 26 percent in the earlier year. Nevertheless, the 1986 DWS 
indicates that there was little improvement in the proportion of displac 
ed workers who were obliged to take a pay cut upon reemployment. 
For 1984, table 1.1 indicates that 46.1 percent of individuals working 
full time in both their predisplacement and postdisplacement jobs suf 
fered a loss in earnings. The same statistic for 1986 is 44.1 percent. 
Over both five-year periods, about 30 percent of those reemployed in 
full-time wage and salary jobs suffered pay cuts of 20 percent or more. 
Levels of reemployment among older workers were still relatively low; 
in addition, reemployment rates for women, blacks, and Hispanics con 
tinued to fall considerably short of those for white males.
Should Displaced Workers Receive Special Assistance?
The very real possibility of large expected losses when a displaced 
worker suffers an extended period of unemployment or cannot find a
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new job offering a wage comparable to that earned earlier raises the 
issue of whether special assistance should be provided these individuals. 
The literature focuses on two reasons to explain why a displaced worker 
may suffer a substantial economic loss: 4
1. The worker received an economic rent (i.e., a wage that is higher 
than his or her best alternative wage) on the last job. An example is 
the situation facing a worker displaced from a unionized job whose subse 
quent job is nonunion.
2. The worker invested in specific training on the last job in the ex 
pectation of a longer payout period than in fact occurred.
Concerning the first, there appears to be little justification for pro 
viding special assistance to workers who previously received above- 
equilibrium wages because they were sheltered from competition from 
other workers. The one argument supporting assistance in this case is 
that compensation may be needed to buy off politically powerful in 
terests that would otherwise block socially desirable policies. A leading 
example of such a compensation scheme is the creation of the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program in 1962 as a quid pro quo to organized 
labor in exchange for its acquiescence to trade liberalization (see Baldwin 
1987).
The more important justification for special assistance to displaced 
workers is as a response to the loss of firm-specific human capital. Such 
specific skills include knowledge about the firm©s operating procedures, 
the specialized products it produces, and its production and marketing 
arrangements. Although lost specific human capital cannot be replac 
ed, assistance can still be justified in terms of both equity and economic 
efficiency. The equity explanation relates to the argument just made 
for compensating workers who have lost jobs which provided economic 
rents. The point is that since the nation as a whole gains from socially 
desirable policies such as free trade and the introduction of labor-saving 
technology, it is reasonable to extend assistance to those groups that 
bear the brunt of the adjustment costs associated with maintaining a 
dynamic, generally open domestic economy. Writing in The Wall Street 
Journal, Bhagwati (1988) argues that
[O]pen markets cannot be sustained politically without in 
stitutions to soften the social impact of dramatic changes
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resulting from foreign trade and investments. If better in 
tegration into the world economy means that large corpora 
tions can leave small communities and that changes in com 
petition can result in social-adjustment problems, political 
prudence if not humanity requires that we help American 
workers cope with the consequences. . . . This is part of the 
grease that must be provided to let the wheel of capitalist 
fortune operate.
As noted in this quotation and emphasized by other authors including 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982, chap. 3), groups affected by social ad 
justment problems include not only displaced workers and their im 
mediate families, but also the communities in which they reside.
The efficiency argument is that if losses due to displacement are un- 
compensated, risk-averse workers and their employers will be discourag 
ed from investing in all forms of firm-specific human capital. The result 
of suboptimal investment in specific training is, in turn, a social loss 
due to an inefficient organization of production.
Hamermesh, Cordes, and Goldfarb (1987) make the further point that 
only workers whose loss of returns to specific training was unanticipated 
should receive special assistance. As they note, demand fluctuations 
occur frequently enough in some industries that periodic layoffs are a 
predictable aspect of employment. Hence job losses are likely to be an 
ticipated by workers and compensated through the market in the form 
of a wage premium for the higher risk of a capital loss. Mass layoffs 
and plant closures, in contrast, are less frequent and thus less predic 
table. In the absence of predictability, job losses are more likely to be 
unanticipated, and workers at risk are less likely to receive compensa 
tion through the market.
The discussion of table 1.1 and the results of the second DWS in 
dicate that job losses associated with plant closings and company reloca 
tions are indeed an important source of displacement, and that the move 
ment between occupations and industries required to locate new jobs 
may well entail sizable losses of specific training. Econometric investiga 
tions of 1984 DWS data by Addison and Portugal (1987a), Madden 
(1988), and Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) provide evidence that a 
change in industry, in particular, entails dramatic decreases in earn-
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ings. Since union coverage is not reported in the DWS, however, it 
is difficult to distinguish whether the decrease in earnings associated 
with interindustry mobility represents loss of economic rents or loss 
of returns to specific human capital. Podgursky and Swaim deal with 
this data problem by merging information on industry unionization rates 
into their DWS sample. Controlling for industry unionization rates on 
the former job, the authors report for blue-collar males reemployed full 
time that a change in three-digit industry depresses earnings by 20 per 
cent relative to the case in which a comparable displaced worker is 
reemployed in the same industry. A second commonly used measure 
of specific training length of tenure on the predisplacement job is 
also found to significantly increase earnings losses for blue-collar males.
Further evidence which helps to distinguish between the economic 
rent and specific human capital explanations is provided in an ingenious 
paper by Hamermesh (1987). Rather than comparing predisplacement 
and postdisplacement earnings, he uses the slope of estimated wage- 
tenure profiles to measure the extent to which plant closings are an 
ticipated by workers. If the profile flattens out as the date of job loss 
approaches, the inference is that informed workers are responding to 
the decrease in expected returns by cutting back their investment in 
specific training.
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics data, Hamermesh©s em 
pirical results indicate that (1) displacement is not typically anticipated 
by workers and (2) earnings losses associated with unanticipated layoffs 
are quite large. Under reasonable assumptions about the real interest 
rate and the rate of depreciation of firm-specific human capital, he 
estimates that the present value of a worker©s share of the lost returns 
on investments in firm-specific training is around $7,000 (in 1980 
dollars). To this estimate must also be added the value of the often 
substantial periods of time displaced workers spend unemployed; the 
value of lost occupation- and industry-specific training; and the value 
of lost fringe benefits, particularly losses of unvested pension benefits 
and group health insurance coverage.
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Major Questions to be Answered
While a case can and is being made that displaced workers are a 
population group deserving of special government assistance, several 
very practical issues immediately arise. What form should this assistance 
take? How should displaced worker programs be designed and put into 
place? Are there side effects of the programs which are unduly costly? 
And how should these programs be funded?
The perspective taken in this study is that state programs to assist 
displaced workers can be viewed as quasi-independent experiments 
whose designs and outcomes potentially offer a wealth of useful infor 
mation to policymakers and labor market analysts. As will be describ 
ed in detail, displaced worker programs range from conventional retrain 
ing and job search assistance programs to such unconventional initiatives 
as reemployment bonuses and unemployed entrepreneur programs. Con 
troversial issues that arise in discussing the operation of these programs 
include "creaming" in the selection of program participants, the wisdom 
of tailoring programs to the specifications of particular employers, and 
the requirement that employers provide advance notice of plant clos 
ings and mass layoffs.
In formulating public policy, however, it is important to move beyond 
describing what has been tried to distilling what can be learned about 
how to best cope with the problems faced by displaced workers. Thus 
this study attempts to provide answers to the following major questions:
1. How do displaced workers differ from other unemployed workers?
2. Which forms of adjustment assistance "work" for displaced 
workers?
3. How should particular adjustment assistance services be provided?
4. What are the best time and place to provide assistance?
5. Is there a role for initiatives designed to keep existing plants open?
6. How should reemployment assistance to displaced workers be 
funded?
Evaluation Framework
An evaluation framework is clearly required to answer these and other 
related questions. Taking account of the twin objectives of raising
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postdisplacement wages and reducing the length of unnecessary delays 
in the reemployment process, the central policy question that must be 
dealt with in program evaluation is whether the stream of earnings 
available to program graduates is enough greater than their earnings 
stream would have been in the absence of the program to justify its 
cost. Ideally, as emphasized by Burtless and Orr (1986), evidence on 
this question would be obtained from a classical experiment in which 
the earnings of graduates are compared to the earnings of a control group, 
and assignment to both groups is made randomly. Random assignment 
is important because its absence is quite likely to mean that estimates 
of net program effects will be biased. (The net effect of a program is 
its effect on an outcome variable net of the change in the outcome variable 
that would have occurred in the program©s absence.) For example, in 
dividuals who choose and are chosen to participate in a training pro 
gram may be more highly motivated and job-ready than nonparticipants. 
If this is the case, a positive bias would be imparted to the estimated 
net program effect because the same unobservable characteristics that 
led to program participation also led to higher earnings. In the absence 
of a controlled experiment with random assignment, the nonexperimental 
approach to program evaluation focuses on differences in outcomes be 
tween program participants and an externally selected comparison group, 
and attempts to adjust statistically for the inherent differences between 
the two groups. 5
Although controlled experiments with random assignment have been 
carried out for a few of the initiatives discussed in this study, informa 
tion on individual program participants that would allow program evalua 
tion of either the experimental or nonexperimental variety is not available 
for most state-funded initiatives. State legislators have generally not 
opted to devote scarce resources to funding the data collection effort 
required to conduct quantitative program evaluation. Rather, the data 
available for individual state programs typically are, at best, such sum 
mary statistics as placement rates, average postprogram earnings, and 
average cost per placement. In the absence of a control group, these 
summary statistics are of limited usefulness. With respect to postprogram 
placement, for example, the real issue is not the absolute level of the 
placement rate of program graduates but rather the placement rate for
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graduates as compared to the rate for a control group whose members 
did not have access to the program.
Given the number and variety of existing state programs and pilot proj 
ects, a three-level evaluation framework involving a mix of available 
quantitative and qualitative evidence is proposed. For any particular 
initiative, the first level is a consideration of existing quantitative evidence 
obtained using data on individual program participants and a control 
group of nonparticipants. A key example of an initiative for which ex 
perimental results are available is the reemployment bonus. The Illinois 
UI experiment and the New Jersey UI reemployment demonstration proj 
ect examine the effectiveness of cash bonuses in speeding up the 
reemployment process.
If data allowing neither an experimental nor a nonexperimental ap 
proach to program evaluation are available (which is usually the case), 
the next level of analysis involves the use of quantitative evidence on 
similar kinds of programs provided by demonstration projects or pilot 
studies. Important sources of this type of evidence are federally-funded 
studies such as the Downriver project carried out over the 1980-83 period 
and the six-site Dislocated Worker Demonstration project conducted 
between October 1982 and September 1983.
If neither of the first two levels of the evaluation strategy can be ap 
plied, the final level is a type of qualitative analysis termed "process 
analysis." Rather than concentrating on program outcomes, process 
analysis focuses on how the program is operating as evaluated by staff 
members, participants, and outside observers. Some of the concerns 
addressed by this level of analysis include program design and implemen 
tation, selection of program participants and the allocation of services 
across participants, and occurrence of fundamental changes in the direc 
tion and funding of the program during its existence.
Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 focuses on state initiatives to upgrade the vocational skills 
of displaced workers through classroom and on-the-job training pro 
grams. Several issues relating to training programs are considered, and 
three state-funded programs are examined in detail. Also briefly discuss-
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ed in this chapter are the efforts of the federal government over the 
past 25 years to improve the reemployment prospects of displaced 
workers.
In addition to classroom and on-the-job training, a third traditional 
type of assistance to displaced workers is designed to enhance job search 
skills. Chapter 3 describes the component services of a broadly defin 
ed job search assistance program and discusses the results from several 
demonstration projects that measure the net impact of this type of 
assistance. Also considered are the reemployment bonus experiments 
and two programs designed to test the effectiveness of more closely 
monitoring the search activity of UI claimants.
In chapter 4 the discussion shifts from different types of adjustment 
assistance initiatives to a consideration of the timing and location of 
program intervention. Specifically examined are (1) state laws requir 
ing advance notification of planned plant closures or mass layoffs, (2) the 
new federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, and 
(3) state-level programs that deliver reemployment services on-site to 
displaced workers. A focal point of the discussion of on-site programs 
is the highly regarded Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service (LAS) 
program.
Chapter 5 includes a consideration of a number of other initiatives 
not yet discussed. These include state programs providing assistance 
to employee groups to save jobs by purchasing facilities that might other 
wise close, enterprise zone proposals, and British and French initiatives 
to assist individual unemployed workers to start up their own small 
businesses. Also discussed in this chapter are several other initiatives 
which are part of the sweeping displaced worker program established 
by Massachusetts© Mature Industries Act.
Chapter 6 pulls together the results of the study by providing answers 
to the six key policy questions posed earlier. The chapter concludes 
with a consideration of what appears to be the best mix of programs 
to meet the needs of displaced workers.
NOTES
1. Using data for the 1968-81 period from the University of Michigan©s Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics, Hamermesh finds that the rate of displacement (where displaced
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workers are defined as those whose plants closed) showed a strong secular increase 
that is independent of the business cycle. Summers examines the rise in what he terms 
the "normal" unemployment rate over the past 20 years. He concludes that most of 
the additional unemployment is concentrated among mature men, job losers, and the 
long-term unemployed. The increased share of married women and young people in 
the labor force is found to have had essentially no effect.
2. Because UI trust funds cannot be used to pay for programs other than income 
maintenance, these state initiatives must be funded by earmarked payroll taxes or general 
state revenues. The funding of the California, Delaware, and Washington programs 
can be viewed as a diversion of UI tax revenues, however, since employers in these 
states had their regular UI payroll tax rates decreased at the same time that the ear 
marked payroll taxes were levied.
3. Flaim and Sehgal (1985:11) also emphasize that those displaced from high-wage 
industries are most likely to suffer a decrease in earnings upon reemployment. Among 
the 980,000 workers displaced from durable goods manufacturing, for example, me 
dian weekly earnings dropped by 21 percent from $344 to $273 in the jobs held in 
January 1984.
4. Madden (1987) considers a third explanation emphasizing that displaced workers 
encounter greater discrimination (or less favoritism) in the general labor market than 
on the last job. Using 1984 DWS data, she presents evidence indicating that women 
suffer a greater loss from displacement than men because sex discrimination in the 
labor market limits the job alternatives available to women.
5. An important controversy in the literature concerns the value of the nonexperimental 
approach to program evaluation. LaLonde (1986) and Fraker and Maynard (1987) pro 
vide evidence showing that nonexperimental strategies involving the selection of com 
parison groups from alternative data sources and the application of available econometric 
techniques fail to replicate experimentally generated results obtained by comparing the 
earnings of randomly assigned treatment and control group members. They therefore 
conclude that randomized experiments are necessary to reliably determine program 
effects. On the other hand, Heckman, Hotz, and Dabos (1987) argue that while in prin 
ciple randomized experiments represent the most desirable approach to program evalua 
tion, the actual implementation of experiments typically creates new forms of sample 





A traditional public policy remedy to prevent long-term unemploy 
ment is retraining either classroom training programs or on-the-job 
training (OJT). The basic presumption of classroom training is that major 
groups of displaced workers lack the transferable skills that would per 
mit them to become reemployed at comparable wages in their local labor 
markets. On the other hand, OJT is appropriate for displaced workers 
who possess the necessary transferable skills and aptitudes to adapt to 
the requirements of new jobs, but who lack firm-specific job skills.
For over 25 years, the federal government has offered vocational train 
ing programs to assist the unemployed to return to work. This chapter 
begins with a brief overview of federal job training programs, emphasiz 
ing those programs intended to provide assistance to displaced workers. 
Drawing on this background information, the next section discusses some 
of the difficult issues that arise in the provision of retraining assistance. 
Then, the operation of three state-funded retraining initiatives is ex 
amined in the context of these issues. The three state initiatives are the 
California Employment Training Panel, the Minnesota Employment and 
Economic Development program, and the Illinois Prairie State 2000 
Authority.
A key policy issue relating to retraining programs is the question of 
whether or not they "work." Since the three state programs examined 
in this chapter were not designed with program evaluation in mind, the 
discussion draws mainly on the type of qualitative analysis described 
in chapter 1 as process analysis. Additional quantitative evidence on 
the effectiveness of retraining displaced workers is, however, available 
from a handful of federally funded demonstration projects. The con 
cluding section of this chapter summarizes the results of the process 
analyses of the state programs considered and introduces some of the
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main findings obtained from relevant demonstration projects. As most 
of these demonstrations involve a comparison of the net impacts of 
classroom training, OJT, and job search assistance programs, the discus 
sion of demonstration project results carries over into the next chapter, 
which deals with job search assistance.
Federally-Funded Programs
The federal government©s first comprehensive attempt to assist displac 
ed workers was the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA). 
Passed in 1962, MDTA represented the response of Congress to a ris 
ing national unemployment rate coupled with a growing concern over 
the effects of automation and technology on the employment options 
of mid-career adult workers. Originally funded at $100 million per year, 
the objective of the program was the retraining of unemployed individuals 
whose skills had been made obsolete by technological advancement. 
Retraining programs took the form of classroom training, OJT, and 
remedial education. By the mid-1960s, an improved labor market and 
lessened concern over automation led to a shift in interest and funding 
away from the employment problems of displaced workers and toward 
the employ ability of disadvantaged young people and welfare recipients. 
MDTA©s emphasis on job training continued throughout the remainder 
of the 1960s and into the early 1970s, however.
In 1973, Congress created the Comprehensive Employment and Train 
ing Act (GETA), which consolidated nine earlier programs including 
MDTA. Two distinct types of programs were funded under CETA. Title 
I provided disadvantaged workers a program mix including classroom 
training, OJT, and "work experience" (subsidized public sector jobs 
emphasizing work habits and skill development). In contrast, Titles II 
and VI offered public service employment (PSE) programs to workers 
who had recently lost jobs in high-unemployment geographic areas. Tide 
n was intended to serve the structurally unemployed, while Title VI 
was strictly a countercyclical job creation program. As unemployment 
rose during the 1970s, CETA expenditures shifted away from Title I 
training programs toward the provision of PSE jobs primarily funded
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under Title VI. PSE programs typically provided little or no formal 
training. Amendments to the CETA legislation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s reduced PSE expenditures and finally eliminated PSE fun 
ding entirely.
Two other features of CETA are worth noting. First, the responsibility 
for running training programs was shifted from the federal government 
to local government units called "prime sponsors." Second, the U.S. 
Department of Labor (USDOL) funded, for the first time, the develop 
ment of a longitudinal data base specifically designed for program evalua 
tion. Baraow (1987) provides a useful survey of results of the major 
CETA evaluation studies.
In addition to MDTA, the other major federal program specifically 
intended to assist displaced workers was the Trade Adjustment Assistance 
(TAA) program. Also created in 1962, the objective of TAA was to 
provide income support and retraining to workers who lost jobs in in 
dustries adversely affected by foreign imports. For the first 12 years 
of the program, only about 35,000 workers received TAA assistance. 
This low rate of program participation reflected the stringent require 
ment that affected workers and firms demonstrate that trade liberaliza 
tion led to increased imports which, in turn, were the major cause of 
reduced domestic sales and lost jobs. Most TAA participants were pro 
vided income maintenance support, with only about 10 percent receiv 
ing training, placement, or relocation assistance.
In 1974, Congress modified TAA requirements, making eligibility 
easier and providing a generous income support package. TAA sup 
port payments were allowed to supplement state UI payments during 
the period of UI eligibility (typically 26 weeks), raising them to a level 
of 70 percent of the previous weekly wage. In addition, benefits at that 
level were allowed to continue for an additional 26 weeks. If the worker 
was in a retraining program when the one-year period ended, moreover, 
TAA support could be continued for up to 26 more weeks. Thus TAA 
provided a maximum of 18 months of income support. With easier 
eligibility and improved benefits, TAA expenditures and the number 
of workers served increased rapidly over the next several years, peak 
ing at $1.6 billion and 532,000 workers, respectively, in fiscal year 
1980. Retraining, however, continued to receive relatively little attention.
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New legislation passed in 1981 reversed the more liberal TAA re 
quirements enacted seven years earlier. Eligibility was tightened, and 
income support was cut back to the level of UI payments (typically 50 
percent of the previous weekly wage), with TAA payments allowed to 
begin only after exhaustion of UI eligibility. Under the new regulations, 
dollar outlays and number of recipients dropped substantially. Authoriza 
tion for TAA lapsed in 1985, but legislation signed by President Reagan 
in April 1986 extended the program to the end of fiscal year 1991. The 
1986 legislation includes a requirement that receipt of allowances is 
conditional on participation in a job search program, and that workers 
are to be encouraged, but not required, to enter a job training program.
The CETA program expired in 1982 with the economy in the trough 
of the deepest recession since the 1930s. Once again, the displacement 
of experienced adult workers became an important national issue. Rather 
than renewing CETA with its emphasis on public service employment, 
Congress enacted a broad new program the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA) intended to train and place workers in private sector jobs. l 
The new law has three major titles. Title II provides training to disad- 
vantaged youth and adults and summer jobs to disadvantaged youth. 
Tide ffl funds training and other services for displaced workers. Under 
these two titles, federal dollars are allocated to the states, and the states 
are responsible for program design and implementation. 2 Finally, Ti 
tle IV authorizes programs that are directly administered by the USDOL. 
These include training programs for native Americans, seasonal and 
migrant workers, and veterans. Federal appropriations from July 1984 
to June 1985 for Titles II, HI, and IV were, respectively, $2.7 billion, 
$221 million, and $800 million. By way of contrast, the budget for CETA 
in its peak year exceeded $9 billion.
Titles H and m of JTPA differ from CETA and earlier federal pro 
grams in several important respects:
1. JTPA puts strict limits on the share of funds that can be used to 
provide income maintenance for trainees. As noted, the TAA program 
provided very liberal income maintenance allowances to eligible 
unemployed workers. Similarly, the Office of Technology Assessment 
(1986:171) mentions that CETA was criticized for providing training
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allowances that were higher than the wages trainees could earn in paid 
employment.
2. JTPA makes the direction of training programs the responsibility 
of state governors. Under Title n, federal funding to the states is 
reallocated by the governors to local units called "service delivery 
areas." With respect to Title HI, governors more often have kept con 
trol over JTPA expenditures by designating an existing state agency 
to deliver services statewide or by appointing a state official to choose 
contract operators through competitive bidding. State control of JTPA 
programs allows for the possibility of substantial variation in the range 
and mix of services provided in response to interstate differences in 
economic conditions and the specific needs of the displaced worker 
population. Under CETA, in contrast, local prime sponsors reported 
directly to the USDOL.
One other significant organizational difference from earlier programs 
is that JTPA gives the business community, in the form of Private In 
dustry Councils, an important share of the responsibility for designing 
and administering local programs. Each service delivery area is required 
to appoint a Private Industry Council.
3. JTPA requires each governor to issue performance standards for 
evaluating job training programs in the state. These performance stan 
dards may include financial awards to programs that exceed placement 
and participant cost criteria and sanctions against programs that fail to 
meet the standards.
Congress slashed the fiscal 1986 budget for the Title m of JTPA to 
about $96 million from $223 million in fiscal 1985. Title ffl funding 
for fiscal 1987 then rebounded to about $200 million. For fiscal 1988, 
President Reagan proposed a comprehensive program that would com 
bine Title ffl with other dislocated worker programs including TAA. 
Under the new program, funding to provide displaced workers with 
retraining, job search assistance, and other forms of adjustment aid would 
nearly triple to $980 million from $344 million in fiscal year 1987. The 
Reagan proposal follows closely the recommendations of the Secretary 
of Labor©s Task Force report (1986). As mentioned in chapter 1, the 
new program is now law as part of the Omnibus Trade and Com 
petitiveness Act of 1988.
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Issues in Providing Retraining Assistance
The 25 years of experience with federally-funded training programs 
has raised a number of issues to be considered in evaluating state-level 
initiatives. This section explores several of these issues before proceeding 
to a description of particular state programs.
What Is the Appropriate Mix of Services 
for Displaced Workers?
Although displaced workers are by definition experienced adult 
workers, their reemployment assistance needs are likely to vary wide 
ly, reflecting differences in transferable skills and aptitudes and in local 
labor market conditions. Critics of JTPA suggest that Title in perfor 
mance standards and the influence of the business community through 
Private Industry Councils may skew the mix of services offered to 
displaced workers. In particular, Title HI program planners may pay 
too much attention to short-term placement rates and per participant 
program costs and too little attention to the longer-term objective of 
increasing participants© human capital.
To get a feel for the placement rates and per participant costs associated 
with various services, table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the six 
sites of the national Dislocated Worker Demonstration project. This 
federally-funded project was specifically intended to assess the effec 
tiveness of alternative approaches to reemploying displaced workers. 
Across the six sites, over 10,000 workers enrolled in classroom train 
ing, OJT, and job search assistance programs. Corson, Maynard, and 
Wichita (1984:17) summarize the cost figures shown in the table, noting 
that for planning purposes average cost per participant ranges from about 
$400 to $1,000 for job search assistance, between $1,000 and $2,400 
for OJT, and between $800 and $3,500 for classroom training.
Using the kind of information shown in table 2.1, JTPA critics sug 
gest that inexpensive job search assistance will tend to be overemphasized 
while classroom vocational training will be underutilized because of 
its higher cost and lower immediate impact on placement rates. Similarly, 
remedial education programs would also be expected to be underutiliz 
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JTPA Title in programs by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(1987a:46-47) reports that nearly all participants received sorne^jbrm 
of job search assistance, while about 26 percent of participants receiv 
ed classroom training. Only 6 percent of participants were provided 
remedial training, and such remedial training programs that were 
available averaged just two weeks in length. By way of contrast, the 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report (1986:179) points out 
that a substantial minority of displaced workers 20 percent or more 
in some projects are handicapped in finding new jobs because of serious 
deficiencies in basic reading and math skills.
While OJT programs tend to be more expensive than job search 
assistance, the virtual guarantee of immediate placement may also lead 
to an overutilization of OJT. Guaranteed placement occurs because the 
subsidy to employers providing training is typically contingent on the 
retention of trained workers for a period of 30 to 90 days.
How Are Program Participants to be Selected?
The same pressures on JTPA program planners to achieve high place 
ment rates and low costs are also likely to affect their decisions in select 
ing trainees. The danger is that displaced workers most likely to be 
selected into training programs are those least in need of skill 
enhancement a problem commonly known as "creaming." While some 
level of basic education and aptitude is necessary for retraining to be 
worthwhile, a case can be made that it is displaced workers at the low 
end of the skill distribution who should be first in line for access to 
retraining programs (see, for example, Blumenthal 1987). The U.S. 
General Accounting Office (1987a:39-45) reports that both older and 
less educated displaced workers are underrepresented in Title III pro 
grams. Using 1984 DWS data, only 8 percent of Title HI enrollees were 
found to be 55 years of age or older, as compared to 20 percent of the 
displaced worker population. Similarly, 32 percent of all displaced 
workers had less than a high school education, whereas only 22 per 
cent of Title HI participants fell into this schooling category.
Another issue involving participant selection is income suppport for 
trainees. Since JTPA regulations discourage the provision of living
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allowances for trainees, the basic 26 weeks of UI is usually an essen 
tial part of the income-support package. The UI constraint has two ef 
fects on program operators. First, they are forced to set up worthwhile 
training programs that do not exceed the six months of benefits. This 
means that classroom training courses may have to be truncated or com 
pressed in length to conform to the benefit period. Second, program 
operators are under some pressure to select program participants early 
in their period of UI eligibility to avoid foreclosing classroom training 
as an option to unemployed workers who have no other means of finan 
cial support. 3
Forecasting Occupational Demand in Selecting Curricula
With reference to classroom vocational training, one of the most dif 
ficult tasks in the retraining process is to accurately forecast the oc 
cupational demand for labor so that curricula can be selected which sup 
ply marketable skills. Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984:30-38) 
provide a detailed discussion of the steps taken in the Downriver 
demonstration project to identify growth occupations and develop ap 
propriate retraining programs. Most observers, however, question the 
usefulness of attempts to forecast occupational skill requirements. The 
OTA report (1986:201) notes that in many states good information, even 
about current openings in local labor markets, is unavailable.
Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984:16) also remark on this issue, 
drawing on the experience gained from the Dislocated Worker 
Demonstration project. They note that despite attempts to base course 
selection on area labor market data, many successful program graduates 
were unable to locate training-related jobs. Similarly, the report of the 
National Academy of Sciences© Panel on Technology and Employment 
concludes that there is little if any need for additional investment in 
forecasting occupational demand (see Cyert and Mowery 1987:142-43). 
In support of its conclusion, the Panel points to (1) the flexibility of 
the highly decentralized U.S. training system and (2) the low reliabili 
ty of existing manpower forecasting models. Concerning the second 
point, the Panel notes that current forecasting models are weak 
methodologically and provide forecasts of a high degree of uncertainty.
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JTPA©s performance standards requirement allows program planners 
to shift to training vendors much of the burden of making sure that 
trainees acquire marketable skills. This shifting is accomplished through 
performance-based contracts. The initial decision on courses for 
classroom training is typically made by project planners with the ap 
proval of local Private Industry Councils. Then the training contract 
is put out for bids with the proviso that the training vendor must meet 
JTPA performance standards. Contracts often include the following types 
of performance standards:
1. A 75 percent placement rate for program graduates in full-time 
jobs, with all but 10 percent of the jobs being training-related.
2. A starting wage no lower than $4 to $5 per hour.
3. Retention of graduates on the job for at least 30 days. 
Typical contracts require that these provisions be met before the train 
ing contractor is entitled to receive full payment.
The OTA report (1986:253) notes that reliance on performance-based 
contracting in JTPA programs appears to be growing. In a recent OTA 
telephone survey described in the report, about half of the states respond 
ing indicated that they make use of such contracts in their Title III pro 
grams, and 11 states indicated that they use them predominantly.
Should Employers be Paid to Provide Training?
JTPA regulations permit training contractors to be involved in select 
ing program participants and shaping curricula. Since contractors may 
be and often are private business firms, a creaming-related issue is 
whether public funds should be used to pay for training workers whom 
employers would have hired and trained anyway at their own expense. 
If this form of creaming should occur, the training program simply pro 
vides a windfall transfer from taxpayers to employers with no net benefit 
for targeted workers.
The employer windfall issue is put into even sharper focus when, 
as is often the case, the training contractors are large, profitable firms. 
In this situation, Blumenthal (1987) notes that some of JTPA©s harshest 
critics label it "welfare for corporations."
Vocational Training Programs 29 
State-Funded Training Programs
The recent USGAO report (1987a:2) points out that through June 1986 
JTPA Title HI programs assisted, at most, 7 percent of the estimated 
number of eligible displaced workers. This difference between perceived 
need and available federally-funded services represents a market niche 
that the states are attempting to fill. In his survey of state-funded train 
ing programs, Stevens (1986) reports that only six states do not com 
mit funds to subsidize state initiatives offering classroom training or OJT.
State programs differ, in general, from comparable JTPA programs 
in at least the following two respects:
1. State programs are not exclusively targeted to specific groups such 
as displaced or disadvantaged workers. Rather, training is often made 
available to currently employed workers in order to avoid layoffs and 
plant closures.
2. Training is usually tailored to the needs of individual employers. 
This means that state training initiatives are viewed more as a tool for 
economic development than as an investment in human capital. That 
is, training programs have the demand-side objective of creating jobs 
as well as the traditional supply-side objective of raising the level of 
workers© skills to enable them to qualify for existing jobs.
Rather than attempting to provide a survey of all state-funded train 
ing programs along the lines of that furnished by Stevens (1986), this 
section focuses on the programs provided by three states. California©s 
innovative program is selected because it is the largest and undoubted 
ly the best known state initiative. Even though it is not explicitly designed 
to upgrade workers© skills, Minnesota©s program is considered next 
because it offers an interesting contrast to California in terms of both 
the type of subsidy and the characteristics of the population served. Final 
ly, the training programs provided by Illinois are examined for three 
reasons. The first is the comprehensive nature of the state©s approach 
to retraining, and the second is the use made of the state©s existing educa 
tional infrastructure. Third, Illinois© Prairie State 2000 Authority is an 
interesting example of the recent emphasis of many industrial states on 
retaining rather than creating jobs.
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California©s Employment Training Panel (ETP)4
Begun in January 1983, California©s ETP involves funding of $55 
million per year to be used for retraining the following categories of 
workers:
1. Those who are unemployed and collecting UI benefits.
2. Former UI recipients who exhausted their UI eligibility within the 
past 12 months and are still unemployed.
3. Those who are currently employed but are likely to be laid off
and claim UI benefits.
To qualify workers for retraining while still employed, employers must 
certify that in the absence of retraining, employees will be laid off and 
replaced by other workers who already possess the necessary skills.
The explicit objective of the Panel is to provide access to retraining 
for experienced workers who have been or are likely to be displaced 
from their jobs. In meeting this objective, one of the Panel©s statutory 
responsibilities is to minimize the cost of UI by putting current reci 
pients and exhaustees back to work and by preventing unemployment 
through retraining before workers are laid off. A second statutory respon 
sibility is to foster economic development by helping to provide Califor 
nia employers with a skilled workforce.
Selection of program participants, curricula, and providers. To 
understand ETP©s approach to retraining, it is essential to recognize 
at the outset that the program is almost entirely employer-driven. Train 
ing projects are typically initiated by a telephone call from an employer 
to one of ETP©s regional offices. There are no application forms to fill 
out. A meeting usually follows in which representatives of the com 
pany and Panel staff members discuss an outline of the retraining proj 
ect. The project will not be approved unless a specific employer has 
established a need for the program.
Retraining programs funded by ETP may be classroom training or 
OJT; 5 and the provider of the program may be either the employer re 
questing the training or an independent training institution such as a 
public or private school, a joint labor-management apprenticeship com 
mittee, or an employer association. Regardless of the provider, the 
employer selects trainees according to its own specifications (subject
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to the eligibility conditions listed above). Similarly, the employer sets 
the standards for successful program completion, and it must approve 
the training curricula if an outside training agency is used. In return 
for this discretion in all aspects of the retraining process, participating 
employers must make a good-faith commitment to hire or retain pro 
gram graduates.
Following a meeting with the interested employer, ETP staff members 
develop an outline of the project which is submitted to the seven-member 
Panel for review. Representatives of the employer and the training pro 
vider (if the employer does not provide the training) appear at that 
meeting to explain the project. Once the outline is approved, the staff 
prepares a formal agreement for the Panel©s approval at its next meeting. 
The formal agreement includes a negotiated fixed fee per trainee, and 
all contracting is done directly with employers or training agencies. 6 
The Panel takes pride in noting that its staff, not the employer, does 
the paperwork, and that when speed is important the project outline 
and a formal agreement can be approved within a time period as short 
as one month.
Performance-based contracting. The previous section described the 
use of performance-based contracts in JTPA Title in programs, and 
noted that about half of the states enter into such contracts with train 
ing vendors. ETP©s enabling legislation specifies an even higher level 
of accountability by requiring that all contracts between the Panel and 
employers and training agencies be performance-based. Moreover, a 
stringent definition of performance is applied. The full negotiated pay 
ment per person is withheld until trainees have completed their train 
ing programs, are placed in training-related jobs at wage rates stipulated 
in the contract, and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days. In 
practice, training projects are typically not approved for jobs with start 
ing wages of less than $5.00 per hour. Moreover, the jobs for which 
workers are trained must be good jobs in the sense that they offer long- 
term employment security and career potential. With respect to the 
withholding of full payment to contractors, only for nonprofit organiza 
tions is an exception made by allowing some advance and progress 
payments. For these organizations, 25 percent of the full payment is
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withheld until after the 90-day period. If all the trainees covered by 
the contract do not complete the 90-day employment period, the funds 
received for their training must be repaid to the Panel.
Summary statistics provided for the first four and one-half years of 
ETP are shown in table 2.2. Average cost per trainee on all projects 
($2,515) is within the ranges noted earlier in connection with table 2.1 
for classroom training and OJT. Also shown in table 2.2 are the same 
statistics broken down by target group. It is interesting to note that 
relative to programs that train only potentially displaced workers, pro 
grams that focus on the unemployed tend to have a higher average cost 
per trainee, a longer length of training, and a lower post-training wage. 
The 32 percent higher cost of training a new employee as opposed to 
retraining a current employee provides support for the Panel©s philosophy 
of attempting to provide training prior to layoffs.
Table 2.2 
Summary Statistics for the ETP Program, June 30, 1987
Type of Percentage Avg. cost/ Post-training Avg. hours 
project of projects trainee8 wageb of training
All projects





















SOURCE: ETP (1987, tables HI-D and III-E).
a. Cost is for trainees hired in training-related jobs and retained in those jobs for 90 days, 
b. Post-training wage for projects for which final billing and placement information is available. 
For other projects, wage is minimum stated in contract.
Placement rate information is also available as of June 30, 1986. Ap 
proximately 77 percent of all trainees successfully completed their train 
ing, and 83 percent of program graduates were placed in training-related 
jobs and were retained in those jobs for at least 90 days at a wage 
specified in the contract. Almost 94 percent of graduates found
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employment of some kind. These placement rates compare very 
favorably with those reported in table 2.1, although the absence of a 
control group and the possibility of creaming in the participant-selection 
process make comparisons of placement rates rather dubious.
Performance-based contracting was also used in the Buffalo and 
Alameda dislocated worker demonstration projects. While noting that 
this form of contracting has the advantage of increasing the likelihood 
of placement in training-related jobs, Corson, Maynard, and Wichita 
(1984:143-47) caution that contracting agencies should be prepared to 
assume several additional burdens. First, contract negotiators need to 
possess a detailed knowledge of specific costs in order to negotiate suc 
cessfully. Second, the agency must have the capacity to monitor con 
tractor processes and program outcomes. Third, the fixed costs of con 
tract negotiation and monitoring should not be underestimated. In cases 
of inadequate contractor performance, finally, the agency, as an obliga 
tion to participants, may have to provide the promised services.
Funding. A unique feature of ETP is its funding mechanism. As noted 
in chapter 1, federal law prohibits states from using UI trust funds to 
pay directly the costs of training. To fund ETP, the California legislature 
therefore created a separate Employment Training Fund financed by 
a 0.1 percent payroll tax assessed on all employers with a positive reserve 
in their UI account. At the same time, California employers had their 
regular UI tax rates reduced by 0.1 percent. The funding of ETP can 
thus be viewed as a diversion of a small part of regular UI tax revenues 
to finance training and economic development. California was and con 
tinues to be in a favorable position to carry out this diversion because 
of a surplus in its UI trust fund. State law limits the amount of funds 
that can be placed in the Employment Training Fund to $55 million 
per year. Any remaining funds are deposited in the state©s UI trust fund.
Since 1983, two states Delaware and Washington have followed 
California©s example in establishing separate training and economic 
development funds financed by an employer payroll tax. 7 Delaware©s 
experience differed from that of California, however, in that Delaware 
was initially deeply in debt to the federal UI loan fund. During the ear 
ly 1980s, a federally imposed 0.6 percent penalty tax was levied on
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Delaware employers to repay the state©s trust fund indebtedness. When 
the debt was retired in 1984, employers received a 0.5 percent (rather 
than 0.6 percent) payroll tax reduction, with the incremental 0.1 per 
cent dedicated to financing training and economic development pro 
grams. Revenues from the tax totaled $1.5 million in 1985. Twenty- 
five percent of the funds raised is for services contracted out through 
the Delaware Development Office, and the other 75 percent is used by 
Delaware©s Private Industry Council to supplement its JTPA funds. The 
state©s training program is directed toward the counseling, retraining, 
and placement of actively employed workers as well as displaced 
workers. 8
The Claimant Placement Project approved by the Washington state 
legislature in 1985 as a two-year pilot project provides intensive job 
search assistance to UI claimants judged to be readily employable. The 
$4.6 million allocated to the pilot project (the program was scheduled 
to end on July 1, 1987) was obtained by diverting funds from the state©s 
UI trust fund. Specifically, an earmarked tax of 0.02 percent was im 
posed on employer payrolls, with an offsetting reduction in UI tax rates 
of 0.02 percent for most employers. Like California, Washington was 
in a position to utilize the diversion approach to financing the new pro 
gram because of a small UI trust fund surplus of $264 million (about 
1 percent of the state©s total wage bill). As will be described in more 
detail in chapter 3, a bill passed by the legislature in the spring of 1987 
makes the Claimant Placement Project a permanent state program with 
funding provided by an earmarked 0.02 percent payroll tax.
Evaluation studies. The ETP program differs from the other state- 
funded programs described here in that it has been subjected to evalua 
tion by outside agencies. In the first of these evaluation studies, the 
accounting firm of Arthur Young (1985) provides a descriptive analysis 
of the operation of the program through January 1985. Among the 
positive aspects noted in this study is ETP©s flexibility and quick response 
time in meeting employers© requests and its high placement rate for pro 
gram graduates. The study also comments favorably on the Panel©s role 
in reducing UI costs and in encouraging employers to locate and ex 
pand in California.
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The recommendations for improvement suggested in the Arthur Young 
study largely represent a fine-tuning of the Panel©s operation and policies. 
These recommendations include the following:
1. The need for an improved information system for tracking the 
employment status of trainees.
2. The suggestion that the Panel establish program goals and priorities 
in making longer-term decisions about training programs.
3. The suggestion that the Panel review policies for determining 
whether workers are likely to be displaced and for calculating the 
fixed fee prices paid to contractors.
4. A need to review the appropriateness of Panel policies with regard 
to required minimum wages following the completion of training.
The second evaluation study is a quantitative analysis carried out by 
the Training Research Corporation (see Moore, Wilms, and Bolus 1988). 
Using data for 3,913 trainees enrolled in ETP programs between January 
1, 1983 and December 31, 1985, this study investigates the impact of 
ETP on participants© annual earnings, their annual weeks of unemploy 
ment, and total UI payments. The analysis shows that, on average, an 
nual earnings of unemployed workers who successfully completed the 
program increased by 76 percent from $9,628 to $16,912. In addition, 
their average annual weeks of unemployment fell by 56 percent from 
6.2 weeks to 2.7 weeks.
These striking results should be viewed as preliminary in at least two 
respects. First, as noted in the Training Research Corporation report, 
there is no control group of nonparticipants against which to compare 
the record of ETP participants. Thus, for example, growth in the Califor 
nia economy over the period examined might have resulted in similar 
gains in earnings and decreases in unemployment for nonparticipants. 
Second, human capital theory leads to the expectation that a successful 
training program will result in higher wages for trainees. If the higher 
annual earnings are the result of lower unemployment or increased ac 
cess to stable employment, however, the program©s effect may have 
been to increase job search proficiency rather than to increase training- 
related skills. In this case, the benefits to society are less than the private 
benefits, since ETP participants may simply have taken jobs that other 
wise would have gone to other workers. It is nevertheless interesting
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to note that ETP participants who were employed but potentially sub 
ject to displacement also experienced a sizable 27 percent increase in 
earnings.
ETP can also be examined in terms of the four issues raised earlier 
in this chapter in connection with federally-funded training programs. 
To briefly recapitulate, these issues involve (1) the appropriate mix of 
services, (2) selection of program participants, (3) forecasting occupa 
tional demand in selecting program curricula, and (4) subsidizing the 
training expenses of private employers. The strength of the ETP ap 
proach to retraining is that decisions on service mix and curricula are 
made by the market, not by program planners. As has been emphasiz 
ed, a training program will not receive Panel approval unless a specific 
employer has asked for the program and committed itself to hiring pro 
gram graduates. Entirely bypassed, therefore, is the problem that workers 
will be trained in skills that are no longer demanded by employers. In 
this connection, one of the recommendations in the Arthur Young report 
(1985:34) appears to miss the mark. The recommendation is that the 
Panel should use labor market data to set occupational and industry goals 
and priorities to be sure that program funds are spent in areas that will 
further the economic development of the state. One of the main advan 
tages of the ETP approach is that such forecasting is unnecessary. 9
Potential concerns about the program involve the issues of partici 
pant selection and subsidization of employers. With respect to the first 
issue, there is little question that adherence to a performance-based con 
tracting system of compensating training agents encourages creaming 
in the recruiting and selection of program participants. One piece of 
evidence suggesting that creaming does in fact occur is the Panel©s own 
finding that only 17 percent of Panel trainees had failed to complete 
at least 12 years of schooling (ETP 1987). The same statistic for the 
state©s labor force as a whole is 27 percent. The report also points out 
that 23 percent of trainees were women, compared to a workforce that 
is 43 percent female. Blacks and Hispanics, nevertheless, are over- 
represented among ETP trainees. In its early evaluation of ETP, the 
Arthur Young report (1985) also observes that the intensive screening 
of participants in entry-level programs contributed to what was viewed 
as the slow start-up of many ETP programs.
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Moreover, ETP increasingly appears to be subsidizing training by 
employers of their current workforces as opposed to supplying train 
ing to unemployed workers. One reason, as noted in the study by the 
National Academy of Sciences© Panel, is that the requirement that 
trainees be placed in jobs for 90 days prior to payment to the training 
provider discourages many potential external providers, such as com 
munity colleges, from participating in the program (see Cyert and 
Mowery 1987:152). A consequence of the increasing retraining of the 
employed is that ETP may be substituting public funds for the training 
investments that employers would have made in the program©s absence. 
This implies that there is little net increase in the delivery of training 
services to workers actually displaced from their jobs.
On the further assumption that large firms are better able to fund 
retraining than small firms, the following evidence on the size distribution 
























Firm size in this table is measured by number of employees. It is clear 
that ETP trainees are underrepresented in the workforces of small 
employers and overrepresented in the workforces of quite large 
employers.
In defense of ETP, at least three points may be brought out in con 
nection with these concerns. First, it should be noted that a minimum 
level of general training is probably required before an individual can 
benefit from more specialized training, and ETP is specifically prohibited 
from offering remedial education. The continued active involvement
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of employers is likely to be conditional on a high degree of assurance 
that program graduates will be able to perform successfully in the jobs 
they have been trained for without the need for supplemental OJT.
Second, the year 1987 marked an important transition for ETP in that, 
for the first time, employers© demand for training assistance exceeded 
the supply of available funds forcing the rationing of funds among pro 
spective contractors. This excess-demand situation has led the Panel 
to impose certain priorities on its basic system of responding to the 
market demand for training. In particular, the list of Panel priorities 
includes expedited consideration given to proposals in which special 
employment opportunities are offered to minorities, women, the disabled, 
and veterans and to proposals which promise assistance to persons 
already laid off or in danger of layoff due to plant closures or perma 
nent mass layoffs. In addition, the Panel has committed itself to targeting 
approximately 30 percent of its funds for projects retraining the 
unemployed; and it is conducting a special marketing outreach to small 
businesses and minority- and female-owned enterprises.
Finally and most fundamentally, ETP should be properly viewed as 
an economic devleopment program to assist both employers and workers 
as opposed to a jobs program to assist disadvantaged workers. From 
this perspective, a major goal of the program is to provide employers 
with an incentive to modernize plants and avoid layoffs by subsidizing 
the costs of retraining existing employees. With respect to subsidizing 
the training expenses of large employers, it should be pointed out that 
large firms provide jobs that pay high wages and offer career potential  
that is, the kinds of jobs that are mandated by ETP©s enabling legisla 
tion. Since ETP is funded by what amounts to a portion of the UI payroll 
tax, moreover, political support for the program is strengthened if every 
employer who pays UI taxes, regardless of size, is permitted to benefit. 
In this regard, a BusinessWeek (1985) article quotes a Bank of America 
official as stating that an ETP-funded training program allowed the bank 
a return on its UI tax payments that it would otherwise not have receiv 
ed because of its negligible layoff rate. 10 As will be described in the 
next section, Minnesota©s MEED program takes the opposite approach 
of giving small employers priority in program participation.
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The Minnesota Employment and Economic 
Development (MEED) Wage-Subsidy Program
MEED design and implementation. Originally titled the Minnesota 
Emergency Employment Development Program, MEED was created 
under circumstances quite different from the ETP program. In the case 
of ETP, California officials were required by statute to lower their UI 
payroll tax rate because of the large UI trust fund surplus that had ac 
cumulated. Resources were thus made available to initiate a new pro 
gram at no additional cost to state taxpayers. In contrast, MEED was 
created in 1983 by a Minnesota state legislature faced with double-digit 
unemployment rates coupled with a high percentage of unemployed 
workers who had exhausted their UI eligibility. The legislature©s response 
in MEED was a two-year program designed to create temporary jobs 
in the public sector and permanent jobs in the private sector. The pro 
gram was initially funded at a hefty $70 million for the July 1983-June 
1985 biennium using general tax revenues.
As originally conceived, MEED was fundamentally an emergency 
job creation program, with at least 60 percent of the created jobs ex 
pected to be in the public sector. The focus on public sector job crea 
tion was due to the legislature©s initial skepticism about the willingness 
of private sector employers to participate in MEED. As the program 
evolved, however, greater than expected participation of private sec 
tor employers led to a reversal in job placement objectives. By the se 
cond year of the program, 60 percent of jobs were designated to be 
in the private sector (a 70 percent private sector placement rate was 
actually achieved); and an additional $30 million was appropriated by 
the legislature. MEED was made a permanent program in 1985. Cur 
rently, a minimum of 75 percent of jobs created must be in the private 
sector; 11 and $27 million was appropriated for MEED for the biennium 
ending June 30, 1987. It is worth emphasizing that Minnesota continues 
to devote substantial resources to MEED, even though the economic 
crisis that led to its creation is past.
The private sector component of MEED is a wage-subsidy program. 
Specific features of the wage-subsidy are the following:
1. Eligible job seekers are those who are unemployed and are ineligible 
for or have exhausted either UI benefits or workers©compensation. Prior-
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ity is given to applicants living in households with no other source of 
income, to those eligible for general assistance, to those eligible for 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and to farm families 
that can demonstrate severe financial need. MEED is therefore available 
to assist displaced workers who have exhausted their UI eligibility, but 
it is not restricted to only displaced workers.
2. MEED offers employers who hire targeted workers a subsidy of 
up to $4 per hour in wages and up to $1 per hour in fringe benefits 
for a period not to exceed six months. The six-month period can be 
extended up to one year for workers undergoing job training. A worker©s 
wage is set by the employer and must be equal to the wage paid other 
employees for the same work.
3. Participating employers are given an incentive to retain targeted 
workers for at least 12 months beyond the six months of subsidized 
employment. Employers are required to repay 70 percent of the amount 
received under the program if the employee is not continued on the job 
beyond the initial six months. No repayment is expected, on the other 
hand, if targeted workers are retained one year or longer beyond the 
subsidy period. A prorated portion of the subsidy must be repaid for 
employees retained less than one year. Employers are also prohibited 
from laying off or reducing the hours of other employees in order to 
hire subsidized workers.
4. Given priority for MEED participation are small businesses as well 
as firms that offer the potential for long-term employment, that con 
serve energy, that make use of state resources and new technology, that 
operate primarily in Minnesota, and that are female- or minority-owned.
The MEED annual report (1987) covering the July 1985 to December 
1986 period indicates that 85 percent of private sector participants were 
employed in unsubsidized jobs at the time of a 60-day follow-up survey 
after the completion of the subsidy period. Of those workers in unsub 
sidized jobs, nearly 91 percent were still employed by the same firm, 
while about 9 percent changed employers following the subsidy period. 
Average unsubsidized hourly wages for the two groups were $5.37 and 
$6.06, respectively. Most individuals employed under MEED qualify 
for the full subsidy over 26 weeks. Hence, average program cost per 
worker is relatively high at approximately $4,680.
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Contrasts with ETP. Beyond the difference in economic circumstances 
existing at their creation, the MEED program offers an interesting con 
trast to California©s ETP in three additional respects. One contrast is 
in underlying philosophies. ETP©s philosophy is that updated skills are 
a prerequisite for workers to obtain or retain jobs. Thus payments made 
to employers providing OJT are viewed as compensation for training 
costs. In contrast, the explicit philosophy of MEED is that job seekers 
need employment, not retraining. If jobs are available, workers will 
be found to fill them. From this perspective, wage-subsidies are primarily 
viewed as a job creation device. Nevertheless, MEED-funded jobs do 
appear in many cases to offer training opportunities. A survey carried 
out by a coalition of state organizations, the Jobs Now Coalition, in 
dicates that over 77 percent of participating private sector employers 
provided an affirmative answer to the question, "Did you provide any 
special training on- or off-the-job?" (See Rangan 1985.)
A second difference between the programs concerns the characteristics 
of workers likely to receive assistance. The earlier discussion of ETP sug 
gests that creaming is likely to be involved in the trainee-selection process. 
MEED, on the other hand, targets the wage-subsidy to members of spe 
cific disadvantaged groups. A more recent 1987 Jobs Now Coalition sur 
vey (see Rode 1988) indicates, in fact, that MEED placements are dispro 
portionately held by general assistance eligibles, women, and minorities. 
Fifty-four percent of its placements during the 1985-87 biennium were 
general assistance eligible, 42 piercent were women, and 25 percent were 
minorities (in a state with a total minority population of only 4 to 5 percent).
A final difference is in the mix of participating employers. As noted, 
relatively large California employers are more likely than smaller 
employers to participate in ETP. In line with MEED©s legislative 
priorities, on the other hand, small Minnesota employers are heavily 
involved in the program. The 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey reports 
the following information on the size distribution of participating 
employers (see Rode 1988:Table 5):
Firm size Participating firms
Less than 20 81.1%
21-50 9.7%
51-99 4.8%
100 or more 4.3%
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where firm size is again measured by number of employees. As large 
firms are known to pay higher wages on average than smaller firms, 
the MEED wage-subsidy represents an especially large cut in labor costs 
to smaller firms.
Contrast with the Dayton wage-subsidy experiment. It is also in 
teresting to contrast the experience of the MEED program to date with 
the results of a federally-funded controlled experiment carried out in 
Dayton, Ohio during 1980 and 1981. As described by Burtless (1985), 
the purpose of the Dayton experiment was to test the effectiveness of a 
targeted wage-subsidy program in increasing the labor market success of 
disadvantaged workers. Program-targeted workers, who were all AFDC 
or general assistance recipients, were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups. The first group of workers received vouchers that entitled their 
employers, upon making a hiring commitment, to a tax credit equal 
to 50 percent of earnings paid during the first year of employment and 
25 percent of second-year earnings. Rather than a tax credit, the vouchers 
received by the second group authorized their employers to receive direct 
cash payments equal to the same percentages of first- and second-year 
earnings. Subsidy limits for both treatment groups were $3,000 and 
$1,500, respectively, for the first two years of employment. The third 
group of targeted workers served as the control group and received no 
vouchers. Members of all three groups received two weeks of job search 
training, which were followed by six weeks of structured job search. 
The vouchers expired at the end of the six-week job search period.
The Dayton experiment was designed to address two specific research 
issues. The first was to determine whether giving job seekers themselves 
the responsibility of informing prospective employers of their eligibili 
ty for subsidy benefits would increase the low take-up rates that have 
historically plagued targeted wage-subsidy programs. The second was 
the question whether firms with no tax liabilities to be reduced by a 
tax credit (because their profits are low or they are suffering losses) 
can still be induced to hire disadvantaged workers with the promise of 
direct cash payments.
The results of the experiment were unexpected. Among the two treat 
ment groups, 13.0 percent of the tax credit group and 12.7 percent of
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the direct cash payment group found employment during the eight weeks 
of the experiment. Thus the direct cash payments did not increase labor 
market success relative to the tax credits. More important, the place 
ment rates of both treatment groups were lower than the 20.6 percent 
rate obtained by the control group. Unfortunately, the evaluation of the 
experiment is limited to an analysis of placement rates and initial wages 
because of its premature cancellation in the spring of 1981. (There was 
essentially no difference in average wages between the treatment groups 
and the control group.) Subject to this qualification, Burtless interprets 
the results as indicating that employers used the vouchers primarily as 
a labor market signal of potentially poor job performance. This explana 
tion would account for both the lower placement rates observed for the 
treatment groups and the failure of the different subsidy payment 
mechanisms to make a difference. The disquieting implication for cur 
rent and proposed wage-subsidy policies is that vouchers have a 
stigmatizing effect in the sense that rather than easing the placement 
of target groups, the vouchers provide information which employers 
used to discriminate against the disadvantaged.
In contrast to the Dayton experiment, the MEED wage-subsidy ap 
pears to have been enthusiastically received by Minnesota employers, 
particularly small and relatively new businesses, despite the priority 
given to hiring hard-to-employ target groups. This is indicated by the 
shift in the program©s emphasis toward private sector job creation, its 
continued funding during the economic recovery following the 1981-82 
recession, and surveys describing a high degree of employer satisfac 
tion with MEED. The reasons for the difference in employers© reac 
tions to the two programs can only be speculated upon. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that MEED officials, like those of California©s ETP program, 
recognize that it is critical to retain the support of the business com 
munity. From this perspective, the following considerations may play 
a role in MEED©s relative success.
1. MEED is promoted as a program to assist Minnesota©s small 
businesses to grow and diversify. In other words * MEED is sold as an 
economic development tool rather than as a program to assist the 
unemployed and disadvantaged. In this connection, the 1987 Jobs Now 
Coalition survey (see Rode 1988) points out that 81 percent of surveyed 
employers responded affirmatively to a question that asked whether
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MEED enabled them to expand their production or scale of operations, 
60 percent noted that the subsidy made it possible for them to invest 
in new capital equipment, and 54 percent stated that MEED made it 
possible to diversify into new areas. Among firms that reported expan 
sion of their workforces, 56 percent indicated that they would not have 
been able to create new jobs without MEED assistance, and another 
4 percent suggested that their expansion would have been delayed without 
the program. A further breakdown of these data suggests that MEED 
assistance is particularly beneficial to the growth of very small and new 
businesses. The same survey indicates, finally, that 86 percent of re 
sponding employers responded that they were "very satisfied" with 
their MEED employees, and only 23 percent mentioned that the sub 
sidy failed to improve the performance of their business.
2. MEED officials have taken pains to keep their rules simple and 
administrative overhead low. The 1987 Jobs Now Coalition survey 
reports that 92 percent of responding employers felt that they were able 
to fill their jobs with a minimum of red tape, and 94 percent stated that 
they found the rules easy to understand.
As noted at the beginning of this section, most state-funded training 
programs pose few constraints on employers in their selection of trainees. 
The MEED program demonstrates that it is possible to walk the fine 
line between targeting assistance to particular groups of workers while 
at the same time enjoying widespread business support. 12
Illinois© Retraining Programs
Illinois is unique among the states in offering a comprehensive three- 
pronged approach to retraining. The Illinois programs are (1) the In 
dustrial Training Program authorized in 1979; (2) the High Impact Train 
ing Services program created in 1985; and (3) the Prairie State 2000 
Authority, also created in 1985. The Prairie State 2000 Authority is 
emphasized in this discussion because it is representative of the recent 
focus by some states on retraining programs intended to retain rather 
than to create jobs.
The Industrial Training and High Impact Training Services Programs. 
Administered by the Illinois Department of Commerce and Communi 
ty Affairs, the Industrial Training Program provides cost-sharing for
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the OJT expenses incurred by "new" or "expanding" industrial enter 
prises. Expansion is defined in the enabling legislation as "a perma 
nent increase in production that results in the addition of personnel 
through additional work shifts and/or facilities in excess of normal growth 
or turnover." Just what constitutes normal growth or turnover is not 
spelled out. The program©s contribution to the costs of OJT cannot ex 
ceed two-thirds of direct costs unless the trainees are unemployed, receiv 
ing state welfare benefits, or enrolled in training for the handicapped. 
For each of these categories of trainees, the Industrial Training Pro 
gram is authorized to provide up to 100 percent of training costs.
Emphasizing classroom training rather than OJT, the High Impact 
Training Services program is also administered by an existing state agen 
cy in this case, the Illinois State Board of Education. This program is 
intended to provide an economic development role for the state©s 
vocational-technical education facilities. Private sector employers in 
terested in program funding must join with a community college, area 
vocational center, or comprehensive high school in putting together a 
collaborative proposal. These joint proposals are then submitted to the 
state Board of Education, which is obligated to respond promptly with a 
decision on funding. As is the case for the Industrial Training Program, 
program participation is restricted to new and expanding enterprises.
The High Impact Training Services program is similar to 
Massachusetts© Bay State Skills Corporation (BSSC) in attempting to 
establish cooperative relationships between employers and state educa 
tional institutions. Begun in 1981, the BSSC encourages educational 
institutions and other training agencies to propose new courses and pro 
grams that are directly responsive to the demands of the marketplace. 
But the BSSC will only fund proposals identifying one or more com 
panies that will participate directly in the training. Participating firms 
are required to match at least 20 percent of BSSC funds with direct 
or in-kind support.
The Prairie State 2000 Authority. In contrast to the first two Illinois 
programs with their job-creation emphasis, the primary mission of the 
Prairie State 2000 Authority is to retain jobs already located in the state. 
Job retention is accomplished by upgrading the skills of Illinois workers 
so that they can adapt to advances in technology and other changes in
46 Vocational Training Programs
the workplace. With its focus on retaining jobs, the 2000 Authority is 
similar to retraining programs offered by such Upper Midwest states 
as Michigan and Ohio. The programs in both of these states are primarily 
intended to make use of existing systems of vocational and technical 
schools and community colleges to provide skill upgrading.
The Illinois state legislature initially created the Prairie State 2000 
Fund in 1983 with the objective of assisting UI recipients and employed 
workers at risk of layoff to retrain themselves to meet the skill re 
quirements imposed by technological change. The program did not 
receive state funding, however, until the passage of an amendment in 
1985 creating the Prairie State 2000 Authority as an independent state 
agency. 13 The 2000 Authority has the following two components: the 
Individual Training Assistance Program and the Employer Training 
Assistance Program. In the Individual Training Assistance Program, 
the 2000 Authority issues training vouchers to approved training in 
stitutions (community colleges, school districts, and not-for-profit 
organizations) on behalf of individual trainees. Upon the enrollment 
of a trainee, the participating institution is permitted to redeem a voucher 
to cover the individual©s tuition and related fees. Vouchers are valued 
at up to $2,000 for eligible unemployed persons and up to $1,000 for 
eligible employed individuals. Eligibility criteria are quite minimal. 
Unemployed applicants must have worked a minimum of three years 
out of the past ten in Ul-covered employment, and employed applicants 
must be in need of additional skills to retain their present jobs. It is 
the responsibility of each participating educational institution to admit 
trainees and to assign each trainee an appropriate training curriculum.
The more important component of the 2000 Authority is the Employer 
Training Assistance Program which provides qualifying employers with 
a loan or grant to cover the direct costs of supplying training. Of the 
agency©s fiscal 1987 budget of $3 million, about 87 percent was spent 
on grants and loans under the employer assistance program. The loan 
option covers 100 percent of direct training costs, and 25 percent of 
the principal of the loan is forgiven if trainees are retained by the 
employer for one year. The grant option covers 50 percent of direct 
training costs, with half the grant amount dispersed in advance of training 
and the other half paid after trainees are retained on the job 90 days 
from completion of training. A third funding option is to couple a grant
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request covering 50 percent of allowable training costs with a loan re 
quest to cover the remaining 50 percent. In general, funding approval 
is based on a demonstration that the training cannot be internally financed 
by the employer and that workers are in jeopardy of being laid off unless 
additional training is made available to them.
Evidence related to the retraining vouchers provided by the Individual 
Training Assistance Program is available from the income maintenance 
experiments carred out between 1970 and 1978 in Seattle and Denver 
(the SIME/DIME experiments). All experimental subjects were eligi 
ble for free employment counseling, and a subset of subjects was eligi 
ble for a training subsidy at the rate of either 50 percent or 100 percent 
of direct costs incurred. The training subsidy program operated like 
a voucher system in that the training provider and the curriculum chosen 
were left up to the individual.
A study of the training subsidy program by Hall (1980) indicates that 
participation was far short of universal. The participation rate for the 
counseling treatment was 42 percent, while 22 percent and 35 percent 
of those eligible for the 50 and 100 percent training subsidies, respec 
tively, chose to enroll in a training program (mainly courses provided 
by community colleges). Concerning postprogram wage rates, Hall ten 
tatively concludes that while the point estimates indicate a small positive 
training effect, the size of the associated standard errors make it im 
possible to reject the null hypothesis that the effect is zero.
A secondary mission of the 2000 Authority is to investigate innovative 
employment programs. In this capacity, the agency is planning a four- 
year pilot project to examine the feasibility of Individual Training Ac 
count (ITA) programs in Illinois. The basic idea of the ITA concept 
is to provide a fund privately financed by workers, employers, or both 
workers and employers that can be drawn upon to pay for additional 
educational or training investments. Choate and Carey (1985) and Lovell 
(1984) have presented specific proposals for implementing the ITA 
concept.
In the Choate-Carey proposal, contributions by both workers and 
employers would be used to create an ITA trust fund. A worker displaced 
from his or her job would be entitled to receive a voucher valued at 
up to $4,000 to be used to pay for retraining and/or relocation. If the
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retraining option were chosen, the type and location of training would 
be left up to the worker. At the time of retirement, both workers and 
employers would be refunded their unused contributions plus interest. 
The Lovell proposal differs in that displaced workers who choose to 
participate in the program would first be provided several weeks of 
counseling and job search assistance. If these services do not result in 
a satisfactory job placement, the participant is then given a voucher to 
pay for a retraining program of his or her choice. With respect to both 
ITA proposals, the OTA report (1986:267) makes the useful observa 
tion that the training voucher system would serve best to encourage 
lifetime education and retraining, as opposed to a crisis response to the 
specific needs of displaced workers.
Summary
In the context of the experience gained from over 25 years of federally 
funded vocational training programs, this chapter described the in 
novative state-level training programs in California, Minnesota, and 
Illinois. State training initiatives tend to differ from federal programs 
in terms of their availability to employed workers at risk of being displac 
ed and their important economic development role. As an economic 
development tool, state initiatives have the demand-side objective of 
creating jobs as well as the traditional supply-side objective of increas 
ing workers© human capital.
Begun in 1983, California©s ETP program is the largest and best known 
of state-funded training initiatives. Among the innovative features of 
ETP are the following: (1) the heavy involvement of employers in 
designing individual projects and choosing trainees and program pro 
viders (in the case of classroom training), (2) the commitment required 
of participating employers to hire program graduates, (3) the high level 
of accountability imposed on training providers by the use of 
performance-based contracts, and (4) the diversion of UI tax revenues 
to fund the costs of training programs.
The Minnesota MEED program was created in 1983 as a temporary 
job creation program mainly directed toward jobs in the public sector. 
Originally conceived as a temporary two-year program, the unexpectedly 
favorable response of private sector employers to MEED led to its con-
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tinuation as a permanent program emphasizing private sector job crea 
tion. The private sector component of MEED provides a targeted wage- 
subsidy to employers. Three features of the program are especially 
noteworthy. First, in contrast to most state programs, MEED is targeted 
toward specific groups of hard-to-employ persons. Second, despite ques 
tions raised in the literature about employers© interest in participating 
in targeted wage-subsidy programs, MEED is strongly supported by 
Minnesota businessmen, especially the small business community. Final 
ly, MEED appears to be having a positive impact on skill upgrading 
although it is primarily promoted as an economic development tool.
The final state program considered Illinois© Prairie State 2000 
Authority was examined because it is representative of the recent em 
phasis in heavily industrial states on retraining programs intended to 
retain rather than to create jobs. The 2000 Authority has two compo 
nent programs. In the first, individuals in need of retraining are assisted 
through the provision of vouchers to be used at approved training in 
stitutions. In the more important second component, employers seek 
ing to upgrade the skills of their workers are provided grants and/or 
loans to cover the direct costs of providing retraining services.
Process analyses of the California and Minnesota programs indicate 
generally favorable results, particularly as viewed as an economic 
development tool. As noted in the introductory section, however, neither 
ETP nor MEED was designed to allow program evaluation involving 
a control group comparison. The available quantitative evidence for 
assessing the net impact of retraining programs comes mainly from 
federally-funded demonstration projects, and this evidence indicates a 
less favorable view of the effectiveness of retraining.
Two of the most influential of these federally-funded demonstrations 
are the Downriver dislocated worker project and the Dislocated Worker 
Demonstration project. Carried out between 1980 and 1983 in the Detroit 
metropolitan area, the Downriver project provided a full range of 
reemployment services (i.e., classroom training, OJT, and job search 
assistance) to about 2,100 workers displaced from their jobs due to the 
closure of several auto assembly and auto parts plants. The evaluation 
report by Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984) points out that the 
Downriver project significantly increased participants© access to train 
ing opportunities over what would have been expected in the program©s
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absence. Despite the increased access to training opportunities, however, 
the authors find that retraining does not yield a statistically significant 
incremental gain in participants© reemployment experience above that 
resulting from job search assistance (ISA) only. Average training costs 
per participant were more than twice the average costs of ISA.
The Downriver project was followed in 1982 by the Dislocated Worker 
Demonstration project, which was carried out to test the effectiveness 
of alternative reemployment services under a wider range of operating 
conditions. Although all six sites of the project offered displaced workers 
a full range of reemployment services, the Buffalo program was selected 
for a full impact study mainly because its evaluation design offered the 
best opportunity for estimating net program impacts.
In their evaluation of the Buffalo project, Corson, Long, and Maynard 
(1985) draw four important conclusions regarding retraining programs. 
First, less than 20 percent of the displaced workers recruited for the 
program chose to participate. The recruitment of more recently laid- 
off workers appears to lead to higher overall participation rates. Sec 
ond, program participation had large and statistically significant effects 
on reemployment and average weekly earnings. Third, both classroom 
training and ISA significantly facilitated worker readjustment, with the 
estimated impacts being of similar size. Given its substantially lower 
cost ($851 per participant versus $2,431 per participant for classroom 
training), the absence of an incremental impact for classroom training 
suggests that JSA is the more cost effective of the two services. This 
conclusions is reinforced by the parallel result obtained from the 
Downriver project. Finally, OJT is not found to have a significant ef 
fect on reemployment, suggesting that its use in the Buffalo project as 
a job placement tool may have been unnecessary.
NOTES
1. Two recent books supply useful information on the design and operation of JTPA 
programs. Levitan and Gallo (1988) is a comprehensive qualitative assessment of all 
of JTPA©s components, while Cook (1987) contains case studies of nine operating proj 
ects funded by Title HI of JTPA.
2. Title HI also requires that states match federal grants dollar for dollar. However, 
the burden imposed on state treasuries is lightened by allowing (1) state matches to 
be in-kind as well as in cash and (2) part or all of the match to be forgiven for states 
with unemployment rates above the national average.
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3. The flip side of this argument is that early intervention is inefficient if services 
are provided to workers who would have otherwise found jobs on their own, or if workers 
do not yet face sufficient economic pressure to seek alternative employment or to enter 
a retraining program.
4. The description of the ETP program is primarily based on Employment Training 
Panel (1984, 1985, 1986, 1987) and Arthur Young (1985).
5. ETP provides funds only for the reimbursement of actual training costs incurred 
by employers or training agencies. Funds may not be spent to subsidize the wages paid 
to trainees or to pay income maintenance allowances. Similarly, ETP does not support 
remedial education.
6. During its early years, the Panel used "master contracts" with state agencies and 
business and training organizations as an administrative tool to carry out the dual ob 
jectives of providing training and fostering economic development. For example, under 
a master contract with the Los Angeles Community College District, the Panel authorized 
a variety of training projects to meet the needs of Los Angeles employers. More recently, 
however, the Panel has determined that master contracts are ineffective and their use 
has been abandoned.
7. In January 1987, a third state North Carolina passed legislation to cut employers© 
UI payroll taxes and simultaneously assess a new payroll tax earmarked to finance a 
worker training trust fund. A commission has been appointed to study how best to utilize 
the trust fund.
8. Planning information for the Delaware program was provided by a randomized 
experiment carried out between late January and early July 1983 by the Delaware Depart 
ment of Labor. The design and results of the experiment are discussed in chapter 3.
9. On the other hand, Stevens (1986:29) makes the point that employers are quickly 
learning that the states are serious about sharing in training expenses without being 
intrusive in the trainee-selection process. He goes on to suggest that states must move 
quickly to assess their priorities in preparing to formalize criteria to be used in 
distinguishing between employers applying for limited training funds.
10. Although the employer makes the actual contribution, Hamermesh (1977:10-15) 
provides an interesting discussion of the possibility that the source of funds used to 
pay the UI tax may be consumers if the tax can be shifted forward, or employees if 
the tax is shifted backward.
11. Temporary public sector employment is currently viewed as a method for allowing 
the most disadvantaged to acquire the work experience that will lead to eventual private 
sector MEED placement.
12. Stevens (1986:25) makes the same point in connection with Massachusetts© Bay 
State Skills Corporation. This is a training program which attempts to foster partner 
ships between state postsecondary schools and employers with skill-training re 
quirements. Targeted populations are displaced workers, minorities, and the economical 
ly disadvantaged.
13. The only source of funding for the 2000 Fund was voluntary contributions by 
business firms in exchange for a credit on the state corporate income tax. Not surpris 
ingly, the tax credit incentive proved insufficient to encourage substantial business con 
tributions to the program.

3 
Job Search Assistance Programs
As noted at the beginning of chapter 2, the basic presumption of 
retraining programs is that displaced workers lack the vocational skills  
either transferable or firm-specific that would qualify them to com 
pete for vacant jobs in their local labor markets. The presumption 
underlying job search assistance (ISA) programs, in contrast, is that 
displaced workers already possess the necessary vocational skills to com 
pete. Rather, their reemployment is delayed for one of three reasons: 
(1) lack of knowledge about how to go about searching for a job, (2) lack 
of motivation to engage in search, or (3) lack of interest in the jobs 
that are available. Lack of knowledge is a problem for many displaced 
workers because, as long-term employees in their previous jobs, their 
job search skills were largely unused and have become rusty. Lack of 
motivation to search may occur because of the work disincentive 
associated with the UI system. Finally, as emphasized in chapter 1, the 
unattractive prospect for some displaced workers of having to accept 
sharply reduced wages and benefits reduces the odds of an early accep 
tance of a job offer.
The work disincentive factor is the topic of a large body of literature. 
As originally pointed out by Feldstein (1974), the provision of UI in 
come support reduces the cost of not working, which tends to increase 
the length of recipients© job search. More recently, Kingston, Burgess, 
and St. Louis (1986) and St. Louis, Burgess, and Kingston (1986) pro 
vide evidence that many UI recipients substantially overreport their actual 
job search effort in order to comply with the UI "work test" (i.e., the 
requirement that UI claimants be actively seeking employment). This 
evidence suggests that for some workers, UI benefits may actually be 
subsidizing leisure and nonmarket pursuits rather than job search. 
Burgess and Kingston (1987) discuss in detail the adverse incentives
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built into the UI system, along with the problems of program complex 
ity and ineffective claimant monitoring, and offer a number of sugges 
tions for reforming the existing system.
In connection with JTPA Title HI programs, chapter 2 also pointed 
out that program developers are under considerable pressure to reduce 
per participant costs while attempting to maintain high placement rates. 
This pressure, as well as questions about the effectiveness of retrain 
ing and the desire of many program participants to get back to work 
as quickly as possible, has led most Title III projects to place substan 
tially more emphasis on ISA than vocational training. The first section 
of this chapter outlines the component services commonly found in ISA 
programs including those funded by Title HI. This discussion provides 
the background information needed for understanding the details of par 
ticular JSA programs.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into three substantive sec 
tions, which are distinguished by the type of JSA program considered. 
The first of these sections outlines five experimental programs intend 
ed to increase job search skills. Available for four of these programs 
is evaluation evidence drawn from a comparison of randomly selected 
treatment and control groups. The other two sections investigate two 
alternative approaches to JSA, both of which have the objective of in 
creasing the motivation to engage in active job search. The reemploy- 
ment bonus experiments carried out in Illinois and New Jersey are ex 
amined first. Then considered are demonstration projects in Charleston, 
South Carolina and Washington state which were intended to test the 
effectiveness of more closely monitoring the search activity of UI 
claimants. The chapter concludes with a summary section.
Components of JSA Programs
In describing the individual services typically provided in JSA pro 
grams, JSA will be defined broadly so that the services discussed range 
from initial outreach to terminal job placement activities. Such a broadly 
defined JSA program is included, for example, as the first of three 
treatments in the New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment
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Demonstration Project initiated in October 1985.© It should be noted, 
however, that the term JSA is often defined more narrowly to include 
only individual job search training services and job development and 
job matching (items 4 and 6 discussed below). The services are discussed 
in roughly the sequential order in which they are generally offered.
1. Outreach. The first problem is to make known to displaced workers 
the services offered by a JSA program. With respect to workers af 
fected by a plant closing or mass layoff, the surest means of making 
contact is to offer assistance at the plant site before layoffs begin. Chapter 
4 goes into more detail on site-specific services, including a discussion 
of advance notification requirements and early warning systems. For 
other unemployed workers, outreach depends more on media campaigns, 
word of mouth, and referrals from local Job Service offices of state 
Employment Service (ES) agencies.
2. Orientation. Orientation plays the key role of informing prospec 
tive participants about the services offered by the program, what these 
services can and cannot be expected to deliver, and what is expected 
of the participants themselves. The objective is to help unemployed 
workers arrive at a sensible decision regarding program participation. 
In particular, unemployed workers anticipating recall and those who 
can reasonably be expected to find satisfactory jobs without assistance 
should be discouraged from continuing further. Helpful in this regard 
is the clear acknowledgement by project staff members that there is no 
guarantee that jobs available to program graduates will offer prelayoff 
levels of pay and benefits. Potential participants should especially be 
cautioned that not everyone benefits from relatively costly and time- 
consuming retraining programs.
3. Assessment and testing. In many JSA programs, the next service 
provided is an assessment intended to determine whether a participant 
already possesses locally marketable skills or whether retraining is 
necessary for reemployment. Formal testing is often used to determine 
the participant©s vocational interests and his or her aptitude for under 
taking particular retraining programs. In some cases, testing may reveal 
that remedial education is a prerequisite for retraining. For example, 
Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer (1984:46) point out in their evaluation 
of the Downriver demonstration project that despite fairly high levels
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of educational attainment (close to 60 percent of program-eligible 
workers had completed high school), some 20 percent of participants 
scored below sixth grade levels on standardized reading and math tests 
administered by the program. The report also notes that the two-week 
assessment and job search training sequence used in the Downriver proj 
ect served the purpose, among other objectives, of screening out those 
participants who lacked the motivation to actively pursue reemployment.
4. Job search workshops. Based on the assessment results, participants 
are typically channeled into either a classroom training or OJT pro 
gram or enrolled in a job search workshop. Job search workshops 
generally last about 20 hours spread over four or five days. Workshop 
content usually consists of two primary elements. First, specific job 
search skills are taught, including resume preparation, techniques for 
locating job leads, and effective application and interviewing practices. 
Second, motivational activities and exercises are provided to raise the 
low self-esteem that many displaced workers suffer after being laid off.
Following the job search workshop, most programs make available 
a "resource center" which participants can use as a base of operation 
for their self-directed job search. Resource centers are typically outfit 
ted with a telephone bank, telephone and business directories, newspaper 
help-wanted ads, and listings of job openings from the local Job Ser 
vice office. An important objective of resource centers is to create an 
atmosphere of mutual encouragement and support by encouraging job 
searchers to operate out of a common location.
A second logical follow-up to the job search workshop is the forma 
tion of a job club in which club members meet on a regular basis to 
telephone employers for job leads. Job clubs allow for the supervised 
application of recently acquired job search skills and offer the oppor 
tunity for developing a group support system during the search period. 
Drawing on the experience of the Dislocated Worker Demonstration 
project, Corson, Maynard, and Wichita (1984:132-34) describe a suc 
cessful implementation of the job club concept in the Lehigh Valley 
program. A key feature of this program was a fixed membership per 
club of about 15 participants that was unchanged until all club members 
obtained jobs. The reduction in the number of club members as 
placements occurred had a positive rather than a negative effect on
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remaining members and the project staff since job club moderators took 
pride in watching the club "close-out." The authors also caution, never 
theless, that because of the highly personal interaction likely to be 
generated in job clubs, they may not be appropriate for all clients or 
in all areas.
5. Counseling. Most ISA programs provide some form of follow-up 
counseling at regular intervals. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita 
(1984:134) note that counseling at the six sites of the Dislocated Worker 
Demonstration project ranged on a continuum from informal, occasional 
counseling largely consisting of job interview advice to sophisticated 
case-management systems which assigned clients to particular counselors 
who were given full responsibility for the client©s progress through the 
program. Whatever form the counseling takes, its primary goal is to 
insure that program participants are making satisfactory progress in their 
job search. Particular services a counselor can provide include 
(1) serving as a "sounding board" for participants, (2) providing job 
information and arranging for support services, (3) urging clients to 
make use of resource center facilities, (4) providing coordination with 
job development activities, and (5) encouraging participants to persevere 
in their search.
6. Job development and job matching. In addition to training the in 
dividual unemployed worker to locate his or her own job, some ISA 
programs also offer the service called job development of utilizing 
the informal contacts of staff members to turn up job openings that are 
not advertised. That is, the function of a job developer is to uncover 
job vacancies that would be unlikely to come to the attention of displaced 
workers searching on their own. The OTA report (1986:249) notes that 
job development is successful when job developers earn the confidence 
of local employers by carefully screening workers for job openings. 
With program staff doing the screening, employers need interview on 
ly a few well-qualified applicants. Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer 
(1984:44) provide the following description of the dynamic nature of 
the job development process:
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the DCC [Downriver 
Community Conference] program©s job development strategy 
was its continued intensity. Program staff kept an ever-
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expanding file of employers and contacted each one every 
month to inquire whether their hiring needs had changed or 
whether the program could assist them in any way. Even if 
an employer had already hired participants, staff made the 
contact to ask if there were additional openings. Such efforts 
in some instances resulted in placement of several workers 
within one firm. Such continuous monitoring of employers© 
situations also enhanced the likelihood that Downriver staff 
would be in the right place at the right time, should an 
employer develop a vacancy.
Job matching typically involves storing participant information (e.g., 
test scores, vocational interests, and background) organized by occupa 
tional code. When a job order is produced by a job developer, the par 
ticipant file is accessed to identify appropriate referrals. Files of pro 
spective candidates are then reviewed, often in consultation with the 
counselors responsible for particular individuals. Once a tentative selec 
tion is made, the participants are notified, and, if they are interested, 
an interview is arranged.
Programs to Enhance Job Search Skills
The OTA report (1986:248) remarks that training in job search skills 
is valuable because many displaced workers do not know how or where 
to look for employment. Often, the report points out, displaced workers 
have had only one job in their lives, and they got it by just showing 
up at the plant gate. Five state-sponsored experiments intended to test 
the effectiveness of alternative JSA services in enhancing the job search 
skills of displaced workers are examined in this section.
The Delaware Dislocated Worker Pilot Program
Between late January and early July 1983, the Delaware Department 
of Labor conducted a randomized experiment to assess the impact of 
alternative services in increasing the earnings of displaced workers and 
in reducing their need for UI benefits. The four basic services were 
job search workshops, individual counseling, job development, and
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retraining. Information from the program was to be used in planning 
Delaware©s JTPA displaced worker program. As noted in chapter 2, 
a statewide program in Delaware was begun in 1984.
Although the pilot program achieved the quite high placement rate 
of 80 percent for program participants, the econometric analysis reported 
by Bloom (1987) indicates that there is no significant difference be 
tween the treatment and control groups in either UI benefit payments 
or short-run earnings. An extremely small sample size only 65 per 
sons in the treatment group and 110 in the control group leads to large 
standard errors, however, making it unlikely that precise program im 
pacts would be detected.
Of perhaps more interest than his empirical results are Bloom©s recom 
mendations based on qualitative evidence regarding the three JSA ser 
vices (job search workshops, counseling, and job development) included 
in the Delaware pilot program. Using information gained from site visits 
and discussions with program staff members, he draws the following 
conclusions.
1. Staff members frequently complained that some participants lack 
ed motivation to engage in job search. Program changes suggested by 
Bloom thus include (1) more detailed interviews by program staff and 
(2) more motivational hurdles at the outset of the program (e.g., fur 
ther individual assessment and required participation in more preliminary 
orientation activities). The more comprehensive initial screening of par 
ticipants would hopefully have the effect of restricting program ser 
vices to those who really need them and are likely to benefit.
2. The four to five half-day job search workshops were perceived 
by both participants and staff as quite valuable. Given the amount of 
material covered (i.e., assessment of individual career goals, putting 
together a resume, interview preparation, uses of media and other job 
information, and self-directed job finding approaches), Bloom recom 
mends that the workshops be continued and extended in length.
3. The counseling and job development roles were performed by 
separate groups of persons on loan from area high schools and com 
munity colleges. The provision of both of these services would be 
strengthened if (1) counselors and job developers devoted more of their 
time to the program and (2) the counseling and job development ser-
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vices were more closely linked. Corson, Maynard, and Wichita 
(1984:134) reinforce this conclusion, pointing out that the absence of 
coordination means that job developers work with little detailed 
knowledge of the employment strengths and weaknesses of individual 
participants. At the same time, counselors and participants operate 
without detailed information on area employers and specific job 
openings.
The Wisconsin ERP Pilot Project
In contrast to the Delaware program, the Wisconsin ERP Pilot Proj 
ect concentrated on just one ISA service job search workshops. 2 As 
described by Jaggers et al. (1984), the objective of the project was to 
determine the effect on UI benefit expenditures of mandatory attendance 
at a one-day, six-hour workshop. The project involved a sample of4,276 
indefinitely separated UI claimants who were randomly assigned to treat 
ment and control groups (the treatment group consisted of 1,999 in 
dividuals). Workshops were conducted at six sites between March and 
August 1983. Unfortunately, the design of the pilot project does not 
allow for an assessment of the impact of differences in workshop con 
tent and methodologies between sites.
The principal result of the ERP project is that the treatment group 
is found to have received on average 0.62 fewer weeks of UI benefits 
than the control group. Spread over the entire sample of claimants, the 
0.62-week difference amounts to a gross saving of $164,837 in UI benefit 
expenditures. Of this figure, $11,438 is due to the denial of one week 
of benefits to treatment group claimants who failed to attend a workshop. 
The implication is that the remaining saving of $153,399 can be attributed 
to workshop attendance. Total project costs were approximately $50,000.
As was the case for the Delaware program, the qualitative reaction 
to the ERP workshops was highly favorable. Nearly all of the claimants 
who attended a workshop reported that they benefited from the ex 
perience. Similarly, district Job Service directors at the project sites 
and workshop staff members were unanimous in supporting the con 
tinuation of this JSA service. Jaggers et al. (1984:5) conclude that in 
a period of high unemployment and ES understaffing due to federal cut 
backs, job search workshops represent an efficient use of UI resources
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in terms of both the effective utilization of ES employment assistance 
expertise and the preservation of the state©s UI trust fund.
JSA Services in the New Jersey UI Reemployment 
Demonstration Project
Possibly the most ambitious experiment designed to measure the ef 
fectiveness of JSA services (as well as other types of reemployment 
assistance) is the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration Proj 
ect. The U.S. Department of Labor initiated the project, and it is operated 
as a joint venture by the USDOL and the New Jersey Department of 
Labor. Implementation began in July 1986.
An overview of the demonstration. The New Jersey demonstration 
has two primary objectives. The first is to assess the feasibility of an 
"early intervention" strategy. At issue are the questions of whether 
and how it is possible to use the UI system to identify early in the claim 
period unemployed workers who are likely to exhaust benefits but are 
unlikely to return to their old or similar jobs. "Early" is defined opera 
tionally as the fifth week of claiming UI benefits. The second objective 
is to empirically measure the effectiveness of three alternative packages 
of reemployment services in accelerating the return to work. JSA, which 
is designated Treatment 1, is the first of the three. Treatments 2 and 
3 are, respectively, JSA plus an offer of either training or relocation 
assistance and JSA plus an offer of a reemployment bonus.
Concerning the first objective, the basic problem is to distinguish 
displaced workers from those who are unemployed for other (cyclical, 
frictional, or seasonal) reasons so that appropriate services can be pro 
vided early in the spell of unemployment. The Unemployment Insurance 
Service report (1986:6) describing the New Jersey demonstration points 
out that the clearest way to make this distinction is by looking at the 
length of completed unemployment spells. The longer the spell, the more 
likely it is that the unemployed worker is truly displaced. But, as the 
report notes, ex post information on length of spells is not very helpful 
in making ex ante decisions on which claimants should be targeted for 
assistance.
The approach taken in the demonstration project is to apply five 
"screens" during the fourth week of claiming benefits. The cumulative
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effect of these screens is to define displaced workers as unemployed 
workers on permanent layoff who are 25 years of age and older and 
who had at least three years of tenure with their last employer prior 
to being laid off. Over 7,000 claimants who passed through these screens 
were randomly selected for the experiment and offered demonstration 
services.
Turning to the second objective of the demonstration, a full range 
of ISA services is included as part of Treatment 1. These services in 
clude orientation, testing, a job search workshop, a resource center, 
an assessment/counseling interview, and job referral. Following the 
assessment/counseling interview, participants are expected to have a 
specific job goal, an "employability plan" directed at achieving that 
goal, and a working knowledge of how to effectively use a resource 
center. Periodic follow-up contacts are scheduled following the assess 
ment interview.
It should be emphasized that these ISA services are above and beyond 
those currently provided to unemployed New Jersey residents. That is, 
unemployed workers assigned to both the treatment group and the con 
trol group would be eligible for JTPA Title III services, they would 
be referred to the ES for placement assistance, and they would par 
ticipate in the UI work search process. The demonstration services dif 
fer from those currently offered in that claimants in the demonstration 
have a considerably higher chance of receiving the (JSA or retrain 
ing/relocation) services, and the demonstration services are generally 
provided earlier in the unemployment spell. In each of 10 demonstra 
tion sites, current and demonstration services are provided by four-person 
teams consisting of three ES staff members and a JTPA staff member 
from the local Service Delivery Area.
Preliminary results. An interim report by Corson and Kerachsky 
(1987) discusses preliminary results for the first six months of program 
operation following its implementation in July 1986. Regarding the 
demonstration©s first objective, the report notes that it is not yet possi 
ble to determine whether the five screens satisfactorily identify claimants 
who, in the absence of additional employment services, would experience 
difficulty in becoming reemployed. Nevertheless, the screens do ap 
pear to restrict the demonstration-eligible population to persons whose
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attributes are usually associated with displaced workers and reemploy- 
ment difficulty. For example, sizable fractions of the demonstration 
population are male, displaced from jobs in manufacturing, and black 
or Hispanic. Cases in which the screening procedure tended to break 
down include individuals from growing industries like services, and 
claimants who eventually returned to their former employer and 
presumably did not require reemployment services.
Preliminary evidence on the net impact of the three treatments on 
weeks and amount of UI benefits is presented in table 3.1. (Later reports 
are to include estimates of treatment effects on employment and earn 
ings.) Estimates shown are the treatment group mean minus the con 
trol group mean. The ISA-only treatment is seen to decrease length of 
UI benefits by slightly over half a week and amount of benefits by nearly 
$88. The estimated effect on weeks of UI benefits is quite comparable 
to the estimate of 0.62 of a week obtained for job search workshops 
only in the Wisconsin ERP project.
Table 3.1




Weeks of UI paid















SOURCE: Corson and Kerachsky (1987, Table 4, p. 21).
Looking across treatments, the results in the table are generally con 
sistent with a priori expectations. In particular, the reemployment bonus 
is expected to have the largest impact because of the substantial reemploy 
ment incentive created by the bonus. (This result will be discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter.) Corson and Kerachsky (1987:21) note 
that the estimated differences between the bonus treatment and the JSA-
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only treatment are statistically significant. It is also expected that the 
training/relocation treatment will have the smallest immediate effect on 
UI receipt, since individuals undergoing training continue to receive 
UI benefits. The benefit of training in terms of economizing on UI costs 
should occur in the longer run as retrained individuals enjoy more stable 
employment. The small differences seen in table 3.1 between the ISA- 
only and the ISA plus training/relocation treatments are not statistical 
ly significant. Also contributing to the small estimated differences is 
the low participation rate of 14 to 16 percent of those offered the train 
ing/relocation option. 3
The Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration (WAD) Projects
It is useful to compare the preliminary results from the ongoing New 
Jersey demonstration to the findings of the completed Texas WAD proj 
ects. Carried out during 1983-85 by the Texas Department of Com 
munity Affairs, WAD involved some 2,250 Title ffl JTPA program 
participants in two projects in El Paso and one in Houston. It is impor 
tant to note that the Texas demonstration projects represent the first 
attempt to apply an experimental design methodology to an evaluation 
of continuing Title HI programs.
As described in the report by Bloom and Kulik (1986), the experimen 
tal design of the WAD projects included random assignment of Title 
HI program participants to either of two treatment groups or to a con 
trol group. The first treatment group received JSA services only (Tier 
I). Core JSA services provided at all three sites included orientation, 
job search workshops, assessment, and job development and placement. 
Members of the second treatment group received JSA followed, if 
necessary, by more expensive classroom or OJT retraining (the Tier 
I/II sequence). The control group was supplied all non-Title III ser 
vices available in Texas.
In addition to the Tier I and Tier I/II distinction, there were also im 
portant differences between sites. In Houston, participants tended to 
be prime-age white males, while Hispanic females were heavily 
represented in the two El Paso sites. Overall, nearly 40 percent of WAD 
participants were women. Only for the Houston site could the differential 
effect of the additional services in the Tier I/TJ sequence be distinguished
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from the Tier I ISA-only services. The available comparison for the 
El Paso sites is limited to the Tier I/n sequence and the control group. 
The WAD demonstration yielded three main results. As summariz 
ed in table 3.2, the first is that program participants experienced short- 
run positive impacts on earnings and weeks worked as well as a decrease 
in dollars received in UI benefits. (The ambiguous findings for female 
participants in Houston appear to be due to the small sample size.) Sec 
ond, these impact estimates tended to be larger and more pronounced 
for women than for men. In particular, female participants in El Paso 
experienced a program-induced gain in annual earnings of $1,070. The 
gain in annual earnings for men in Houston and El Paso ranged from 
$750 to $770. Since the mostly male Houston participants earned more 
than twice as much as the mostly female El Paso participants prior to 
WAD enrollment, the gender difference in estimated earnings gains is 
even more striking when expressed in percentage terms.
Table 3.2 
Estimated Program Effects for the Texas WAD Projects
Men Women
Outcome measure Houston El Paso Houston El Paso
Annual earnings for the year 
after random assignment
Weeks worked for post- 
assignment quarters 3 and 4














SOURCE: Bloom and Kulik (1986, Exhibit 7.2, p. 171).
The third result (not shown in table 3.2) involved the differential ef 
fect of Tier I versus Tier I/IE services. For males in Houston, the effect 
of retraining services (which were almost exclusively classroom train 
ing) was to decrease both earnings and employment relative to the ef 
fect of ISA-only. For example, the earnings gain for the year after
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random assignment was $860 for Tier I-only participants as compared 
to only $680 for Tier I/n participants. Bloom and Kulik (1986:173) 
take considerable pains to qualify this result. Most important, they note 
that the technical-vocational classroom training provided in Houston 
was of limited interest to participants, who were predominantly highly- 
paid former petrochemical workers. This mismatch between partici 
pant interests and available retraining options resulted in low participation 
in the training component of the Tier I/n sequence, and it undoubtedly 
contributed to the negative incremental effect estimated for classroom 
training. For future Title in programs, Bloom and Kulik (1986:181) 
conclude that (1) JSA should be the core service provided and (2) skill 
training should be used sparingly for well-specified needs and only where 
adequate local training resources are present.
The Washington Claimant Placement Project
The final JSA program summarized in this section is the Claimant 
Placement Project first authorized in 1985 as a two-year pilot project 
by the Washington state legislature. One important feature of this pro 
gram is its funding. As described in chapter 2, funding is provided 
through an earmarked tax of 0.02 percent on employer payrolls, with 
an offsetting reduction in UI tax rates of 0.02 percent for most employers. 
Also worth noting is the project©s explicit goal of protecting the solvency 
of the state©s UI trust fund by reducing the average length of claimants© 
unemployment spells. The method by which this objective is to be ac 
complished is individualized JSA services provided early in the period 
of UI eligibility.
To provide some assurance that sufficient job openings will be 
available to match up with unemployed workers, the project selected 
20 Job Service offices located in local labor markets identified as hav 
ing the greatest potential for claimants to return to work quickly. From 
each of these 20 offices, project staff members work with claimants 
from the onset of their UI claims through approximately the tenth week 
of unemployment. A full mix of JSA services is offered including skill 
assessment and testing, job search workshops, job matching, and job 
development.
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Two JSA services of particular interest are the comprehensive 
employability plan worked out for each claimant and the First Source 
Hire Program. A recent report of the Washington State ES Department 
(1987) details the elements of an employability plan as including (1) a 
listing of the claimant©s skills and experience, (2) notice of any factors 
hindering job search (e.g., lack of child care), (3) identification of 
suitable occupations and a reasonable expected wage rate, (4) a plan 
consisting of specific action steps leading to employment, (5) recognition 
of any additional social services necessary to overcome barriers to 
employment, and (6) a signed commitment by a project staff member 
and the claimant to follow through with the plan.
The First Source Hire Program allows a claimant to try out a job 
for 30 days while continuing to draw UI benefits. The idea behind the 
program is to provide the employer a chance to assess a claimant©s job 
performance before putting him or her on the payroll. The ES depart 
ment report notes that the JSA service making the most difference for 
project claimants is the employability plan. Unfortunately, there is cur 
rently no quantitative evaluation evidence publicly available.
In the spring of 1987, the Washington state legislature took action 
to permanently fund the Claimant Placement Project but with an in 
teresting change in emphasis. Whereas services provided by the pilot 
project were available to almost any UI claimant on permanent layoff, 
the 1987 legislation gives priority to older workers and the long-term 
unemployed. The former group is defined as UI claimants 50 years of 
age and older. The ES department is delegated the responsibility of iden 
tifying the latter group subject to the guideline that the long-term 
unemployed are to include those demographic groups of UI claimants 
with the highest percentages of persons who have either drawn at least 
15 weeks of UI benefits or exhausted their UI eligibility. The enabling 
legislation singles out these two groups to receive special JSA services 
because they are thought to be less likely than the general population 
of claimants to find new employment at wages comparable to their 
prelayoff earnings.
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The Reemployment Bonus Concept
While the previous section focused on programs designed to enhance 
job search skills, the introduction to this chapter pointed out that the 
reemployment of displaced workers may also be delayed by a lack of 
motivation to engage in search or by the natural reluctance to accept 
a new job offering considerably lower wages and benefits. This sec 
tion describes two experiments designed to test the impact of a reemploy 
ment bonus in stimulating the intensity of job search and the willingness 
to accept offered jobs. Since the reemployment bonus is a new con 
cept, the results of these experiments are being closely studied by 
policymakers interested in innovative approaches for reducing UI outlays 
and the length of insured unemployment spells.
The Illinois UI Experiment
Between mid-1984 and mid-1985, the Illinois ES department con 
ducted a controlled experiment involving two types of reemployment 
bonuses. In the Claimant Bonus Experiment, a random sample of new 
UI claimants was told that they would receive a cash bonus of $500 
upon reemployment. 4 The intent of this experiment was to encourage 
more intensive job search and faster reemployment. In the Employer 
Bonus Experiment, another random sample of new UI claimants was 
told that, once a hiring commitment was made, the employer of each 
newly hired claimant would be eligible for a $500 cash bonus. Here 
the intent was to test the effect of a marginal wage-bill subsidy (or training 
subsidy) in reducing the duration of insured unemployment.
Bonuses in both experiments were paid only if hiring (of 30 hours 
or more per week) occurred within 11 weeks of the initial claim and 
if the job lasted at least four months. The 11-week period was chosen 
because it was one to two weeks less than the median duration of in 
sured unemployment in the state. The four-month job duration require 
ment was imposed to reduce the possibility that a claimant would ac 
cept a temporary or seasonal job simply to obtain the bonus. Roughly 
4,000 UI claimants between the ages of 20 and 55 were randomly assign 
ed to each of the two treatment groups and to the control group.
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As reported by Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), the main results 
of the Illinois UI experiments include the following:
1. Important differences were found in claimants© willingness to par 
ticipate in the two experiments. About 84 percent of those eligible for 
the Claimant Experiment agreed to participate, as opposed to just 65 
percent of those offered the chance to participate in the Employer Ex 
periment. A similar difference in actual use of the programs was also 
detected. Only 3 percent of Employer Experiment enrollees were respon 
sible for a bonus payment to their employers, whereas 14 percent of 
Claimant Experiment enrollees earned a bonus for themselves.
2. Comparing the entire Employer Experiment treatment group to 
the entire control group, there is no significant difference in either UI 
benefits paid or weeks of insured unemployment, where both outcome 
variables are measured over the full benefit year. This result is not sur 
prising, given the limited participation in the program and the very small 
percentage of employers who actually received bonuses.
When white women are analyzed separately, however, enrollment 
in the Employer Experiment is found to unambiguously reduce both 
UI benefit payments and weeks of insured unemployment. White female 
enrollees received $164 less in UI benefits and experienced one full 
week less of insured unemployment (over the full benefit year) than 
did white women randomly assigned to the control group. White women 
were the only race-sex group that experienced a statistically significant 
effect in this experiment.
3. In contrast to the generally insignificant Employer Experiment 
results, the Claimant Experiment is found on average to have reduced 
UI benefits by $158 and duration of insured unemployment by 1.15 
weeks, where both outcome variables are measured over the benefit 
year. These estimates are obtained for all workers assigned to the Claim 
ant Experiment, whether or not they agreed to participate, and whether 
or not they actually received bonus payments. When the average $158 
reduction in UI benefits is multiplied by the over 4,000 Claimant Ex 
periment assignees, Illinois saved roughtly $660,000 relative to what 
its UI benefit expenditures would have been in the absence of the pro 
gram. Bonus payments to eligible claimants amounted to $285,000, so
70 Job Search Assistance Programs
that unemployment benefits were reduced by a striking $2.32 for every 
$1 in bonuses paid out to claimants by the state.
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987:527) also point out that if the Clai 
mant Experiment were implemented in a full-scale program, the take- 
up rate would undoubtedly be higher than it was in the experiment. The 
experiment©s take-up rate of 0.545 is calculated by dividing the pro 
portion of claimants receiving a bonus (0.136) by the proportion quali 
fying for a bonus (0.250). A higher take-up rate would have the effect 
of reducing the benefit-cost ratio for the program. But even in the unlikely 
event of a 100 percent take-up rate, the benefit-cost ratio would fall 
to only 1.26, which implies that the Claimant Experiment would reduce 
UI benefit expenditures by considerably more than the bonus costs 
incurred.
4. A possible explanation of the effect of the Claimant Experiment 
in reducing length of unemployment is that program participants may 
have accepted a less favorable match between worker and job (thereby 
sacrificing earnings) in order to qualify for the $500 bonus. A com 
parison of postprogram earnings across the treatment and control groups 
indicates, however, that this is not the case. More consistent with the 
evidence is the hypothesis that the faster reemployment resulted from 
more intense job search effort by Claimant Experiment participants.
The Reemployment Bonus Treatment in the
New Jersey Demonstration Project
The encouraging response of UI claimants to the Illinois Claimant 
Experiment program suggests that it might be useful to explore further 
the potential of the reemployment bonus concept. A desirable exten 
sion of the Illinois experiment would be to make the size of the bonus 
conditional on the length of job search. Treatment 3 of the New Jersey 
UI Reemployment Demonstration Project is a reemployment bonus the 
size of which hinges on a claimant©s remaining UI "entitlement." Re 
maining entitlement is defined as the lump-sum payment representing 
the stream of benefit payments to be received over the remaining weeks 
of UI eligibility.
The New Jersey reemployment bonus treatment works as follows. 
Treatment group members pass through the sequence of JSA services
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(orientation, testing, and a job search workshop) to the assess 
ment/counseling interview which occurs in the seventh week of the 
benefit period. In the course of their interviews, claimants selected for 
this treatment are informed of the specifics of the bonus program. If 
they decide to participate, they can collect the maximum bonus by 
locating and accepting a job during the next two weeks. The maximum 
bonus is specified to be one-half of the claimant©s total entitlement. After 
the two-week period has passed, the size of the bonus will decrease 
by 10 percent per week, reaching zero at the end of the eleventh week 
after the assessment/counseling interview (the eighteenth week of the 
entitlement period).
A concern of program designers was that the bonus be structured so 
that it would not encourage claimants to take minimum wage or very 
short-term jobs. The Illinois experiment dealt with this problem, as noted, 
by requiring full-time employment lasting at least four months. Treat 
ment 3 participants in New Jersey are required to obtain full-time 
employment lasting four weeks in order to qualify for a bonus. 
Moreover, two additional provisions are built into the program to en 
courage participants to seek "appropriate" employment. First, 
counselors are to inform participants in the assessment/counseling in 
terview of the potential long-term earnings loss that would result from 
accepting a low-wage job just to get the bonus. Second, the bonus pay 
ment is divided into two lump-sums, with receipt of the second lump- 
sum contingent on continued employment for 12 weeks.
Corson and Kerachsky (1987:18) report that the bonus receipt rate 
is about 20 percent. 5 About one-quarter of those who earned the bonus 
received the maximum of $1,600, and most others received over 60 
percent of the maximum (the mean expected bonus is about $1,300). 
Given the limited experience to date, the authors indicate that the average 
job for which the bonus is claimed starts about four weeks after the 
assessment/counseling interview.
Returning to the estimates shown for the New Jersey demonstration 
in table 3.1, the incremental effects of the reemployment bonus are a 
reduction in the average duration of insured unemployment by 0.10 of 
a week and a decrease in UI benefit expenditures of $84.17. These 
estimates are substantially smaller than the corresponding estimates of
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1.15 weeks and $158 obtained for the Illinois Claimant Bonus Experi 
ment. Since the average bonus payment is more than twice that paid 
out in Illinois, the cost effectiveness of the Illinois claimant bonus pro 
gram does not appear to carry over to the New Jersey experiment. The 
New Jersey program pays out $260 (=.20 x $1,300) to save about $84 
in UI payments. Nevertheless, as argued by Corson and Kerachsky 
(1987:21), the truncation of the observation period means that the 
estimates presented in the table are likely to underestimate the ultimate 
effect of the reemployment bonus (as well as that of the other two 
treatments).
As a final comment on the reemployment bonus concept, Woodbury 
and Spiegelman (1987) make the point that the bonus paid to workers 
can be viewed in the context of either a job search model or an income- 
leisure model of labor supply. In the labor supply context, the bonus 
raises the opportunity cost of leisure consumed during the time period 
immediately following the initial claim, thus creating an incentive to 
substitute income for leisure. From this perspective, a reemployment 
bonus represents a wage-subsidy to workers which should help to over 
come their reluctance to move to jobs paying lower wages but offering 
superior career opportunities.
Programs to Monitor Job Search
In addition to paying bonuses to stimulate job search intensity, the 
incentive to engage in active job search may also be increased by rais 
ing the probability that claimants who fail to meet the UI work test will 
be detected and their names removed from UI benefit rolls. This sec 
tion discusses two demonstration projects intended to test the effec 
tiveness of alternative approaches to monitoring and directing the search 
activity of UI claimants.
The Charleston Claimant Placement 
and Work Test Demonstration
Carried out during the period from February through December 1983, 
this demonstration project involved over 5,000 UI claimants in the
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Charleston, South Carolina area who were randomly assigned to three 
treatment groups and a control group. All three treatment groups received 
a "strengthened work test" implemented by sending a call-in notice 
to claimants at the time their first UI check was issued requiring them 
to register at a local Job Service office within one week or face a possi 
ble loss of benefits. This delayed registration requirement represented 
a change from standard procedures in several ways. First, it exempted 
from registration ineligible and job-attached claimants, thereby allow 
ing the ES to focus its attention on those who might benefit most from 
its services. Second, it provided a definite date by which registration 
was to occur. Third, the registration requirement was explicitly 
monitored by a computerized matching of UI call-ins and ES registra 
tion files. Finally, when a match was not found, the claimant was sent 
a notice to report for a fact-finding interview, and no benefits were paid 
until he or she had reported. Treatment Group 3 received only the 
strengthened work test, as well as the same services provided all other 
ES applicants.
Treatment Group 2 differed from Group 3 in that, in addition to the 
strengthened work test, its members received more intensive job place 
ment services than those customarily provided. In particular, Group 
2 claimants were offered a placement interview during which they were 
placed in the job-matching system. After the placement interview, 
claimants considered job-ready could also expect to receive either a job 
referral or a job development attempt. Those claimants who were still 
unemployed nine weeks later were sent a second call-in notice requir 
ing a return visit to the ES. Enhanced placement services were also 
provided during this second visit.
Treatment Group 1 claimants were offered the same services as pro 
vided Group 2, with the addition of an opportunity to participate in a 
three-hour job search workshop. The workshops were offered to 
claimants who had been collecting UI benefits for four weeks. The special 
call-ins involved in Groups 1 and 2 services also increased the ability 
of the ES to provide information to enforce the UI work test. Group 
4, the control group, was told about the services available at ES offices 
but not required to report.
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The main results of the Charleston demonstration are described in 
Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985) and summarized in table 3.3. 
Relative to the experience of the control group, the strengthened work 
test applied to claimants in Group 3 reduced length of UI benefits by 
slightly over half a week and the amount of benefits by about $53. The 
ISA activities provided to claimants in Groups 1 and 2 further reduced 
per claimant UI expenditures, particularly the addition of the job search 
workshop for Group 1 claimants.
Table 3.3
Estimated Treatment Effects and Costs 
for the Charleston Demonstration Project
Treatment Group8 
Outcome measure 123














SOURCE: Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985: Table V.I, p. 104).
a. Treatment Group 3 received only the strengthened work test. Group 2 received enhanced job 
placement services plus the strengthened work test. Group 1 was offered a job search workshop 
in addition to enhanced job placement services and the strengthened work test.
Taking account of administrative costs, the final row of the table in 
dicates that for each dollar spent on administering the strengthened work 
test, UI expenditures were reduced by an amazing $11.21. The addi 
tion of enhanced job placement services for Group 2 claimants increas 
ed administrative costs by more than its small impact in reducing UI 
benefits. On the other hand, the job search workshop added for Group 
1 claimants decreased UI payments by more than the associated increase 
in administrative costs. Treatment 1 is therefore cost effective relative 
to Treatment 2.
Job Search Assistance Programs 75
Corson, Long, and Nicholson (1985:106-108) interpret their results 
as suggesting that there is no strong evidence that the treatments af 
fected the reemployment success of claimants, either by encouraging 
more active job search or by helping claimants to find jobs more rapid 
ly than they would have otherwise. Rather, it appears that the report 
ing requirements, coupled with the cessation of UI payments for failure 
to report, were the most important reasons why the treatments led to 
a reduction-in UI expenditures. Claimants tended to leave the UI rolls 
either because they were formally denied benefits or they simply stop 
ped claiming benefits. From an overall policy perspective, the Charleston 
demonstration indicates that the manner in which the UI work test is 
monitored does matter.
The Washington Alternative Work Search Project
The second demonstration project examined in this section is similar 
in design and orientation to the Charleston demonstration, but it places 
less emphasis on work test monitoring and more emphasis on alternatives 
for structuring UI claimants© work search effort. Located in Tacoma, 
Washington, the demonstration began on July 1, 1986 and was to con 
tinue for five quarters through the end of September 1987. Results are 
as yet unavailable.
Like the Charleston project, claimants in the Tacoma demonstration 
are randomly distributed across three treatment groups and a control 
group. Treatment 1 represents a radical departure from current policy. 
Claimants are instructed that they are expected to conduct an active 
search for work, but there is no monitoring of their search by the local 
Job Service office. The only requirement for continued UI benefit 
eligibility is that claimants call in whenever there is a change in their 
eligibility status (e.g., positive earnings or employment, ceasing to look 
for employment, or unavailability for work). The basic question ad 
dressed by this treatment is whether current monitoring and reporting 
requirements affect the motivation to seek work and the duration of 
unemployment.
Treatment 2 the control group subjects claimants to current work 
search policy. That is, following ES registration compliance with the 
UI work test is implemented by requiring all claimants, excluding those
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on temporary layoffs, to make three employer contacts per week. 
Claimants© self-reported search activity is monitored by local Job Ser 
vice officials on a weekly basis. The only reemployment service pro 
vided claimants is an Eligibility Review Interview (ERI) conducted dur 
ing the thirteenth week of unemployment (which is the average dura 
tion of unemployment for the state). The intent of the ERI is to advise 
claimants of continued eligibility requirements and to discuss work search 
techniques. Underlying this treatment is the premise that intervention 
in the search process is a low priority use of scarce resources in com 
parison to the timely payment of benefits. In meeting the specific needs 
of displaced workers, it is perhaps worth noting that the Secretary of 
Labor©s Task Force (1986:33) recommends that the ES be restructured 
to more effectively and efficiently deliver labor market adjustment 
services.
Treatment 3 represents a more activist approach to assisting the return 
to work. The main change from current policy is to tailor search re 
quirements to the needs of individual claimants and to local labor market 
conditions. In particular, the required number of contacts per week is 
made more flexible depending on the claimant©s occupation and par 
ticular reemployment problems. The work search requirement expressed 
in terms of contacts per week becomes more intensive, however, as 
length of unemployment increases. The ERI is also moved up in the 
claim period to as early as the fourth week for claimants in high-demand 
occupations.
Treatment 4 is similar to Treatment 3 except that instead of the earlier 
ERI, its main form of intervention is an intensive two-day job search 
workshop scheduled for the fourth week of unemployment. Interven 
tion in the fourth week is based on the presumption that if unemploy 
ment lasts more than a few weeks, the claimant is probably in need 
of JSA services. Workshop services include skill assessment, interview 
ing and marketing techniques, telephone canvassing, and job develop 
ment. The workshop is followed by three weeks of telephoning 
employers using the facilities of resource centers.
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Summary
Following a description of individual job search assistance services, 
this chapter focused on three types of JSA programs. A common ob 
jective of all three types is to speed up reemployment in order to reduce 
UI benefit expenditures. The different categories of programs are 
distinguished by the problem perceived as causing the reemployment 
process to be delayed. The most noteworthy feature of the evaluation 
evidence presented in the chapter is that the three types of JSA pro 
grams have all been subjected to evaluation using controlled experiments 
with random assignment.
The first type of JSA program is directed at the problem that displac 
ed workers may possess the vocational training but lack the job search 
skills necessary to locate new employment expeditiously. Programs in 
tended to enhance job search skills typically include a mix of services 
including orientation, assessment and testing, a job search workshop, 
counseling, and job development and job matching. Such JSA programs 
are widely available under Title HI of the Job Training Partnership Act. 
Described in detail in this chapter are the JSA experiments carried out 
in Delaware, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Texas, and Washington state. 
The evidence produced from the Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Texas 
experiments indicates substantial program effects measured in terms 
of reducing weeks of unemployment and level of UI benefits paid out. 
For the other two programs, the size of the sample available for the 
Delaware pilot project is probably insufficient for drawing reliable 
statistical inferences, and quantitative evidence is not available for the 
Washington project. It should be noted, however, that both the Delaware 
and Washington experiments have led to permanent state-funded 
programs.
A second type of JSA program is directed at the problem that 
reemployment is delayed because UI claimants lack the motivation to 
actively engage in job search. An innovative approach to stimulating 
the intensity of job search is the reemployment bonus. Examined in this 
chapter are two experimental programs designed to test the effectiveness 
of the reemployment bonus concept. Results from the completed ex 
periment in Illinois and preliminary results from the New Jersey
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experiment indicate that a reemployment bonus paid to workers (although 
not to employers) can reduce the length of unemployment and associated 
UI outlays. A striking finding from the Illinois experiment is that UI 
benefits were reduced by $2.32 for every $1 in bonuses paid out to 
claimants by the state.
The third type of ISA program is based on the hypothesis that alter 
native procedures for monitoring and directing the search activityof UI 
claimants would increase, relative to current practices, the intensity of 
job search. A test of this hypothesis has been carried out in Charleston, 
South Carolina and is currently being conducted in Tacoma, Washington. 
The Charleston demonstration project suggests that strengthening and 
regularizing the way initial ES registration is handled can make a substan 
tial difference in UI benefit expenditures. Rather than speeding up 
reemployment, however, the saving in UI expenditures appears to have 
been mostly due to an increase in the denial of benefits because of 
claimants© failure to satisfy the UI work test and to persons failing to 
continue to apply for benefits in the early weeks of their claims.
A common theme in the experimental results reported for all three 
types of programs is the significant impact of ISA in reducing UI benefit 
expenditures. Reinforcing these favorable results are ISA impact 
estimates on short-term earnings and reemployment opportunities ob 
tained from the federally-funded Downriver and Buffalo demonstration 
projects. In the case of the Buffalo project, for instance, Corson, Long, 
and Maynard (1985:112) report that program participants who receiv 
ed ISA services earned $134 more in the first six months after the pro 
gram ended than did members of the control group. Since ISA services 
are relatively inexpensive to provide, their favorable impact on UI benefit 
expenditures means that ISA programs are quite likely to be cost 
effective.
NOTES
1. The second and third treatments are, respectively, ISA plus an offer of either train 
ing or relocation assistance and ISA plus an offer of a reemployment bonus.
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2. ERP stands for "Eligibility Review Process," a term used in federal UI regula 
tions to refer to the process of promoting active job search by UI claimants. Because 
the job search workshops were viewed as assisting claimants in their job search, UI 
funds could be used to underwrite the cost of employing ES staff to conduct the 
workshops.
3. Corson and Kerachsky (1987:15) note, consistent with other evidence, that fewer 
than 1 percent of those offered relocation assistance used it.
4. The $500 figure represented a balance between the budget constraint of the ex 
periment and an arbitrary judgment about how small a bonus could still be expected 
to elicit a response. For the average UI claimant, $500 was approximately 5 percent 
of annual wage and salary earnings, and represented about four weeks of UI payments.
5. An additional 10 percent of Treatment 3 claimants stopped collecting UI but fail 
ed to collect a bonus. Claimants falling into this 10 percent are likely to have been 
ineligible for a bonus because they either returned to their former employer or they 
obtained part-time or seasonal work.

4
Advance Notice and On-Site 
Delivery of Services
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed, respectively, state initiatives in voca 
tional training and job search assistance (ISA) programs. Relatively little 
attention in those chapters was devoted to the questions of where the 
programs should be physically located and when the services should 
be offered. This chapter examines these two questions in the context 
of on-site delivery of reemployment services. On-site programs are 
generally of short duration and are timed to either precede or closely 
follow the announcement of a layoff or plant closure.
Concerning the location in which reemployment services are provid 
ed, the Office of Technology Assessment report (1986:234) makes the 
following argument favoring on-site programs:
Some of the best-run displaced worker projects are those 
centered in plants that are closing or undergoing large layoffs, 
and are operated by people who work at the plant on both 
the labor and management sides. Plant-centered projects have 
several advantages in their favor: the people who run them 
have a personal stake in the outcome, know many of the in 
dividual workers involved, and are acquainted with the local 
business community where the hidden job market (openings 
that are never publicly announced) is found.
Although it is not explicit in this quotation, the author of this section 
of the OTA report almost certainly had in mind the operation of on-site 
programs sponsored by the Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service 
(LAS). The LAS program serves as a model for the state rapid-response 
team initiatives discussed later in the chapter.
Before leaving the location question, it should be noted that, despite 
this chapter©s focus on site-specific programs, the great majority of
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displaced worker programs in the U.S. are neither located at the plant 
nor temporary. Programs operated beyond plant gates by continuing 
outside organizations are necessary because a large layoff or plant closing 
typically has a ripple effect in the community causing other firms, 
especially suppliers to the closed plant and local retail and service outlets, 
to terminate employees.
Regarding the timing of adjustment assistance, most analysts suggest 
that policy intervention is most effective if it is in place before layoffs 
begin (see, for example, Fedrau 1984:86). Although not all displaced 
workers will opt for immediate program participation, making reemploy- 
ment services available early offers several advantages. First, displac 
ed workers can be identified and offered program services before they 
disperse following layoffs. Second, program staff members are given 
an opportunity to counsel workers on the need to adjust to the new labor 
market realities they face and to assist them in planning a systematic 
job search strategy. In addition to minimizing the loss of earnings and 
benefits associated with layoffs, the early formulation of a job search 
strategy helps to avoid the bitterness and breakdown in self-respect that 
often accompanies the unexpected loss of a long-held job and the resulting 
period of inactivity. Finally, early intervention provides workers who 
choose to enroll in a retraining program the full 26 weeks of income 
maintenance furnished by UI. l It is also worth emphasizing that JTPA 
Title HI funds can only be used to assist workers who have already 
received a termination notice. Thus state-funded programs fill an im 
portant gap in assisting displaced workers before they are laid off.
A precondition for effective early intervention is that policymakers 
are aware of the imminence of a mass layoff or plant closure. This 
chapter begins with a discussion of advance notice legislation and ear 
ly warning systems. After describing state advance notice laws and the 
new federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the 
first section examines the limited number of empirical studies of the 
effectiveness of prenotification.
The next section provides an overview of the rapid-response programs 
in place in many states to deliver reemployment services on-site to 
displaced workers. Included is a discussion of the highly regarded Cana 
dian IAS program. A final section summarizes the chapter.
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Advance Notice and Early Warnings Systems
Early warning of a planned plant closure or mass layoff can be ob 
tained in either of two ways. 2 First, employers can be asked (voluntary 
advance notice) or mandated (required advance notice) to inform 
policymakers in advance of the date of a planned layoff or plant clos 
ing. Alternatively, a state may develop its own early warning system 
for identifying troubled firms. This section begins with an examination 
of the advance notice issue. Then state early warning systems are briefly 
discussed.
Advance Notification
Current and proposed legislation. During the past 20 years the states 
of Maine, Wisconsin, and Hawaii have enacted mandatory advance 
notice laws. In addition, at least two other states have legislation en 
couraging employers to voluntarily give advance notice of layoffs and 
plant closings, 3 and a number of other states are considering advance 
notice legislation. The first state plant closing law was adopted in Maine 
in 1971. As originally passed, the Maine law covered all firms with 
more than 100 employees and required that employees be given one 
month©s notice of an intended closing. The penalty levied against 
employers for failure to give notice was one week©s pay for every year 
worked (up to a maximum of one month©s pay) for every employee 
with at least one year of seniority. During the years that followed, the 
law was amended several times. From 1974 to 1982 the employee 
notification provision was dropped, and employers were only required 
to notify the director of the state©s Bureau of Labor. The law currently 
requires that an employer relocating outside the state must give 60 days© 
advance notice to employees and to the director of the Bureau of Labor. 
Also included in the law is a provision requiring one week©s severance 
pay per year of service for displaced workers with more than three years 
of seniority. 4
In Wisconsin, plant closing legislation was passed in 1976 and amend 
ed in 1984. The law currently requires 60 days© notice of a plant closure 
affecting at least 10 employees by any firm with 100 or more employees 
in the state. Notification must be received by affected workers, their
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collective bargaining representative, local community officials, and the 
state©s Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations. Employers 
who fail to comply with the notification requirement are subject to a 
fine of $50 per employee laid off.
The most recent piece of state plant closing legislation was signed 
into law by the Governor of Hawaii on July 7, 1987. This law requires 
employers with 50 or more workers to give 45 days© advance notice 
of a planned layoff. Notice must be provided in writing to all affected 
employees and to the state©s director of Labor and Industrial Relations. 
Penalties for noncompliance are twofold: (1) affected employees have 
the right to sue the employer for damages and (2) the employer is sub 
ject to a fine equal in value to three months© wages and benefits for 
each laid-off employee.
Turning to the national level, Hamermesh (1987) reports that an ad 
vance notice bill the Labor-Management Notification and Consulta 
tion Act of 1985 came within five votes of passage in the House of 
Representatives. This bill would have mandated at least 90 days© prior 
notification of a permanent layoff or plant closing involving more than 
50 employees. Dropped on the House floor from the final version of 
the bill was a provision requiring employers to consult© ©in good faith©© 
with representatives of employees on alternatives to a scheduled clos 
ing or layoff.
More recently, the highly controversial advance notice provision 
originally attached to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 required that firms employing 100 or more workers must give 
60 days© notice of a plant closing. In the case of a layoff, the bill re 
quired the 60 days© notice if the layoff involves 50 or more workers 
representing at least one-third of the workforce at a place of employ 
ment. Firms violating the advance notification requirement would be 
obligated to provide back pay to employees for each day of notice not 
given (up to a maximum of 60 days of wages) and to pay fines of up 
to $500 per day to their local governments. It is interesting to note that 
the final version of the bill approved by a House-Senate conference com 
mittee omitted a House provision requiring employers, after giving 
notification, to consult with unions on proposals to forestall closures 
or large layoffs.
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In addition to exempting small firms from the notification require 
ment, the 1988 act specified a number of other situations in which an 
employer scheduling a shutdown would not be required to give advance 
notice. Specifically, exemptions from the notification period would be 
permitted in the event of unforeseeable business circumstances or in 
cases in which a "faltering" employer was actively seeking additional 
capital or new orders to avoid or postpone shutting down. Other ex 
emptions included plant closings caused by the sale of the business, 
relocations within a community if workers were offered new positions, 
and closing of temporary facilities or completions of particular projects.
In May 1988, President Reagan vetoed the entire trade bill, principally 
because of his opposition to the mandatory advance notice provision. 
The House voted immediately to override the veto, but the 61 to 37 
vote in the Senate fell short of the two-thirds majority needed to over 
ride. Subsequently, however, prenotification became a hot issue dur 
ing the 1988 presidential campaign; and political pressure for the passage 
of some form of advance notice legislation was overwhelming. In July 
1988, Congress passed the conference committee version of the bill under 
the title, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) 
Act. The act finally became law in early August when President Reagan 
decided against vetoing the trade bill a second time.
Empirical studies. Despite the recent intense policy interest in plant 
closing regulation, relatively little has been done in attempting to em 
pirically measure the relationship between advance notice and the subse 
quent unemployment and earnings experience of displaced workers. 
There are four major studies available at this time.
In the earliest of these studies, Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick (1984) 
examine the plant closing legislation adopted in Maine. Although the 
Maine law currently makes advance notice mandatory, during the 
1974-82 time period examined by the authors the law required employers 
only to notify the director of the Bureau of Labor of a closing. Since 
the director treated as confidential the notifications he received, whether 
or not affected workers received advance notice was at the option of 
the employer. The resulting voluntary notification of workers permits 
a comparison to be made of the effects of notified and unnotified plant 
closings on local unemployment rates.
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The methodology applied by Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick involves 
regressing local unemployment rates on three sets of explanatory 
variables: (1) the number of workers laid off in major plant closings 
expressed as a percentage of the local labor force (current and seven 
lagged values of this variable are included); (2) a dummy variable 
representing advance notice of at least one month prior to a plant clos 
ing interacted with the layoff rates; and (3) control variables, including 
the state unemployment rate and a set of dummy variables measuring 
area-specific factors (other than plant closings), that might affect 
unemployment rates. The advance notice-layoff rate interaction terms 
permit the impact of advance notification to be measured conditional 
on the level of the layoff rate. The empirical analysis uses a pooled 
time-series/cross-section data set which includes monthly data for the 
1974-82 period measured across 15 labor market areas in Maine.
The regression results reported by Folbre, Leighton, and Roderick 
indicate that advance notice significantly diminishes the unemployment 
impact of layoffs in the month of the plant closing. Specifically, ad 
vance notice is estimated to reduce the effect of layoffs from 0.8 to 
0.3 unemployed workers in the local labor market area for every worker 
laid off in that month. The effect of advance notice on total unemploy 
ment measured over a six-month period can also be obtained by sum 
ming the estimated coefficients on the current and lagged values of the 
layoff variables and the advance notice-layoff rate interaction variables. 
Carrying out this calculation, the authors find that advance notice lowers 
total unemployment from five to four worker-months for every worker 
laid off. (It should be emphasized that these six-month estimates in 
clude the ripple effect of a layoff so that what is measured is aggregate 
worker-months of unemployment per worker laid off and not average 
months of unemployment experienced by a laid-off worker.)
In interpreting their results, an important point made by Folbre, 
Leighton, and Roderick is that the effect of advance notice on unemploy 
ment rates need not occur through the more rapid reemployment of 
displaced workers. It is also possible that a decrease in unemployment 
may occur via migration from the local labor market or complete 
withdrawal from the labor force. The authors report results from an 
auxiliary analysis showing that advance notice does decrease the size of
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the local labor force, but they are unable to distinguish between labor 
force withdrawal and outmigration (and possible reemployment 
elsewhere).
The provocative, if tentative, findings of Folbre, Leighton, and 
Roderick receive support from a study of individual-specific data by 
Addison and Portugal (1987b). The 1984 DWS data set discussed in 
chapter 1 includes a question that asked displaced workers whether or 
not they received advance notice or otherwise expected to be laid off. 
Addison and Portugal make use of this key piece of information in ex 
amining the effect of advance notice on the length of unemployment 
spells of workers laid off because of a plant closing or relocation. Serv 
ing as control variables in their regression analysis are a varietyof in 
dividual worker attributes including years of schooling, sex, race, 
predisplacement wage and years of tenure, and receipt of UI benefits.
The main results of the Addison-Portugal study are the following:
1. Advance notification of an impending layoff is strongly and in 
versely related to weeks of unemployment. Advance notice is found 
to reduce the average length of unemployment spells by about four weeks 
or nearly 28 percent.
2. The relationship between advance notice and unemployment hinges 
on the receipt of UI benefits, with benefits sharply reducing the effect 
of advance notice. Hence, the negative relationship between advance 
notice and unemployment duration holds mainly for those who did not 
receive benefits. This result can be best understood by noting that a 
worker who is eligible for UI by virtue of being unemployed has not 
been able to exploit the information conveyed in advance notification 
by locating a new job prior to the announced date of plant closure. In 
other words, the notified displaced worker receiving UI benefits is in 
much the same position as one who did not receive notification
3. The impact of advance notice on unemployment is also found to 
be significantly affected by a dummy variable measuring, for those who 
received advance notice of a layoff, the effect of quitting prior to the 
plant closing date. Inclusion of the "early leaver" variable reduces the 
estimated effect of advance notification by about 45 percent. This result 
reinforces the conclusion that the driving force behind the negative
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advance notice-unemployment relationship is the impact of prenotifica- 
tion in stimulating early job leaving.
Addison and Portugal point out three qualifications that should be 
kept in mind in interpreting their results. First, DWS data provide no 
information on the length of advance notification. To the extent that 
the period of advance notice is short, the effect of a policy-induced 
lengthening of the notification period will be understated. A recent 
USGAO study (1987b:34-35) points out that the usual period of notice 
is indeed quite short. Based on a survey of business firms that experienc 
ed a plant closure or made permanent layoffs, the USGAO reports that 
about one-third of the employers surveyed provided no notice at all and 
less than 20 percent provided notice of more than 30 days. The median 
length of notice was seven days.
A second qualification is that the DWS does not contain information 
on ISA services often offered in conjunction with advance notice. The 
same USGAO report (1987b: 46-47) notes that about one-third of the 
firms surveyed offered job search assistance, and about 20 percent of 
fered career and personal counseling. 5 If, as expected, ISA services 
speed up the reemployment process, the omission of these services has 
the impact of upwardly biasing the estimated effect of advance notice 
on unemployment duration.
The final qualification of the Addison-Portugal results is that, as noted, 
the advance notice measure available in the DWS includes respondents 
expecting to be laid off in addition to those who received advance notice 
of a layoff. Thus, the "treatment group" is contaminated by the inclu 
sion of an unknown number of respondents who did not actually receive 
notice but who instead accurately predicted the closing of their plants. 
Swaim and Podgursky (1988:11) argue; reasonably that workers receiving 
formal advance notice are likely to be more aggressive in their 
predisplacement search than those who merely expected to be laid off. 
If this is the case, measurement error in the notification variable will 
tend to bias downward the estimated impact of advance notice.
The third major study is the examination by Swaim and Podgursky 
(1988) of the impact of advance notice on duration of joblessness using 
a pooled sample of displaced workers from both the 1984 DWS and 
the 1986 DWS. 6 The conventional treatment of advance notice as a
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dummy variable implicitly assumes that notification only has an effect 
on postlayoff search. The main innovation of the Swaim-Podgursky study 
is the specification of an empirical model that explicitly allows job search 
to commence prior to layoff for workers receiving advance notice. The 
modeling of predisplacement search as qualitatively different from 
postdisplacement search makes sense for two reasons: (1) the financial 
pressure to engage in search is lower before the layoff date than after, 
and (2) continued employment between the dates of notification and 
layoff absorbs time that potentially could be invested in search activities.
The empirical results obtained by Swaim and Podgursky indicate that 
advance notice significantly accelerates reemployment for males in blue- 
collar and white-collar (including service) jobs and for white-collar 
females. This effect is primarily due to the fact that notified workers 
are more likely to find a new job before layoff and thus report zero 
weeks without work. By way of contrast, it is interesting to note that 
in an earlier study, the same authors report a significant effect of ad 
vance notice only for white-collar women (see Podgursky and Swaim 
1987c). Also worth noting is the Swaim-Podgursky finding that the rate 
of reemployment falls sharply as jobless spells increase in length. This 
negative "duration dependence" implies that although many displaced 
workers become reemployed with little or no joblessness, a substantial 
minority have severe adjustment problems and suffer prolonged spells 
of unemployment. Demographic groups at high risk of long jobless spells 
are found to include older workers, blacks, workers with little school 
ing, and single men. Labor market characteristics associated with lengthy 
spells include long job tenure, industry unionization rate, and area 
unemployment rate.
Swaim and Podgursky next use their results to simulate the effect on 
jobless duration of varying lengths of advance notice. For blue-collar 
males (by far the largest of the four groups examined), eight weeks 
of advance notice compared to no notice reduces the expected length 
of a jobless spell from 51.0 weeks to 48.1 weeks. Using market wage 
levels to measure the foregone earnings associated with joblessness, 
benefits for blue-collar males rise from $539 for four weeks of advance 
notice to $1,572 for twelve weeks of notice.
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The final empirical study, by Ehrenberg and Jakubson (1988), takes 
advantage of detailed industry and slate information available for 1984 
DWS respondents to create a merged data set containing an extensive 
list of industry- and area-specific variables. These variables include area 
unemployment rates, percent unionization by area, estimated three-digit 
industry wage premiums, and industry employment growth rates. Among 
the major findings of the study are the following:
1. There is little support for the hypothesis that workers who receiv 
ed advance notice paid for it by accepting lower predisplacement wages. 
Nor were the authors successful in explaining the incidence of 
prenotification using data on individual and industry characteristics and 
on employment growth and unemployment rates. In analyses such as 
the four studies reviewed here, it appears that advance notice can 
legitimately be treated as exogenously determined.
2. Advance notice did significantly increase the probability that a 
displaced worker would not experience any unemployment. Once 
unemployment is experienced, however, receipt of notification does not 
appear to affect the ultimate duration of joblessness. This result rein 
forces the Addison-Portugal and Swaim-Podgursky conclusion that ad 
vance notice primarily operates by stimulating early job leaving, thus 
moderating increases in local unemployment rates.
3. There is no evidence that receipt of advance notice has any signifi 
cant impact on postdisplacement weekly earnings measured as of the 
January 1984 survey date for workers displaced during the 1979-83 
period. Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) report the same result for workers 
displaced from full-time jobs.
4. For DWS respondents who received advance notice, the authors 
were unable to find evidence indicating that variables that might serve 
as proxies for productivity (such as job tenure, schooling, or previous 
earnings) were systematically associated with the probability that a 
worker might quit prior to the date of his or her displacement. Thus, 
there is essentially no support based on DWS data for the hypothesis 
that prenotification would lead the firm©s most productive workers to 
quit their jobs prior to the plant closure.
Benefits and costs of advance notice. Subject to the qualifications 
noted, particularly with respect to DWS data, the available empirical
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studies provide limited evidence supporting what is probably the most 
important benefit of advance notification legislation. This is the point 
that by speeding up the reemployment process, advance notice reduces 
the adjustment costs of displacement discussed in chapter I. 7 The 
resulting cost reduction represents both a private benefit to workers and 
a social benefit from the viewpoint of society.
The empirical evidence does not provide sufficient detail to offer a 
behavioral explanation of how the reemployment process is expedited. 
But a closely related benefit is that advance notice provides lead time 
prior to a layoff or plant closing for policymakers to plan and put into 
place a program of worker adjustment assistance. In this connection, 
the recent GAO report (1987b:32-33) notes that in Canada, comprehen 
sive advance notice laws require between 56 and 112 days of notice, 
and that officials of the Canadian IAS program argue that it takes the 
bulk of the required time to effectively prepare for a plant closing. 
Evidence summarized in the National Academy of Sciences study in 
dicates further that workers are more likely to enroll for reemployment 
assistance if the programs have the cooperation of management and are 
available prior to layoff (see Cyert and Mowery 1987:155-56). One 
other policy-related benefit is that advance notice provides time for 
government officials to search out new owners for facilities slated for 
closure and to assist employee groups in organizing a buyout attempt.
Given the probable benefits of advance notice legislation, the key 
policy issue is whether these benefits outweigh the costs imposed on 
employers when the government mandates a period of notice that dif 
fers from the notice agreed to voluntarily by workers and employers 
as part of the compensation package. One factor representing a private 
cost to employers is that by reducing the firm©s flexibility in making 
layoffs, advance notification increases the fixed costs of employment. 
Greater fixed costs affect the demand for labor by causing employers 
to hold back on hiring commitments until they can be reasonably sure 
that workers hired can be kept on the payroll long enough to recoup 
the fixed costs. Workers just worth hiring are now priced out of the 
market.
A series of recent editorials in The Wall Street Journal make the argu 
ment that the much higher rate of employment growth in the U.S. than
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in Western Europe since 1970 is due, at least in part, to a difference 
in the cost of hiring and laying off workers. For example, Drouin (1986) 
writes that in Common Market countries:
[R]igid dismissals legislation has transformed labor costs into 
fixed costs. The ensuing inflexibility increases overall 
business costs and risks. Again most countries, notably 
France, are introducing measures to facilitate hiring and fir 
ing. Most countries are allowing increased use of fixed-term 
contracts. Italy is relaxing recruitment regulations. But, 
generally, layoffs continue to require discretionary decisions 
by government and lengthy negotiations. The cost of dismissal 
remains steep.
Lazear (1987) also concludes from his reading of the European ex 
perience that legislation that protects a worker©s right to a job will benefit 
some individuals at the expense of others. Incumbent job holders are 
likely to benefit from job security policies, while the young and the 
unemployed will be hurt. In his view, the record indicates that the number 
of jobs lost far outweighs those retained.
A second cost-side consideration mentioned in connection with the 
Ehrenberg-Jakubson study is a possible negative effect of advance notice 
on worker productivity. One reason is that a termination notice may 
reduce employee morale and encourage shirking during the notifica 
tion period. Also contributing to lower worker productivity is the possible 
effect of advance notice in encouraging early quits, thereby risking the 
loss of crucial employees and potentially crippling reductions in the size 
of the workforce.
Finally, employers frequently make the third cost-side argument that 
advance notice invites contentious efforts by unions and other employee 
groups to alter the decision to close a plant. White (1988) provides an 
interesting description of the backlash that has occurred when parent 
companies try to close plants after having earlier accepted tax conces 
sions and subsidized loans offered by states and local communities to 
preserve jobs. Actions taken by local government officials to keep plants 
in their communities from closing include breach-of-contract suits, prod 
uct boycotts, and court injunctions preventing the transfer of capital 
equipment to other plants.
Advance Notice 93
The balance of opinion among labor economists and policymakers 
appears to favor requiring employers to provide advance notice of plant 
closings or permanent layoffs. On the benefit side, the empirical ar 
ticles surveyed in this section indicate that advance notice does facilitate 
the adjustment of workers into new jobs prior to their date of displace 
ment. On the cost side, in contrast, the fragmentary evidence currently 
available fails to suggest that advance notice requirements impose 
substantial private costs on employers. Regarding the argument of higher 
fixed costs, Abraham and Houseman (1988) conclude from their analysis 
of time-series manufacturing data for Germany and the U.S. that there 
is no strong evidence that the quite restrictive and controversial dismissal 
legislation passed in Germany in the early 1970s affected subsequent 
adjustment practices. 8
Concerning workers© productivity and morale, the Ehrenberg- 
Jakubson findings confirm the results of an early case study by Weber 
and Taylor (1963) of 32 plant shutdowns which shows that there was 
no perceptible decrease in productivity following the announcement of 
a plant closing. Weber and Taylor suggest, in fact, that the spread of 
rumors concerning an impending plant closure may be more destruc 
tive to morale and productivity than a formal announcement of the shut 
down. More recently, the National Academy of Sciences report (see 
Cyert and Mowery 1987:157) concludes that
[T]he productivity and quality improvements that occur [dur 
ing the advance notice period] appear to reflect the reaction 
of employees to the evidence that management is concerned 
about their welfare, the operation of counseling and job search 
programs that begin prior to layoff, the resolution of anx 
ieties and uncertainties, and the desire of workers concern 
ed about reemployment to demonstrate to new employers that 
the quality of the work force in the closed plant was high. 
[Emphasis added.]
Fedrau (1984:84) and the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force (1986:22-23) 
reach similar conclusions.
It should also be mentioned that there is a conceptual counterargu 
ment to the cost-side point that advance notice has the effect of increasing 
fixed costs of employment. The counterargument is that while
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advance notice may increase the private costs borne by employers, failure 
to provide advance notice imposes substantial costs (or "externalities") 
on workers and communities not shared by the firms closing plants or 
laying off workers. Advance notification requirements may thus be view 
ed as a mechanism for ensuring that employers bear (or "internalize") 
a portion of the costs they impose upon others. In other words, such 
requirements help to cushion workers from the mil adverse consequences 
of free market decisions, making it politically possible to avoid the sort 
of heavy government intervention often practiced abroad.
Given the widespread support for some form of plant closing regula 
tion, it is interesting to speculate on the reasons underlying the intense 
opposition of many business groups to the modest advance notice re 
quirement enacted in the 1988 WARN bill. Addison (1988) suggests 
that this opposition has less to do with the specifics of the notification 
requirement than with the fear that this piece of legislation represents 
an opening wedge for the introduction of far more coercive and costly 
forms of government intervention. His argument is that the federal budget 
deficit and taxpayer resistance to tax increases severely constrain federal 
policymakers from directly providing such widely discussed employ 
ment benefits as universal health insurance, parental leave, and child 
care. Thus the natural response of those who seek to extend worker 
entitlements is to mandate employers to foot the bill for such services.
State Early Warning Systems
A number of states have also proceeded independently of employers 
in developing their own early warning systems to identify firms exper 
iencing financial difficulty and to indicate needed changes in state 
economic policies. To date, no assessments of these systems have been 
carried out, and little is known about the importance the states themselves 
attach to internally generated early warning signals. This section con 
tains a brief overview of the early warning programs of a few selected 
states and some associated empirical evidence.
Balderston (1986) describes the early warning systems in place in 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Arizona. In Connecticut, the Depart 
ment of Economic Development has attempted to piece together a 
historical record of every company that closed in the state and the
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reasons for each failure. A predictive model based on these data is then 
used to provide forecasts of which existing firms and plants may be 
at risk of shutting down, and field staff members are assigned to work 
with these employers to increase their chances of survival. Balderston 
notes that the business failure data have also been found useful in con 
tributing information on needed adjustments in state policies.
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that the thrust of economic develop 
ment programs in some states has shifted from attracting new firms to 
retaining existing firms. In the geographically small state of Rhode 
Island, the Department of Economic Development surveys each 
employer in the state on an annual basis as part of its business retention 
program. The purpose of the interviews is to gauge the attitude of the 
business community toward the state©s economic climate and to deter 
mine how state government can assist in lowering operating costs and 
expanding markets. In Arizona, similarly, a Governor©s Task Force 
recently surveyed existing firms as well as employers who left the state 
or chose not to locate in Arizona in an attempt to assess the effectiveness 
of current state economic policies.
Beyond these three states, still other states have recently taken ac 
tion to establish early warning systems. In Massachusetts, the Mature 
Industries Act passed in 1984 provides for an early warning system in 
tended ". . .to identify industries and businesses likely to experience 
large losses in employment or plant closures. . . ." In carrying out this 
objective, the Act directs a designated state agency the Massachusetts 
Industrial Service Program to collect and analyze information on prod 
uct markets experiencing declining growth rates and on industries sub 
ject to competition from Third-World countries. This agency is also 
given the responsibility to monitor changes in patterns of company 
ownership, employment, and layoffs; of UI contributions; and of state 
corporate tax payments. Since 1984, Nelson (1986; 1987) reports that 
Missouri and New Jersey have both established commissions charged 
with developing early warning signals to identify industries beginning 
to decline and firms in danger of closing.
Recent research by Rowland (1988) helps in our understanding of 
what factors are important determinants of plant closures ^nd reloca 
tions. Using Dun and Bradstreet©s Dun Market Identifiers file, she
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merged into a single data set time-series observations for 1973, 1975, 
1979, and 1982 for each of approximately 54,000 establishments in three 
narrowly defined manufacturing industries (metal working machinery, 
electronic components, and motor vehicles). Among her major findings 
are the following:
1. The most important predictor of whether a plant will close is the 
plant©s status as a branch, subsidiary, headquarters, or independent 
(single-plant operation). Branches and subsidiaries are found to close 
at much higher rates than headquarters and independents. An implica 
tion of this finding is that economic development strategies should em 
phasize the promotion of start-ups and expansions of locally owned firms. 
In addition, Rowland suggests that local takeovers of marginally pro 
fitable branches and subsidiaries provide largely untapped opportunities 
to keep these plants operating.
2. Local economic conditions including relative wage levels, utility 
costs, taxes, and rate of unionization do not strongly influence the prob 
ability of a plant closure. This finding implies that local public policies, 
including lowering tax rates, curbing utility costs, and discouraging 
unionization, will not be effective in retaining jobs. Such policies may 
even be counterproductive if they reduce the level of local income and 
tax revenues.
In addition to Dun and Bradstreet data, a potentially quite important 
source of information on plant closures is the Permanent Mass Layoff 
and Plant Closing (PMLPC) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
This federal-state program, initially established in 1984 for eight states, 
uses data from each state©s UI data base to identify and track workers 
affected by major plant closings and layoffs. In 1987, the survey covered 
29 states and included information on 1,687 establishments that reported 
2,020 major layoffs affecting 406,887 workers. It is expected that the 
program will become nationwide during 1988.
The way the PMLPC program works is that state UI data bases are 
used to identify establishments with at least 50 initial claims filed against 
them during a three-week period. Within each state, these establishments 
are then contacted by telephone by the state©s employment security agen 
cy to determine the total number of persons separated, the reasons for 
these separations, whether the separations are permanent or temporary,
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and whether or not the establishment is remaining open. The resulting 
PMLPC data set merges information collected from two different 
sources: (1) state UI data bases which supply information on the per 
sonal attributes of individual claimants such as sex, age, race, ethnici 
ty, and residence, and (2) telephone contacts with employers which pro 
vide information on establishment characteristics including location and 
industry. Until regular UI benefits are exhausted, the continuing im 
pact of a permanent layoff or plant closing can be tracked by matching 
affected initial claimants with continued claims filed under regular state 
UI programs.
On-Site Delivery of Services
On the presumption that policymakers are informed of an imminent 
plant closing, the next question is the most effective way to deliver 
reemployment services to workers scheduled to be displaced from their 
jobs. The OTA report (1986:238) points out that the value of advance 
notification is greatly diminished if high-quality reemployment services 
are not offered during the lead time notification provides. An impor 
tant aspect of policy intervention during the notification period is that 
affected workers are given a structure on which they can pattern their 
job search activities. The idea is that displaced workers who are engaged 
in active job search are less likely to lapse into a destructive loss of 
self-confidence that may otherwise accompany a permanent job loss.
Before proceeding further, it is important to make a distinction be 
tween two types of on-site programs. The first involves the on-site 
delivery of formal vocational training programs to workers who have 
not received notice of termination but who cannot expect to retain their 
present jobs if their skills are not upgraded. An example of this type 
of on-site initiative is the computer numerical control machining pro 
gram provided by California©s ETP program (see Arthur Young 
1985:16-17). 9 Serving employees of three large aerospace firms in 
southern California, this program brings a mobile training facility (i.e., 
a training trailer) to the site of each participating company. In contrast, 
the second type of on-site program is intended to provide predominantly
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ISA services to workers who have received notice of a permanent separa 
tion from their jobs. It is the second type of program which will be 
discussed here.
Recent discussions of on-site JSA programs have featured prominently 
the Canadian IAS program. For example, one of the major recommen 
dations of the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force (1986) is to create a 
worker adjustment service in each state modeled along the lines of the 
IAS. The examination of the IAS program is followed by a description 
of existing state rapid-response team programs.
The Canadian IAS Program
Established in 1963, the IAS is a federally-funded agency intended 
to serve as a catalyst in bringing together local labor and management 
officials to locate job oppportunities for workers displaced by economic 
and technological change. The I AS is very small in terms of number 
of employees and size of budget. Its staff consists of 60 experienced 
professionals, with only three persons located in its headquarters of 
fices in Ottawa and the rest assigned to regional field offices. Its an 
nual budget in recent years has been between $6 and $8 million (in Cana 
dian dollars).
As described in the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force report (1986:21), 
the IAS program operates on five premises.
1. Reemployment services should be offered in advance of, rather 
than after, a plant closing or mass layoff.
2. Advance warning is essential to allow time for planning and im 
plementing appropriate reemployment services.
3. Worker adjustment to displacement is best accomplished by the 
joint action of the parties directly involved.
4. The role of government is to encourage and support, not to sup 
plant, the efforts of management and labor.
5. Program participation should be voluntary.
After learning that a plant closing is imminent, the IAS acts immediate 
ly to meet with labor and management representatives at the highest 
possible level and to offer its assistance in finding new jobs for laid-off 
workers. Early warning of a layoff is quite likely because six of the 
ten Canadian provinces have plant closing laws that require 8 to 16
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weeks© advance notice of layoffs affecting 50 or more workers. In ad 
dition, a national advance notice law applies to government-owned enter 
prises such as airlines and railroads.
If the lAS©s offer of assistance is accepted, which is nearly always 
the case, the agency negotiates a brief formal agreement which pro 
vides for the establishment of an ad hoc labor-management adjustment 
committee consisting of an equal number of labor and management 
representatives. Labor representatives include prospective job losers 
wherever possible. The purpose of the agreement is to obtain from both 
the employer and the union (if a union is present) a commitment of time 
and financial resources to the adjustment process. The IAS also pro 
vides a chairman, whom the adjustment committee may select from a 
roster of experienced people. In addition, it pays half of the commit 
tee©s costs, with the company usually picking up the other half. Com 
mittees typically finish their work and disband in about one year. The 
IAS arranges from 400 to 600 labor-management agreements per year.
The basic strategy of the IAS is to place unemployed workers in jobs 
that are never publicly announced, but instead are filled by word-of- 
mouth. From this strategy follow several of the important features of 
the program. One of these is an emphasis on prompt placement rather 
than retraining, relocation, or counseling. Adjustment committees not 
only undertake to uncover job openings, but they also attempt to make 
it easier for prospective employers to consider client workers by assisting 
in the screening process. Workers who cannot be placed because of 
a need for retraining are referred to Canada©s extensive adult vocational 
training system.
A second feature of the lAS©s strategy is recognition that it is people 
with extensive experience in the industry and community that is, the 
labor and management representatives on an adjustment committee  
who are in the best position to use their informal contacts to engage 
in job development. Thus the LAS advisor to an adjustment committee 
keeps a low profile, and the committees themselves are flexible enough 
to look at the individual needs of each worker. Worth emphasizing is 
the basic philosophy of the IAS that displaced workers are to be assisted 
individually by persons who know them personally.
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The OTA (1986:23-24, 55, and 167) and the Secretary of Labor©s 
Task Force (1986: Appendix A) comment favorably on the operation 
of the IAS. Noted in particular are the program©s modest cost (about 
$171 per year for every worker served), reasonably good placement 
rates (about two-thirds of workers affected by plant closings are placed 
within a year), absence of bureaucratic red tape, and contribution to 
improved labor-management relations. The Task Force report also men 
tions that a survey of displaced workers served during the 1982-83 fiscal 
year indicated that IAS assistance reduced the length of unemployment 
spells by an average of two weeks, with the resulting saving in unemploy 
ment insurance benefits.
One other indication of the interest of U.S. policy makers in the LAS 
program is the implementation in January 1987 of a demonstration 
program the Canadian-American Plant Closing Demonstration 
Project to help determine whether the Canadian model can be transfer 
red to the U.S. Jointly sponsored by the USDOL and the National Gover 
nors© Association, six states including Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, and Vermont, were selected to participate in the proj 
ect. In each state, at least two sites have been selected to test the im 
pact of adjustment committees in assisting the reemployment of displaced 
workers in a variety of different settings. Salzman (1987) reports that 
the project has already caused several states to rethink the administra 
tion and operation of their displaced worker programs.
State Rapid-Response Teams
Of existing labor market initiatives in this country, the one that prob 
ably comes closest to the IAS is the state rapid-response team concept. 
Balderston (1986:39) reports that over 20 states have established rapid- 
response teams to coordinate the delivery of services on-site to displaced 
workers. A representative example of this coordination is the New Jersey 
Labor Response Team program established in December 1984. The pro 
gram is operated by the state©s Department of Labor.
Following notification of a plant closure or mass layoff, represen 
tatives of relevant state agencies arrange for a meeting with manage 
ment officials to discuss the economic status of the company. If a plant 
closure or layoff is determined to be unavoidable, the range of available
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state reemployment services is reviewed, and the meeting concludes 
with an agreement on the plan of action to be taken and the date for 
a response team to make an on-site presentation to affected workers.
A response team consists of staff members of New Jersey©s ES and 
UI divisions, the Division of Employment and Training, and the local 
Service Delivery Area of the Title HI JTPA program. A variety of topics 
are discussed by teams in the on-site sessions. These include an ex 
pedited process for registering for UI benefits, the requirements for con 
tinued eligibility for UI coverage, an ES-sponsored job search workshop, 
and the retraining opportunities available in Title HI programs. The job 
search workshop, in particular, is sold as a service especially designed 
for people who have not been obliged to look for a job in recent years 
because they have been continuously employed. 10 Two themes emphasiz 
ed in the sessions are that (1) a displaced worker should not feel that 
he or she is alone, since the phenomenon of permanent mass layoffs 
and plant closings is a common one in New Jersey and across the na 
tion; and (2) it is important to take prompt advantage of the adjustment 
services offered.
The available evidence indicates that employer awareness of the New 
Jersey program is growing and that more firms involved in curtailing 
operations or shutting down plants are contacting the state©s Depart 
ment of Labor and providing time and space on-site for team presenta 
tions. For the period between July 1, 1986 and March 31, 1987, the 
program estimates that 11,461 potentially displaced workers were of 
fered adjustment assistance services.
Other state rapid-response team programs place somewhat more em 
phasis than New Jersey on employer involvement. In the case of the 
Arizona Pre-Layoff Assistance Coordination Team (PACT) program, 
an employer planning a layoff or plant closure initiates the process by 
alerting state UI or JTPA officials. A PACT team is then assembled, 
consisting of staff members from the state©s JTPA, UI, and ES offices 
plus representatives from Arizona©s regional system of Dislocated 
Worker Assistance Centers. The employer is asked to designate a lead 
official to serve as the company©s primary contact for the PACT team, 
to supply an on-site facility for the prelayoff sessions, and to provide 
two to four hours of paid time off for workers to attend the sessions.
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In addition, companies are encouraged to use their informal contacts 
to help in the placement of affected workers with other employers in 
the local labor market and to cooperate with the PACT team in putting 
on a Job Fair. Once a plant has been closed, remaining displaced workers 
are transferred to the regional Dislocated Worker Assistance Center 
for additional reemployment services. Information provided by the state 
indicates that the PACT program of on-site prelayoff assistance has 
achieved a placement rate of 89 percent.
The South Carolina Rapid Response Team program differs from both 
the New Jersey and Arizona programs in its strong economic develop 
ment focus (see OTA 1986:212). As is the case for the other programs, 
South Carolina©s rapid response teams arrange a site visit following 
notification of a probable or actual plant closing. What is different about 
the South Carolina program is that if the team©s assessment indicates 
that closure is avoidable, a strategy is formulated that commits the state 
to providing assistance directly to the employer. Forms of assistance 
include loan and tax incentive packages; aid in financial management, 
marketing, and research and development; and programs to retrain 
workers for jobs using automated equipment. If the closing is deemed 
inevitable, on the other hand, the team works to find an alternative owner 
for the plant and to convert the workforce to new employment.
As a final example of the rapid-response team concept, the "outplace 
ment team©© initiative of Rhode Island©s Dislocated Workers Program per 
haps comes the closest to the LAS model of joint labor-management 
cooperation. To explain the operation of this initiative, Dislocated Work 
ers Program officials have developed a case study of the closing of a plant 
in Cranston, Rhode Island owned by the Swiss-based Ciba-Geigy Chem 
ical Corporation. The following discussion is based on the case study. n
Following the announcement in January 1984 that the Ciba-Geigy 
plant would be closed by the end of 1985, a joint labor-management 
outplacement team was formed, consisting of representatives of the Oil, 
Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union, the company, and state govern 
ment. The team adopted the following goals for dealing with the ad 
justments required by the plant closure:
1. company participation in the adjustment process;
2. sensitivity to the company©s production obligations;
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3. awareness of the relationship between job loss and workers© feel 
ings of disbelief, despair, and, sometimes, depression;
4. understanding by individual workers of their employment options 
in the context of a career and life plan; and
5. minimizing the time between jobs.
Given the promise of company resources and the pledge of coopera 
tion by the union, state officials on the team played the role of a con 
sultant to company and union team members who jointly had the final 
say on the services to be offered.
With the luxury of two years of advance notice, the outplacement 
team was able to plan and implement a sequence of reemployment ac 
tivities timed to roughly correspond to the phased shutdown of the plant. 
During the first year, the team sponsored retirement seminars for poten 
tial retirees and a series of workshops for workers not contemplating 
retirement. The workshops included assistance in financial planning, 
establishing a job objective, conducting job search, and forming job 
clubs. The team also developed a listing of workers classified by skill 
to alert other area employers to the availability of Ciba-Geigy employees 
and conducted individual and group counseling sessions. It is interesting 
to note that feedback from the counseling sessions indicated a high level 
of worker interest in the possibility of self-employment. The team 
responded to this interest by sponsoring an entrepreneurship seminar 
which led to a contractual arrangement with the state©s Small Business 
Development Center to provide customized assistance to those for whom 
starting their own business was still a viable option.
The outplacement team continued to operate during 1985 with the 
initiation of four additional reemployment activities. The first was a 
two-day "options fair" designed to acquaint workers with available 
career counseling and retraining options. The team also acknowledged 
the relatively low levels of formal schooling of many of the older Ciba- 
Geigy employees by developing a high school equivalency program of 
fered on-site with the cooperation of the Community College of Rhode 
Island. Later in the year, the team organized workers into job clubs 
to better equip them to find jobs on their own. The final activity was 
a two-day Job Fair which brought together 35 potential employers to 
meet with Ciba-Geigy workers.
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The South Carolina and Rhode Island rapid-response team programs 
pose two important policy questions not yet considered in this 
monograph. A question raised by the South Carolina program is the 
desirability of supplying assistance directly to distressed employers to 
keep existing facilities open and retain jobs, as opposed to the alter 
native policy of offering reemployment services to workers laid off when 
a plant closes. The further question posed by the Rhode Island program 
is the wisdom of assisting unemployed workers to establish their own 
small businesses. The next chapter briefly treats state economic develop 
ment initiatives which take the form of packages of financial and other 
types of assistance to attract new employers, retain old employers, and 
find new owners for idled facilities. Also considered in chapter 5 are 
worker ownership initiatives, including employee buyout assistance and 
British and French experience with unemployed entrepreneur programs.
Summary
Ruth Fedrau, a noted manpower analyst who was instrumental in 
establishing the California©s rapid-response program (the California 
Economic Adjustment Team), lists seven principles for developing a 
successful worker reemployment program (see Fedrau 1984). The prin 
ciples stress the desirability of (1) early notification of layoffs,
(2) straightforward communication with employees and union represen 
tatives on planned plant closures and available reemployment services,
(3) temporary but intensive services preferably located on-site,
(4) providing an assistance center on-site, (5) pooling the resources of 
community organizations and government agencies, (6) providing a wide 
range of services, and (7) joint management-labor sponsorship of 
assistance.
This chapter discussed how these principles are implemented in exist 
ing reemployment initiatives. The first half of the chapter dealt with 
the issue of advance notification. Included is an overview of advance 
notice laws on the books in three states and the federal Worker Adjust 
ment and Retraining Notification Act. The limited empirical evidence 
currently available on the impact of advance notice on the subsequent
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unemployment experience of displaced workers is also examined. The 
empirical evidence suggests that advance notice is effective in speeding 
up the transition of displaced workers to new jobs, primarily by en 
couraging workers to locate employment prior to scheduled termina 
tion dates. Thus advance notification appears to reduce both the private 
and social costs of adjustment associated with worker displacement.
What makes advance notice legislation controversial is the question 
of whether this benefit to workers and to society as a whole is suffi 
cient to offset the private cost to employers of higher fixed costs of 
employment and the possible negative effect on worker productivity 
created by such laws. In the absence of evidence demonstrating an 
adverse effect on employers, most analysts take the position that, on 
balance, advance notification requirements represent sound social policy.
The latter half of the chapter considered the temporary on-site 
reemployment programs suggested by the third through seventh of 
Fedrau©s principles. Included in the discussion was the highly regard 
ed Canadian Industrial Assistance Service program. The main strength 
of the LAS is its encouragement of the active participation by employers 
in using their informal networks to place workers in jobs that are never 
publicly announced. The closest U.S. initiative to the IAS is the rapid- 
response team concept, and the operation of several rapid-response team 
programs was examined.
In comparison with the LAS, state rapid-response programs differ 
substantially among themselves in the emphasis placed on employer in 
volvement in minimizing the disruptive effects of displacement. At one 
end of the spectrum, teams consisting of representatives of relevant state 
agencies are the dominant players in programs intended to deliver a 
wide range of reemployment services. Employer participation in these 
programs tends to be limited to providing time and a place for the on- 
site delivery of services. At the other extreme, state programs emphasize 
the joint involvement of management and, where present, unions in 
locating jobs for displaced workers. In these programs, state officials 
typically play the more subordinate role of a consultant to the company 
and union representatives on the team.
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NOTES
1. Federal law permits the waiver of the UI work test if the claimant is enrolled in 
a training program approved by the Employment Security Commissioner of his or her 
state.
2. The provisions in privately negotiated collective bargaining agreements that pro 
vide for advance notice of plant shutdowns are excluded from this discussion.
3. The voluntary Maryland advance notice law passed in 1985 requests that employers 
of 50 or more workers provide 90 days© notification of permanent layoffs. In addition, 
employers are requested to continue employee pension and health insurance benefits, 
and a Quick Response Program to provide on-site assistance to displaced workers was 
established. As part of its Mature Industries Act, Massachusetts requests employers 
to give 90 days© advance notification of large layoffs and plant closings and to extend 
group health insurance coverage to laid-off workers. The Mature Industries Act is 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
4. In a recent decision announced in June 1987 (Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 
No. 86-340), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Maine©s law requiring one-time 
severance pay for plant closings does not conflict with federal labor law regulating 
the administration of employee benefit plans.
5. More common than placement assistance is the offer of either income maintenance 
of continuation of health insurance. About 45 percent of firms surveyed offered the 
former, and about 37 percent offered the latter.
6. The 1986 DWS questionnaire poses exactly the same advance notice question as 
the 1984 questionnaire. This question, as noted in the text, has the serious limitation 
of confounding the responses of workers who expected to be laid off with the responses 
of workers who actually received notice of layoff. In the 1988 DWS, the sequence 
of questions on advance notice is changed so that those who received written notice 
can be distinguished from those who merely expected to be laid off. A second improve 
ment in the 1988 DWS is access to information on the length of time between the dates 
of notification and layoff.
7. Hamermesh (1987) notes, however, that the relatively short period of advance 
notice required in state laws is unlikely to reduce by much the amount of firm-specific 
investment that is rendered worthless by a plant closing. Indeed, he argues (1987:72) 
that "[W]hether employers can even be cognizant of impending doings sufficiently 
far in advance to allow for provision of that information to reduce the costs of adjust 
ment is itself not clear."
8. This legislation added to existing notification requirements the obligation that 
employers making layoffs must negotiate with employee representatives a "social plan" 
that specifies compensation to laid-off workers. Moreover, in the event that the two 
parties cannot agree on the provisions of the social plan, the law provides for binding 
arbitration.
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9. A related on-site vocational training program is the Alabama Industrial Develop 
ment Training program. Begun in 1971, AIDTraining uses a fleet of 36 mobile train 
ing units to locate at the sites of manufacturing firms that have expressed interest in 
moving to or expanding in Alabama.
10. Topics treated in the job workshops include use of labor market information; 
employer expectations; how to fill out job applications, write a resume, and interview; 
self-evaluation of skills, abilities, and aptitudes; and learning to sell oneself to a pro 
spective employer.
11. Fedrau (1984) provides a similar case study of the response of the California 
Economic Adjustment Team to the 1981 closing of a Mack Truck plant in Hayward, 
California. State officials chose the Mack Truck closure to define the roles state agen 
cies should play in meeting the needs of displaced workers and to develop a model 
for local communities to follow. In addition to the cooperation of the United Auto 
Workers and Mack Truck management, Fedrau points out that noteworthy features 
of the program included (1) the involvement of local business leaders in helping displaced 
workers with debt, credit, and mortgage problems, and (2) the opening of an assess 




Most of the programs discussed in chapters 2 through 4 are primari 
ly intended to ease the transition of workers displaced by a plant clos 
ing or mass layoff to new jobs in established enterprises. Chapter 4, 
in particular, began with a quotation which stressed the advantages of 
on-site programs in assisting this transition. The same passage from 
the OTA report (1986:234) goes on to suggest that
. . . such [on-site] programs fill a special need, which is to 
serve large numbers of workers with similar skills and work 
histories who are all dumped on the labor market at once. 
Even in good times, it is difficult for local labor markets to 
absorb a great many similar workers at the same time. 
Even more difficult than absorbing a large number of displaced 
workers in good times is the absorption problem when times are bad. 
Results provided by Podgursky and Swaim (1987c) indicate that local 
labor market conditions significantly affect duration of joblessness, and 
it is not uncommon for a major plant closure or mass layoff to take 
place in a depressed labor market so that few local firms are hiring and 
those jobs that are available are low-wage positions with little oppor 
tunity for advancement. In these circumstances, state policymakers have 
quite naturally shown an interest in developing economic alternatives 
to plant closures.
Broadly speaking, state-level initiatives to save jobs by retaining ex 
isting employers or attracting new ones fall into one or more of the 
following categories:
1. customized training programs;
2. grants, low-interest loans, and tax concessions to employers located 
in depressed communities or other specific geographic areas; and
3. assistance to encourage employee buyouts of existing facilities and 
start-ups of new small businesses by unemployed workers.
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Among these three categories, customized training programs have 
already been discussed in chapter 2. Initiatives falling under the other 
two headings are the subject of this chapter. Because several of these 
initiatives are incorporated in the sweeping displaced worker program 
provided by Massachusetts, the chapter begins with a discussion of that 
state©s Mature Industries Act. Included is a consideration of state 
assistance to businesses located in depressed geographic areas termed 
"enterprise zones." The second major section concerns initiatives in 
tended to stimulate employment growth by encouraging the formation 
of worker-owned enterprises. A brief summary section concludes the 
chapter.
Massachusetts© Mature Industries Act
In 1983, the Governor of Massachusetts, Michael S. Dukakis, ap 
pointed a blue-ribbon commission to develop a cooperative strategy in 
volving business, labor, and government for stabilizing and possibly 
expanding the state©s manufacturing sector. Based on the report of the 
commission, the Governor proposed and the Massachusetts legislature 
passed in 1984 a comprehensive law known as the Mature Industries 
Act. At the heart of this legislation is a voluntary "social compact" 
between business and government to work together to cushion the im 
pact of plant closings while attempting to stimulate the growth of 
manufacturing firms. As part of the social compact, employers are ex 
pected to conform to certain voluntary standards of corporate behavior. 
Specifically, employers are to make a good-faith effort to provide at 
least 90 days© advance notice of large layoffs and plant closings and 
to supply health insurance coverage to laid-off workers. In exchange, 
Massachusetts provides access to state programs offering a variety of 
forms of assistance to displaced employees and financially troubled firms.
The presidential campaign of Governor Dukakis served to focus na 
tional attention on the contribution of programs established by the Mature 
Industries Act to the state©s impressive performance in creating new 
jobs and its very low unemployment rate. As described by Nelson (1987), 
the Act is currently serving as a model for legislation being considered 
by other states.
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An Overview of the Act1
Probably the most important agency created by the Mature Industries 
Act is the Massachusetts Industrial Service Program, and a good way 
to get an overview of the Act©s provisions is to examine the broad scope 
of this umbrella organization. In addition to marketing to employers 
the Act©s social compact, the Program©s responsibilities include the 
following:
1. Overseeing an early warning system.
2. At an employer©s request, providing assistance to alleviate the con 
ditions that threaten to cause a large layoff, plant closure, or business 
failure. Examples of such conditions stated in the Act are outmoded 
production technologies, loss of markets, and poor management.
3. On the request of a local community adversely affected by a ma 
jor plant closure or business failure, assisting in finding new uses for 
idled plants and in fostering job creation in the community.
4. If a mass layoff or plant closure is deemed inevitable, assisting 
in the effort to secure alternative employment and retraining opportunities 
for displaced employees. This assistance includes coordinating the 
delivery of available state and federal reemployment services.
Beginning with the first of these responsibilities, the purpose of the 
early warning system, as described in chapter 4, is to identify industries 
and particular firms that are likely to experience large losses in employ 
ment, plant closures, or bankruptcy. As part of the social compact be 
tween the state and employers, moreover, a firm planning a large layoff 
or plant closure is to notify the director of the state©s Division of Employ 
ment Security promptly in order to qualify affected workers for 
reemployment services. The director©s responsibility is to certify that 
a plant closing or partial closing has or will occur. The Act defines 
a plant closing as the permanent shutting down of a facility which results 
in at least 90 percent of the employees being permanently separated 
within a six-month period prior to the date of certification (the anticipated 
date of plant closure). A partial closing is the permanent cessation of 
a "major discrete part of the business" which results in the layoff of 
a "significant" number of employees and which affects workers and 
communities in a manner similar to that of a plant closing. Notice of 
certification is given to the employer as well as to any union or unions
112 Other Initiatives
representing the employees, and an appeal procedure is available to any 
party wishing to challenge the certification decision.
Turning to the second and third of the four duties listed, the Act gives 
a separate quasi-public agency, titled the Economic Stabilization Trust, 
the responsibility for providing financial assistance to existing or 
reorganized enterprises in mature industries. The Trust has its own board 
of trustees, but the director of the Industrial Service Program serves 
as its chief executive officer; and the Trust is physically located in the 
central office of the Program. In the language of the Act, "[T]he pur 
pose of the economic stabilization trust shall be to provide flexible high 
risk financing necessary to implement a change of ownership, a cor 
porate restructuring, or a turnaround plan for an economically viable, 
but troubled, business. ..." The Trust is designed to supplement the 
credit available through private financial institutions and public economic 
development agencies, but it is specifically instructed not to apply the 
loan loss standards of private commercial lenders. Rather, the Trust 
is to consider the social costs of a plant closure or business failure and 
the tax revenues generated by an ongoing business enterprise.
In addition to the Economic Stabilization Trust, the Act established 
a second quasi-public funding agency the Massachusetts Product 
Development Corporation intended to operate independently of the In 
dustrial Service Program. The role of the Corporation is to assist 
economically viable existing firms to increase their market share and 
expand employment opportunities. More specifically, the Corporation©s 
legal mandate is to provide financial assistance to encourage the develop 
ment and marketing of new products in situations where such assistance 
would not otherwise be reasonably available from private lending 
institutions.
Established by a separate piece of legislation, a third quasi-public fund 
ing agency called the Massachusetts Technology Development Corpora 
tion specializes in providing seed money and early-stage financing to 
entrepreneurs in high-technology areas. (In contrast, the Product 
Development Corporation is a potential source of funds to any 
Massachusetts firm.) As recently described by Gupta (1987), en 
trepreneurs use state grants to get high-tech projects off the ground. 
Once technical feasibility has been demonstrated, the entrepreneur is
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in a position to raise additional funds from the private venture capital 
market.
Besides Massachusetts, a number of other states have created pro 
grams to supply entrepreneurs with seed and early-stage financing. 
Among the best known of these are Pennsylvania©s Ben Franklin Part 
nership, Ohio©s Thomas Edison Program, and Michigan©s comprehen 
sive network of venture capital and seed capital funds. The Ben Franklin 
and Thomas Edison programs offer fledgling entrepreneurs grants and 
a link to scientists and engineers employed in major research centers 
at state universities. A notable feature of Michigan©s venture capital 
program is its enabling legislation passed in 1983 which allows the pro 
gram to invest in new enterprises up to 5 percent of the state©s public 
employee pension funds. These pension funds were valued at $15 billion 
in 1988.
Beyond the three programs providing financial assistance, the direc 
tor of the Industrial Service Program in Massachusetts is authorized 
under certain conditions to contract with private consultants to (1) assess 
the viability of an employer in financial difficulty and develop an ad 
justment strategy that would allow the business to survive or (2) assist 
in securing new ownership or new management to keep the business 
in operation. If the decision is made to seek new ownership, priority 
is given to selling the business either to its employees or to a resident 
of the state. With respect to a potential employee buyout, the Act directs 
that ". . .the director shall inform the employees that the business is 
for sale, inform the employees of their opportunity to purchase the 
business, and provide the employees with the same assistance in pur 
chasing said business for which other interested buyers may be eligible."
The fourth responsibility of the Industrial Service Program is to assist 
in providing reemployment services to workers displaced from their 
jobs by a certified plant closure. Three forms of assistance are specified 
in the Act. The first of these the Reemployment Assistance Program- 
offers a variety of reemployment services, including counseling, place 
ment assistance, and retraining. Combining state funding with federal 
JTPA Title in funds, the Reemployment Assistance Program operates 
out of two types of service centers located across the state. "Emergen 
cy assistance centers" provide temporary services on-site to workers
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displaced by a certified plant closing or large layoff. These emergency 
assistance centers are Massachusetts© version of the state rapid-response 
team programs discussed in chapter 4. "Worker assistance centers," 
in contrast, are designed to serve workers in economically distressed 
areas of the state, particularly areas affected by long-term unemployment 
problems. Because of their longer-term, community-based focus, the 
worker assistance centers attempt to reach workers who remain 
unemployed for lengthy periods of time after the date of a plant closing 
or mass layoff.
Displaced workers participating in the Reemployment Assistance Pro 
gram are eligible for two additional benefits: (1) up to 13 weeks of sup 
plemental Reemployment Assistance Benefits and (2) a maximum of 
three months of health insurance benefits. The Reemployment Assistance 
Benefits are intended, when added to regular UI benefits, to bring the 
individual up to 75 percent of his or her previous weekly wage. Benefits 
are currently subject to a cap of $108 per week, and the benefit period 
is reduced by one week for each week of advance notification and/or 
separation pay. The twofold purpose of the supplemental benefits is to 
help individual workers and their families adjust to a sudden income 
loss and to put a floor under aggregate purchasing power in communities 
adversely affected by the loss of large numbers of jobs.
The third form of assistance is a health insurance program which urges, 
as part of the Act©s social compact, that employers extend group health 
insurance coverage for up to 90 days to workers who would otherwise 
be ineligible for coverage because of a partial or complete plant shut 
down. In the event of a certified plant closing caused by bankruptcy, 
however, the insurance premium that would have been borne by the 
employer is paid by a health insurance benefit fund established by the 
Act. As would be expected, eligibility for the health insurance program 
is restricted to displaced individuals not covered by the health insurance 
carried by another family member. 2
Innovative Features of the Act
There are at least four features of the Massachusetts Mature Industries 
Act that warrant further examination. This section continues with a discus 
sion of three of these features. They are supplemental unemployment
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benefits, continuation of health insurance coverage, and assistance to 
firms located in depressed sections of the state. The fourth innovative 
feature encouragement of employee buyouts is examined in the next 
section of the chapter.
Supplemental and extended unemployment benefits. Massachusetts ap 
pears to be unique among the states in offering unemployed workers 
a program that supplements UI payments. Among federal programs, 
the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program described in chapter 
2 supplemented regular UI payments during the 1974-81 period to boost 
the level of income support to 70 percent of the previous weekly earn 
ings of eligible claimants. As noted in that chapter, TAA legislation 
passed in 1981 cut back income support to the level of UI payments.
Labor economists have extensively analyzed the relationship between 
the level of weekly UI benefits and duration of unemployment. In a 
survey of the literature, Hamermesh (1977:37) reports that his "best" 
point estimate of the relationship is that a 10 percentage point increase 
in the gross wage-replacement ratio (the ratio of UI benefits to wages 
unadjusted by the then nontaxable status of UI benefits) lengthens the 
duration of insured unemployment by about half a week. A more re 
cent and widely cited study by Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) similarly 
finds that a 10 percent increase in the net replacement ratio results in 
an increase of about 0.4 of a week in length of unemployment spells 
for a sample containing a disproportionate number of exhaustees, and 
an increase of about 0.8 to 1.0 week for more representative samples.
While Massachusetts is alone in supplementing the level of UI benefits, 
several states, including California, Connecticut, Alaska, Hawaii, and 
Puerto Rico, provide state-funded programs extending the length of UI 
payments. Historically, the maximum duration of UI payments has also 
varied over time in response to special congressional action and to federal 
legislation that includes "trigger" mechanisms based on state-insured 
unemployment rates. The purpose of extended benefits is to provide 
the income support necessary to allow qualified displaced workers to 
take advantage of longer, more intensive training courses that cannot 
readily be squeezed into the usual 26-week maximum duration of UI 
payments. The main disadvantage of extended benefits is the potential 
disincentive to return to work. Moffitt and Nicholson report that an
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increase in maximum duration of one week results in a 0.1 week in 
crease in average weeks unemployed.
Health insurance coverage. Most Americans with health insurance 
are covered by a group plan for which the employer pays the premium. 
When a worker©s job ends, therefore, insurance coverage generally also 
terminates, usually within 30 to 60 days. The OTA report (1986:118) 
points out that individual policies may cost more than twice as much 
as the group plans they replace.
In a recent article, Podgursky and Swaim (1987a) use 1984 DWS 
data to examine the extent to which displaced workers are likely to be 
without health insurance coverage for an extended period of time. They 
find that for displaced workers who enjoyed group health coverage on 
their previous jobs, 57.9 percent of blue-collar and 70.1 percent of white- 
collar and service workers reported that they were currently covered 
by some sort of group policy. Not surprisingly, the incidence of coverage 
is strongly associated with employment status. But even for reemployed 
workers, only 71.0 percent of blue-collar workers and 79.6 percent of 
white-collar and service workers were covered by a group plan.
Podgursky and Swaim also utilize a second survey administered in 
1984 the Work Experience Survey to examine the extent to which 
displaced workers who had earlier lost employer group health insurance 
are covered by other types of health insurance. Their results indicate 
that many of these workers were able to fall back on coverage from 
another family member©s group policy or on a government health in 
surance program such as medicaid. Nevertheless, 23.2 percent of blue- 
collar workers and 16.2 percent of white-collar workers are found to 
have had no health insurance coverage whatsoever. Worth noting is the 
fact that these estimates do not include a sizable fraction of workers 
(8.5 percent and 12.3 percent of blue-collar and white-collar workers, 
respectively) who reported coverage by some other unspecified type 
of health insurance policy. The authors note that the comprehensiveness 
and quality of insurance programs that fall into this residual category 
are open to question.
In contrast to the provision of supplemental unemployment benefits, 
the lead taken by Massachusetts in the area of health insurance coverage 
has been followed by other states. The annual surveys of new state labor
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legislation provided by Nelson (1984; 1985; 1986; and 1987) suggest 
that states are taking three different approaches in attempting to extend 
health insurance coverage to displaced workers. The first approach is 
to request that employers continue to provide health insurance coverage 
to displaced workers. This approach is followed in Massachusetts© social 
compact and in the voluntary guidelines included in Maryland©s 
Economic Stabilization Act.
The second approach taken in recent legislation passed by several 
other states permits displaced workers, at their own expense, to con 
tinue participating in a group health insurance program. Clearly the 
strongest health insurance provision, however, is that taken in a third 
approach followed by Connecticut. Connecticut employers of 100 or 
more workers, who close or relocate, must pay for the continuation 
of existing group health insurance for affected employees and their 
dependents for up to 120 days. An Iowa law also spells out specific 
circumstances under which an employer remains liable for the continua 
tion of benefits to displaced workers.
Enterprise zones. Many states have recently enacted legislation similar 
to the provisions of the Mature Industries Act intended to stimulate 
economic development and create jobs in severely depressed areas. The 
selected depressed areas are commonly known as "enterprise zones." 
Enterprise zones within a state are geographic areas identified by such 
factors as high unemployment, a concentration of low-income 
households, and decreases in population. Within cities, enterprise zones 
typically include blighted inner-city neighborhoods. Once a zone has 
been identified, special state services are provided to employers and 
workers located or residing within the zone. Bendick and Rasmussen 
(1986) report that 21 states have some form of enterprise zone legisla 
tion on their books.
The original formulation of the enterprise zone approach to economic 
development was modeled after the highly successful experiment in 
unfettered capitalism in Hong Kong. Advocates of this approach argue 
that the rapid growth exhibited in a low-income nation like Hong Kong 
can be attributed, at least in part, to an absence of government regula 
tion and low tax rates. With minimal government presence in the 
marketplace, individual entrepreneurs enjoy both a strong incentive to
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work hard and invest and an an opportunity to adapt flexibly to chang 
ing economic circumstances. Thus the expected outcome of an enter 
prise zone policy is a high birth rate of new, small business firms. 
The enterprise zone concept was congenial to the supply-side 
economics approach to economic policy during the early years of the 
Reagan administration, and President Reagan sent a federal enterprise 
zone proposal to Congress in 1983. Although the proposed Enterprise 
Zone Employment and Development Act did not receive Congressional 
approval, the 1983 legislation is useful in illustrating the specific forms 
that an enterprise zone policy might take. As described in Weiner (1984), 
major provisions of the proposed Act are the following:
1. A general payroll tax credit for employers increasing net employ 
ment in a zone equal to 10 percent of each additional employee©s wage 
up to a maximum credit per employee of $1,750.
2. A nonrefundable special tax credit equal to 50 percent of the 
employee©s earnings (with no upper limit) for employers hiring disad- 
vantaged individuals in a zone. Disadvantaged workers are defined to 
include welfare and general assistance recipients.
3. A nonrefundable tax credit for employees working in the zone of 
5 percent of the employee©s earnings up to a maximum credit per 
employee of $525.
4. A nonrefundable 3 or 5 percent investment tax credit, over and 
above the regular investment tax credit, on capital investment in a zone, 
and a 10 percent credit for the construction or reconstruction of buildings 
in a zone.
5. Elimination of all long-term capital gains taxes on business prop 
erty in a zone.
6. Preservation in zones of the use of tax-exempt, small-issue industrial 
development bonds.
7. Increased regulatory flexibility in zones, whereby federal agen 
cies and regulatory bodies could relax, upon request of state and local 
authorities, any regulatory requirement except requirements provided 
by statute or affecting civil rights, safety, or public health.
8. A requirement that state and local governments commit themselves 
to specific actions to enhance development of a zone, including tax and 
regulatory relief, improved services, and community involvement.
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The employment tax credits included in the first through the third 
of these provisions represent a wage subsidy intended to encourage 
employers to supply more OJT opportunities. Because the tax credits 
are mainly nonrefundable and capital-raising provisions are largely ab 
sent, Weiner points out that the proposal would be expected to be ef 
fective in inducing existing zone firms to expand and nonzone firms 
to open new branches in the zone, but relatively less effective in pro 
moting the birth of small businesses. The major reasons are that (1) small 
firms are unlikely to be profitable enough to benefit from the nonrefun 
dable tax credits, and (2) one of the chief obstacles facing potential en 
trepreneurs is the need to raise capital. As will be described in more 
detail in the next section, small business creation is often seen as a crucial 
factor in encouraging economic development and growth in employ 
ment opportunities. Also worth noting in connection with the seventh 
provision is the meager attempt at achieving greater regulatory flexibility.
With the defeat of President Reagan©s enterprise zone proposal in 
Congress, Bendick and Rasmussen (1986:114-18) point out that the role 
of the states has become central to the implementation of the zone idea. 
Their summary of existing state programs indicates the following general 
patterns. First, most states focus on tax incentive efforts with little more 
than a nod in the direction of regulatory flexibility. Second, most of 
the tax incentives are straightforward reductions of total tax burdens, 
as opposed to reductions in marginal tax rates designed to increase work 
effort or entrepreneurial initiative. Finally, most states are supplemen 
ting their tax incentives with extensive government activity within zones. 
Examples of these activities are land use planning, infrastructure develop 
ment, improvement of public services, loan funds, technical assistance, 
and the training of disadvantaged workers.
Because of problems including inadequate or inappropriate incentives, 
lack of coordination with other state programs, and excessive red tape, 
Bendick and Rasmussen also note that a number of states are planning 
to seek major revisions of their initial enterprise zone legislation. These 
revisions may well embody a return to the original enterprise zone con 
cept with its emphasis on the birth and development of small, indigenous 
firms.
120 Other Initiatives
In this connection, state-funded "incubator" programs represent an 
initiative already in operation in a number of states which is specifical 
ly intended to "hatch" new small businesses. Incubators are generally 
defined as multi-tenant buildings offering affordable space and a varie 
ty of support systems to start-up companies. Describing the 31 small 
business incubators located in Pennsylvania, former Governor Richard 
Thornburgh (1988:5) writes that the buildings housing the start-ups 
. . . range from an empty apparel manufacturing facility, now 
housing two fledgling electronic businesses previously 
operating out of the proverbial basement and garage, to the 
former Bethlehem Steel Homer Research Center in the Lehigh 
Valley. The latter has been crammed with over 20 new and 
diversified small businesses (including one that operated for 
a time out of the facility©s former coat closet). 
Support systems typically provided in incubators include shared office 
services such as telephone answering and word processing; the profes 
sional assistance of lawyers, accountants, and management consultants; 
and access to capital. The objective of an incubator is to nurture the 
growth of fledgling companies by making it possible for entrepreneurs 
to concentrate their energies on producing the product or service on 
which the survival of the business depends. Also important to the growth 
of incubator firms is the informal support system that often develops 
as tenants overcome early crises and become familiar with each other©s 
operations.
Worker Ownership Initiatives
The overview of the enterprise zone concept in the previous section 
emphasized policy initiatives designed to provide an environment in 
which employers located in depressed areas are encouraged to main 
tain or even expand the employment opportunities they offer. This sec 
tion shifts to a discussion of initiatives directed at stimulating employ 
ment growth by encouraging the formation of worker-owned enterprises. 
Two types of initiatives are considered. The first includes programs 
providing assistance to enable employee groups to save their jobs by
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purchasing companies or facilities that might otherwise close. The sec 
ond includes assistance to individual unemployed workers to help them 
start up their own small businesses.
Employee Buyout Programs
Returning for a moment to the Massachusetts Mature Industries Act, 
the director of the Division of Employment Security is instructed, in 
the case of a plant closure, to inform affected employees that the business 
is for sale and that they have an opportunity to purchase the facility 
with the same assistance that would be offered to any other potential 
buyer. As described earlier, financial assistance provided by the 
Economic Stabilization Trust is available for implementing a change 
in ownership of a business that is financially troubled but is nevertheless 
considered economically viable.
Over the 1981-85 period, Balderston (1986:24) reports that a total 
of 14 states, including Massachusetts, enacted legislation specifically 
promoting employee ownership. More recently, Nelson (1986; 1987) 
indicates that three additional states have passed laws to assist the 
development of employee-owned firms. Most of these laws authorize 
programs that offer a combination of technical and financial assistance 
to employee groups seeking to purchase a business that would other 
wise close. One example is the 1984 Pennsylvania Employee-Ownership 
Assistance Program, which appropriated $15 million over three years 
to promote the restructuring of existing businesses, including those facing 
layoffs or closings, into employee-owned enterprises. Approximately 
$3 million of this total was to be spent in providing technical assistance 
to employee groups considering the employee buyout option, and the 
remaining $12 million was intended to assist in the financing of employee 
buyouts.
A second example the 1986 Michigan Employee-Owned Corpora 
tion Act is interesting in terms of the specificity of the services pro 
vided employee groups wishing to develop an employee-owned cor 
poration. As described in Nelson (1987), the state©s Labor Department 
is directed to assist in the formation or operation of employee-owned 
corporations by (1) developing and disseminating information on pro 
cedures for carrying out an employee buyout; (2) evaluating the feasi-
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bility and economic viability of proposed employee-owned corporations; 
(3) providing technical assistance and counseling services; (4) assisting 
in obtaining financing; (5) coordinating local, state, federal, and private 
agency assistance; and (6) recommending appropriate legislative or ex 
ecutive action to enhance opportunities for such corporations. With 
respect to financing, the law specifically states that employee-owned 
corporations are to be considered eligible for grants and loans provid 
ed by the state©s Public Economic Development Corporation to assist 
businesses to locate and expand in Michigan. 3
As a final example, the New Jersey Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
Act of 1984 is worth noting because it spells out a methodology to be 
used in determining whether an enterprise is economically viable. The 
Act directs that when a plant closure is anticipated or actually takes 
place in an already economically distressed municipality, the Commis 
sioner of Commerce and Economic Development may fund the prepara 
tion of a cost-benefit analysis of the potential profitability of an employee 
buyout. After a review of the results of the analysis, financial assistance 
including loan guarantees or low-interest loans is to be provided to 
employee purchasers if the benefits are judged to exceed the costs and 
funds are available.
State initiatives designed to encourage employee buyouts of troubled 
firms reflect the general interest in employee ownership which has 
developed over the past 10 to 15 years. It appears that this interest, 
in turn, largely stems from two factors: (1) the series of tax incentives 
embodied in Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), and 
(2) evidence from case studies of a favorable impact on labor produc 
tivity and profits of greater worker participation in decisionmaking.
Focusing on the first of these factors, an ESOP is a corporate finance 
strategy used to provide company stock to employees on a tax-favored 
basis. The way it works is that the company sets up a special trust similar 
to a pension or profit-sharing trust to which it contributes shares of its 
own stock. Stock held in the trust is allocated to the accounts of individ 
ual employees, making them partial owners of the company. In a typical 
ESOP, employees receive an amount of stock equivalent to 5 to 15 per 
cent of their annual compensation. Thus while employees may make 
wage and benefit concessions to permit a failing firm to survive (in-
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eluding, in some cases, giving up their pension plans in return for an 
equity stake in the company), only rarely do employees groups direct 
ly borrow to purchase company stock.
A major tax advantage of the formation of an ESOP is that the value 
of stock contributions made by the employer is tax deductible from the 
company©s income. In 1984, Congress made ESOPs even more attrac 
tive when it permitted lenders to deduct from taxable income 50 per 
cent of the interest earned on ESOP loans, thus making it possible for 
lenders to profit while lending to ESOPs at below-market rates. Tax 
reform legislation passed in 1986 also permits an ESOP using stock 
dividends to repay debt to deduct the dividends from its tax liability.
Rosen, Klein, and Young (1986:15) point out that as of 1984 there 
were over 7,000 ESOP plans in existence, covering over 10 million 
employees. As they note, ESOPs are established for a variety of reasons. 
These reasons include improving employee benefits, raising capital 
cheaply, making a market for the sale of the equity position of a depart 
ing owner, implementing a participatory management philosophy, car 
rying out a leveraged buyout (i.e., a buyout in which management or 
outside investors borrow enough money to buy a controlling interest 
in the firm), and enabling employees to buy out a firm that would other 
wise close. Employee buyouts of failing companies represent the most 
publicized of the uses of ESOPs, even though it is one of the least com 
mon. Most companies become employee-owned as part of a business 
strategy to restructure the ownership of an ongoing firm. Indeed, Kutt- 
ner (1985a:20) remarks that"... most examples of ©employee owner 
ship© are still cases of traditional corporate management recognizing 
the value of making the workplace a bit less alienating, rather than 
workers effectively organizing production."
Turning to the case study evidence, probably the best known exam 
ple of a favorable impact of worker ownership on productivity and profits 
is the case of Weirton Steel. In March 1982, Weirton©s then parent, 
the National Steel Corporation, announced that it planned to close its 
mill located in the small town of Weirton, West Virginia. The mill was 
only marginally profitable, and National Steel was rapidly diversifying 
away from primary metals. The closing of the mill would have meant 
the loss of over 7,000 jobs and the possible death of the community.
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Following a year and a half of negotiations and exhaustive preparation 
based on an ESOP master plan developed by a well-known consulting 
firm, an employee buyout of the mill was worked out in which workers 
agreed to a 20 percent reduction in wages and benefits. Moreover, 
worker compensation was frozen at the new lower level for six years 
and employees had to wait five years to receive full voting rights.
Since the buyout was completed in January 1984, Weirton Steel has 
survived and even prospered to the extent that the company has reported 
13 consecutive profitable quarters and has hired back all 3,000 workers 
formerly on layoff. While worker wage and benefit concessions clear 
ly played a role in Weirton©s success, O©Boyle and Roth (1985) also 
emphasize the importance of breaking down old antagonisms between 
management and labor, increasing employee participation at all levels 
of decisionmaking within the firm, and establishing a profit-sharing plan.
It must be pointed out, however, that the success thus far of Weirton 
Steel is not necessarily representative of all attempts at employee buyouts. 
A case in point is the failure of worker ownership at the Rath Packing 
Company, a meat-packing firm located in Waterloo, Iowa. Hammer 
and Stern (1986) describe how the threat of Rath©s closure in 1978 led 
the local union to negotiate an employee buyout effected in 1980. 
Through an ESOP, employees gained 60 percent of the company©s stock 
and majority representation on the board of directors, as well as a com 
mitment from the firm to give workers at all levels involvement in deci 
sionmaking. For their part, workers agreed to defer improvements in 
wages and benefits called for by the packing industry©s master contract.
While the shop-floor productivity committees established by the ESOP 
initially appeared to work well, pressures exerted by a traditionally adver 
sarial labor-management relationship and continued financial losses led 
to management demands for further worker wage and benefit conces 
sions and to union demands for personnel changes in top management. 
By the spring of 1983, union leaders had abandoned the system of shop- 
floor committees, and open conflict was breaking out over conditions 
of work and company finances. The company ultimately filed in 
November 1983 for protection under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code.
The Rath Packing Company experience highlights some of the risks 
involved in an employee buyout of a failing firm. Recent discussions
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of the use of ESOPs as a financing tool (see, for example, Kotlowitz 
and Bean 1987) also raise questions about the actual benefits to workers. 
One problem is that ESOPs have to be highly leveraged to take full 
advantage of tax breaks, since these breaks are debt-related. This makes 
ESOPs especially vulnerable to an economic downturn. Other concerns 
are that workers often receive only a passive role in company decision- 
making and that workers are obliged to shoulder greater risk when stock 
ownership is substituted for conventional pension plans. 4
In addition to case study evidence, there are also a limited number 
of empirical studies relating to the effect of employee ownership on 
labor productivity and the job creation performance of firms. Rosen 
and Klein (1983) report on a survey carried out by the National Center 
for Employee Ownership (NCEO) of the structural characteristics and 
employment growth of majority employee-owned companies. Over the 
1977-82 period, the 43 employee-owned firms included in the survey 
are found to have averaged an annual employment growth rate 2.78 
percentage points higher than that of conventional firms in the same 
economic sectors. The authors point out that over a 10-year period this 
difference means that employee-owned firms would generate 31 per 
cent more jobs than comparable conventional firms.
A subsequent NCEO survey described by Rosen, Klein, and Young 
(1986) collected data for 37 ESOP companies and 2,804 employees. 
The purpose of the survey was to investigate the relationship between 
employees© satisfaction with their jobs and their employers and such 
ESOP characteristics as the percentage of company stock owned by the 
ESOP, worker voting rights, and the reason the company established 
its ESOP. The authors find that ESOPs can function effectively to 
motivate workers and increase job satisfaction if employers (1) are will 
ing to make significant financial contributions to the plan, (2) are strongly 
committed to the philosophy of employee ownership, and (3) are ready 
to develop an active program to educate employees about the ESOP. 
It is interesting to note from the Rosen, Klein, and Young study that 
the reason a company established its ESOP appears to have no effect 
on the employee satisfaction variables.
Besides ESOPs, worker cooperatives are the other major form of 
employee ownership. A recent empirical study by Jones (1987) uses
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data for a 1978 sample of 50 British retail cooperatives to obtain 
econometric estimates of the effect on labor productivity of worker finan 
cial participation and employee involvement in decisionmaking through 
representation on boards of directors. His results indicate that board 
representation has a positive impact on productivity, especially the 
presence of worker-directors who currently are employed or once were 
employed in the same co-op. On the other hand, financial participation 
by employees negatively impacts productivity. Jones notes that the lat 
ter finding is the opposite of what is typically found for producer co 
ops. For example, Jones and Svejnar (1985) report for a large sample 
of Italian producer cooperatives that profit-sharing and worker owner 
ship of assets as well as worker participation in management tend to 
increase productivity. Jones (1987) notes that this difference may reflect 
the low level of financial participation by employees in retail co-ops 
as compared to producer co-ops. For retail co-ops, the net impact on 
labor productivity of both forms of worker participation is small but 
positive.
Unemployed Entrepreneur Programs
Although initiatives to assist unemployed workers to become self- 
employed have yet to be implemented in permanent programs in this 
country, U.S. policy makers are presently showing a strong interest in 
the unemployed entrepreneur concept. An example is the useful USDOL 
(1986) report prepared at the request of Senators Gary Hart, Bob 
Packwood, and Lloyd Bentsen, who expressed a particular interest in 
the potential for allowing UI benefits to be used to help support 
unemployed workers in the start-up phase of establishing their own small 
businesses.
Following up on this interest, the USDOL entered into a cooperative 
agreement with Washington state in the fall of 1987 to fund a demonstra 
tion project to test the effectiveness of making UI benefits available to 
claimants who establish small businesses. Approximately 400 laid-off 
workers were to be provided an incentive to start their own business 
by the offer of lump-sum payments of up to $6,000. Since the demonstra 
tion project was to be funded by the federal government, it would not 
violate the federal ban restricting states from paying UI benefits to
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unemployed workers not actively engaged in job search. Galante (1987) 
also notes that the states of Michigan, New Jersey, and Massachusetts 
are studying ways of using UI benefits to help unemployed workers 
in launching new businesses.
Support for unemployed entrepreneur programs appears to represent 
the convergence of two considerations. The first is evidence initially 
presented by Birch (1981) showing that small firms create many more 
jobs than large companies. A widely cited finding of his study is that 
of all the net new jobs created between 1969 and 1976, two-thirds were 
generated by firms with 20 or fewer employees, and about 80 percent 
were created by firms with 100 or fewer employees. These proportions 
are far higher than the share of total employment represented by small 
businesses. 5 At the same time, the USDOL report (1986:58) presents 
evidence to show that many independent small businesses are successful 
attempts at self-employment. The second consideration is the persis 
tent argument that, given the adjustment problems faced by displaced 
workers, expenditure of UI funds for programs other than its traditional 
income maintenance role ought to be explored.
Several major European countries have established programs permit 
ting the diversion of transfer payments to unemployed workers who 
commit themselves to starting their own small businesses. Two of the 
best known of these programs were established in France in 1979 and 
in the United Kingdom in 1982. 6 The French Unemployed Entrepreneurs 
Program provides a lump-sum payment to be received about two months 
after the new firm has been registered. (Benefits may also be used to 
buy an existing business.) The size of the payment was initially deter 
mined by the worker©s previous unemployment insurance contributions 
subject to a cap of six months of unemployment benefits. Since April 
1984, the range of payments has been narrowed by making payment 
size vary only according to the length of unemployment (the sooner 
after losing a job the worker starts his or her business, the larger the 
benefits) and the type of benefit the recipient was previously receiv 
ing. Bendick and Egan (1987:530) report that payments currently range 
in dollar terms between $1,398 and $5,590. In addition to the lump- 
sum payment, program participants receive a payment for each job 
created beyond that occupied by the proprietor. Before April 1984,
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the French program was funded through the unemployment insurance 
trust fund, and since then it has been funded by general tax revenues.
Rather than a lump-sum payment, the British Enterprise Allowance 
Scheme provided a taxable allowance equivalent to $61 per week in 
1983 for a maximum of 52 weeks. Program participants must have been 
without work for at least eight weeks, must be willing to work at the 
business full time, and must demonstrate that they have at least 1000 
British pounds ($1,520 in 1983) to invest in the business. Only new 
businesses are eligible for assistance. As is the case for the French pro 
gram, an assessment of the viability of the proposed business is not part 
of the application review process, 7 and the program is funded by general 
tax revenues. Both programs also provide limited training and technical 
assistance to would-be entrepreneurs.
The fact that the programs in both France and Britain have survived 
for a number of years is an important measure of success for this type 
of initiative. Nevertheless, recent evaluations by Bendick and Egan 
(1987) and the USDOL (1986) raise several questions regarding the 
potential of unemployed entrepreneur programs for returning the 
unemployed to work and creating additional jobs. These questions in 
clude the following:
1. How many new firms would have been created in the absence of 
assistance?
2. Might the subsidized firms compete against and displace existing 
firms in the same local markets?
3. How good are the jobs self-employment provides?
4. How many jobs do these firms generate in addition to those held 
by their proprietors?
Beginning with the first question, by the end of 1985 about 235,000 
persons had participated in the French program and about 139,000 in 
the British. The programs involve only a fraction of 1 percent of the 
annual flow of unemployment in both countries, yet 20 to 30 percent 
of new business starts are program-generated. Without a formal evalua 
tion including a control group comparison, it is difficult to say how 
many of the business starts would have taken place in the absence of 
the programs. The only available evidence on this question is a 1985 
survey of Enterprise Allowance Scheme participants. As described by
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Bendick and Egan (1987:530-31), 33.5 percent of participants surveyed 
reported that they would have established their businesses at the same 
time without the program, and an additional 17.2 percent said that they 
would have gone ahead but with some delay. Thus about half of the 
new firms formed in the U.K. might have occurred without program 
assistance.
The absence of formal evaluation also makes it difficult to provide 
a definitive answer to the second question. Nevertheless, it does ap 
pear likely that displacement of existing firms by subsidized firms will 
occur. One piece of evidence comes from the 1985 survey of British 
program participants. The relevant question asked proprietors of sub 
sidized firms for an estimate of the extent to which their firm©s sales 
took business from other firms, as opposed to offering products or ser 
vices not previously available. Two-thirds of the responding proprietors 
said that displacement accounted for less than 10 percent of their sales. 
The remaining one-third reported that displacement accounted for 11 
to 100 percent of sales. Based on this survey, Bendick and Egan 
(1987:535) note that the British government©s estimate of worker 
displacement is that one worker is thrown into unemployment for every 
two employed.
Also related to the displacement question is a consideration of the 
location and product lines of newly established businesses. The fact that 
most proprietors are able to make only a modest front-end financial 
investment in their businesses limits the choice of activity undertaken. 
Thus subsidized firms are predominantly involved in the services and 
retail trade industries, so that they are dependent on local consumers 
and the level of local income. Both of these industries tend to be highly 
competitive, with the product or service of one firm a close substitute 
for that of other firms. To the extent that prospective entrepreneurs reside 
in depressed areas and communities, in addition, the local demand for 
goods and services is likely to be quite limited.
Turning to the question of the quality of jobs that self-employment 
provides, summary statistics indicate for the British program that me 
dian earnings (about $8,000 annually) and the distribution of earnings 
for program participants are about the same as their market alternatives 
would have provided. These statistics are calculated for firms that sur 
vived three years. But how likely are small enterprises to survive this
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long? The experience in Europe as well as in the U.S. is that small 
businesses generally have a high failure rate. For the French program 
specifically, about one-third of newly formed firms ceased operation 
within their first three years. A similar failure rate is estimated for Enter 
prise Allowance Scheme firms.
Even if a subsidized business should fail, it might be argued that the 
program is still worthwhile if it increases the probability that former 
proprietors will find jobs with existing employers. For the British pro 
gram, however, Bendick and Egan (1987:536) conclude that the flow 
into employment of proprietors of failed businesses is not observably 
higher than the flow estimated for all male unemployed workers. 
Strengthening their conclusion is the fact that program participants have 
somewhat better credentials, and therefore a better chance of reemploy- 
ment, than the average unemployed workers.
The final question concerns the job-creating performance of subsidized 
small businesses. Does their performance live up to the high rate of 
job creation said to be characteristic of new small firms? The answer 
seems to be that only a small subset of subsidized firms are likely to 
provide employment opportunities in addition to the job held by the 
proprietor. For the British program, 62 percent of businesses still 
operating after three years supplied employment only for the proprietor, 
and only 5 percent employed more than six persons. Parallel results 
are reported for the Unemployed Entrepreneurs Program. It should be 
noted, moreover, that these percentages include part-time workers and 
family members who may or may not be paid.
In summary, both the USDOL and Bendick-Egan studies offer a less- 
than-enthusiastic recommendation for transferring the unemployed en 
trepreneur initiative to this country. The USDOL report (1986:63) ex 
presses two main concerns. The first is that given the higher incidence 
of self-employment in the U.S. than in Europe, payments to program 
participants are likely to represent a windfall in the sense that benefits 
are paid to persons who would have taken the desired action in the 
absence of the program. The second concern is that subsidies that in 
duce start-ups by unemployed persons with no previous entrepreneurial 
experience and little initial capital to invest may exacerbate the already 
high rate of small business failure.
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For similar reasons, Bendick and Egan (1987:541) conclude that 
". . . grant diversion for small business development should be at most 
a minor component of the spectrum of efforts to promote employment 
opportunities for the hard-to-employ." A minor role for grant diver 
sion follows from the widespread agreement that the forms of assistance 
most needed by newly created small businesses are counseling and finan 
cial assistance. Moreover, Bendick and Egan point out that unemployed 
entrepreneur programs are subject to the same trade-off as that facing 
traditional reemployment initiatives; namely, the trade-off between serv 
ing the hardest-to-employ and achieving high success rates for program 
participants.
Reinforcing the recommendation of a limited role for unemployed 
entrepreneur programs is the experience gained from a small pilot proj 
ect in Ohio designed to test the effectiveness of self-employment train 
ing. This project was operated during the 1985-86 period by the Ohio 
Bureau of Employment Services using JTPA Title ffl funds. All 200 
displaced workers participating in the project received formal training 
in skills thought to be related to entrepreneurial success as well as post- 
program support services. Across the seven program providers, pro 
gram content ranged from courses in basic business skills such as ac 
counting, market research, and personnel selection to seminars stress 
ing motivation and esteem building.
The analysis of the Ohio pilot project by Mangum and Tansky (1987) 
indicates that 31 percent of participants actually started a small business, 
but less than 10 percent of all participants successfully created businesses 
that offered much chance of generating employment opportunities for 
others and of providing predisplacement levels of earnings. Average 
program cost per small business start-up was $6,767. The authors con 
clude that displaced workers most likely to start businesses with a 
reasonable probability of survival had substantial savings or equity in 
their homes, possessed some managerial experience from previous 
employment, and had been displaced for a relatively short time. Self- 
employment training thus appears to be a viable option for only a very 
select group within the displaced worker population.
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Summary
In contrast to the vocational training and ISA programs discussed in 
earlier chapters, this chapter described a number of less conventional 
initiatives for assisting displaced workers by developing economic alter 
natives to plant closures and by encouraging small business start-ups. 
Since several of these initiatives are incorporated in the comprehen 
sive Massachusetts Mature Industries Act, the chapter began with an 
outline of the Act, including the voluntary "social compact" it establishes 
between business and government to cushion the adverse employment 
impacts of plant closings. A unique feature of the Massachusetts displac 
ed worker program is the provision of supplemental unemployment 
benefits for a period not to exceed 13 weeks. Other adjustment assistance 
initiatives offered by Massachusetts, as well as by other states, include 
continuation of health insurance coverage for displaced workers and 
"enterprise zone" programs providing special government assistance 
and tax relief to employers located in distressed areas of the state.
The second half of the chapter dealt with programs intended to re 
tain jobs and stimulate employment growth by encouraging the forma 
tion of employee-owned enterprises. These programs typically take one 
of two forms: (1) assisting employee groups to purchase facilities that 
would otherwise be closed, and (2) assistance to enable individual 
unemployed workers to start up their own small businesses. The discus 
sion of the first type of program focused on case studies of Weirton 
Steel and the Rath Packing Company and on a handful of empirical 
studies relating to the impact of ESOPs on worker productivity and job 
creation. While the available evidence is not terribly persuasive one 
way or the other, it does appear that under certain conditions a case 
can be made for public assistance in worker buyout attempts.
The second type of worker-ownership program was primarily discuss 
ed in terms of the experience in Britain and France with national 
unemployed entrepreneur programs.Programs in both countries have 
been viewed as sufficiently successful that their funding has been con 
tinued over time. In neither case, however, is quantitative evidence 
available allowing a comparison of the performance of program par 
ticipants with that of a control group. Even in the absence of experimental
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data, however, important questions were raised from the available 
evidence regarding the ability of most displaced workers to start up a 
viable small business and the limited potential for job creation in addi 
tion to the job of the proprietor. Caution is thus warranted in recom 
mending the extension of this type of program to the U.S.
NOTES
1. This discussion is primarily based on the enabling legislation for the Mature In 
dustries Act and the legislative report of the state Division of Employment Security 
(1987).
2. An interesting third case covered by the Act is that the state health insurance benefit 
fund will pay for continued coverage by health insurance policies individually pur 
chased by workers displaced by a certified plant closing.
3. As described in Trolin and Randall (1987), another interesting funding initiative, 
included in the proposed Oregon Employee Ownership Act, would allow employees 
to use their UI benefits to purchase shares in companies that would otherwise close down.
4. On the other hand, Miller (1988) points out that, as shareholders, workers may 
enjoy substantial windfall gains when an ESOP-owned firm is taken public or sells 
out in a transaction that eventually reduces or eliminates employee ownership. Ironically, 
this outcome flouts congressional intent (i.e., the encouragement of worker owner 
ship) in giving tax-favored treatment to ESOPs.
5. Wessel and Brown (1988) offer an interesting discussion of various criticisms of 
the thesis that small businesses generate nearly all of U.S. job growth and report Birch©s 
response to his critics.
6. The discussion of these two programs relies heavily on the data presented and 
analyzed in Bendick and Egan (1987).
7. While a screening of business proposals would be likely to decrease failures, pro 
gram officials in both countries have been reluctant to adopt a policy of extensive screen 
ing. One reason is the additional program cost and complexity associated with screen 
ing. A second factor is a reluctance to substitute the judgment of agency personnel 
for that of the entrepreneur and the market.

6 
Summary and Policy Implications
The introductory chapter of this study posed six major questions in 
volving the provision of effective labor market adjustment assistance 
to displaced workers. Chapters 2 through 5 then described a variety 
of specific initiatives through which assistance is or could be supplied. 
The focus in these chapters was on contemporary, innovative, state- 
level programs. Available quantitative and qualitative evidence on these 
programs was also presented in detail.
The first section of this concluding chapter attempts to answer each 
of the six questions. The purpose of the question-and-answer format 
is to be as concrete as possible in spelling out what can be learned from 
state, federal, and, in a few cases, foreign government experience about 
how best to cope with the adjustment problems faced by displaced 
workers. A second section briefly outlines what appears to be the best 
mix of displaced worker programs.
Major Policy Questions
Question 1: How do displaced workers differ from other unemployed 
workers ?
Adjustment assistance programs directed specifically toward displaced 
workers are based on the premise that the displaced are different from 
other unemployed workers in ways that require special services. Not 
all analysts agree on exactly how to define displaced workers. Nor is 
there unanimity on the proposition that the displaced worker problem 
has recently become more serious. Nevertheless, most observers seem 
to agree that relative to other unemployed workers, displaced workers 
(1) possess a stable employment history with their predisplacement
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employers, (2) have little chance of being recalled to jobs with their 
old employer or in their old industry, and (3) may face poor reemploy- 
ment prospects in their local labor markets.
An implication of the first difference is that the job search skills of 
many displaced workers have grown rusty because they had not been 
obliged to seek alternative employment for a number of years. The length 
of their unemployment spells is thus likely to be longer than otherwise 
would be the case. Output foregone because of unnecessary delays in 
the reemployment process represents a social loss which must be con 
sidered in addition to the private losses borne by individual displaced 
workers and their families.
Evidence from the 1984 Displaced Worker Survey reported in table 
1.1 indicates that about 40 percent of workers displaced from their jobs 
between 1979 and 1984 were unemployed or no longer in the labor force 
at the end of the survey period, and that nearly half of the displaced 
workers who drew UI benefits during the 1979-84 period exhausted 
their eligibility for benefits (i.e., they were unemployed for longer than 
26 weeks). The 1986 DWS shows that even with the cyclical upswing 
in the economy between 1984 and 1986, fully one-third of workers 
displaced during the 1981-86 period were without employment in 
January 1986.
The further analysis of 1984 DWS data by Podgursky and Swaim 
(1987c) shows that the distribution of completed spells of joblessness 
is highly skewed to the right. While nearly half of respondents in their 
sample found jobs within 14 weeks of displacement, a substantial minori 
ty of displaced workers faced a high risk of being jobless for a year 
or more. The highly skewed distribution of completed spells makes the 
average length of unemployment substantially longer than can be 
reasonably accounted for by cyclical phenomenon or by job search fac 
tors such as an unrealistically high initial reservation wage. It also sug 
gests that reemployment programs should be targeted to the minority 
of workers facing the most severe adjustment problems. Drawing on 
the Podgursky-Swaim regression results, these individuals include 
workers displaced from blue-collar occupations, workers with below- 
average levels of education, minorities and women, and residents of 
communities with above-average unemployment rates.
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The second difference between displaced and other unemployed 
workers implies that the reemployment of the displaced is likely to in 
volve a change in occupation, industry, or both. Such changes, in turn, 
often imply lower earnings upon reemployment, which compound the 
private costs associated with a spell of unemployment. As emphasized 
in chapter 1, lower earnings arise because a displaced worker
(1) received an economic rent on his or her predisplacement job or
(2) was forced to forego the opportunity to earn a return on investments 
previously made in firm-specific human capital. Data compiled from 
the 1984 DWS and the 1986 DWS indicate that about 30 percent of 
those reemployed in full-time wage and salary jobs suffered pay cuts 
of 20 percent or more (see table 1.1). Losses in the form of group health 
insurance coverage and vested pension plans add to the private costs 
borne by displaced workers.
In an effort to distinguish between these two explanations of earn 
ings losses, Podgursky and Swaim (1987b) use industry unionization 
coverage of last job as a proxy measure of the possibility that the 
predisplacement job provided a significant economic rent. Controlling 
for this measure as well as predisplacement earnings, the authors find 
for blue-collar males that a change in industry significantly depresses 
reemployment earnings, thus providing support for the specific train 
ing explanation. Greater tenure on the old job and the area unemploy 
ment rate also significantly increase the earnings loss estimated for blue- 
collar men. On the other hand, years of schooling completed which 
can be interpreted as a measure of general training is found to have 
a strong positive effect on postdisplacement earnings. Hamermesh (1987) 
provides further evidence indicating that displacement is not typically 
anticipated by affected workers and that the value of workers© share 
of lost returns on firm-specific training can be substantial.
Uncompensated losses on specific training result in a social loss if 
risk-averse workers and their employers are discouraged from making 
optimal levels of investment in specific human capital. Even evidence 
of losses of economic rents can be used to justify special assistance to 
displaced workers on the grounds that such assistance is politically 
necessary for the maintenance of a dynamic and open domestic economy.
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The third difference between displaced workers and other unemployed 
workers recognizes that a major plant closure or permanent layoff has 
a serious impact on employment opportunities in the community. The 
ripple effect of a closure generates displacement in smaller firms that 
service the closed establishment and in retail outlets that depend on the 
purchasing power of laid-off workers. This increases the competition 
for those jobs that are still available in the local labor market, even though 
many of them are likely to be low-wage positions offering little oppor 
tunity for advancement. Moreover, declining property values and an 
eroding tax base leaves schools and other public services underfunded, 
making it even more difficult to attract new employers to the community.
Question 2: Which forms of adjustment assistance © ©work© ©for displac 
ed workers?
Just as displaced workers can conceptually be distinguished from other 
unemployed workers, displaced workers are themselves a heterogeneous 
population with different backgrounds and skills and with a variety of 
needs for adjustment assistance. The most highly publicized segment 
of the displaced worker population includes workers laid off from 
unionized, high-wage jobs in the manufacturing sector. Many of these 
workers have made substantial investments in firm-specific training 
which now must be written off. Others undoubtedly enjoyed sizable 
rents on their predisplacement jobs.
In spite of the common denominator of having been laid off from 
a high-paying job in manufacturing, appropriate forms of adjustment 
assistance may differ substantially for different individuals, even within 
this group of displaced workers. Some workers may require retraining 
to qualify for jobs in expanding industries. Many others will benefit 
from counseling and other types of job search assistance to help them 
realize that their chances of recall are low but that employment options 
offering greater career opportunities do exist, albeit at lower wages, 
in other industries or occupations. For still others in this group, remedial 
education is a prerequisite before they can be either retrained or assisted 
in formulating a job search strategy.
It is also important to recognize that the population of displaced 
workers includes nonunion workers laid off from low-wage jobs in
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industries other than manufacturing. This group of displaced workers 
includes individuals who are poorly educated, female, and black or 
Hispanic. Since these individuals may never have had a chance to ac 
cumulate specific human capital, appropriate adjustment services in 
clude remedial education and retraining programs intended to provide 
basic and job-related skills. These programs accompanied by job search 
assistance offer the potential for enhancing workers© employment op 
portunities in better-paying occupations.
In response to the variety of needs of displaced workers, states have 
established a broad spectrum of reemployment assistance programs. As 
described in chapters 2 through 4, these programs include a number 
of variants of retraining and job search assistance programs. Still other 
state programs described in chapter 5 are aimed at maintaining employ 
ment opportunities in the local labor market either by enabling current 
owners to stay in business or by helping to find new owners (including 
employee groups) to keep existing facilities from closing. Also con 
sidered in chapter 5 is the European experience with programs that assist 
unemployed workers to start their own small businesses. The most im 
portant single gap in the spectrum of state programs appears to be in 
the area of remedial education, a not surprising result given the em 
phasis of most states on economic development rather than human capital 
investment.
The rich set of state-level programs provides an opportunity for 
researchers to pull together and analyze an enormous amount of infor 
mation about the design and effectiveness of adjustment assistance ser 
vices. Such information should be invaluable to decisionmakers charg 
ed with allocating funds across existing programs, initiating new 
programs, and terminating old programs. Unfortunately, relatively few 
state programs have been designed to allow the kind of evaluation which 
would allow their effectiveness to be measured quantitatively by a com 
parison of the behavior of individuals randomly assigned to treatment 
and control groups. Fortunately, there are a few key random-assignment 
experiments that represent exceptions to this statement.
One of the most important of these exceptions is the Worker Adjust 
ment Demonstration, involving about 2,250 Title HI JTPA program par 
ticipants at three sites located in Houston and El Paso, Texas. Reemploy-
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ment services randomly assigned to participants in two treatment groups 
are job search assistance (ISA) and ISA plus referral, where necessary, 
to a retraining program. Also randomly assigned were the members 
of a control group who received all available non-Title III services. As 
described by Bloom and Kulik (1986), WAD participants are found to 
experience a short-run positive impact on earnings and likelihood of 
employment, and a corresponding negative impact on UI benefits receiv 
ed. The primary program effect for men is to expedite their reemploy- 
ment, while for women it appears that wages as well are positively af 
fected by program participation. A surprising result is that the extra 
cost of retraining services provided to male participants in Houston did 
not result in additional labor market benefits. The authors suggest that 
the most realistic explanation for this finding is that a mismatch occur 
red between the training opportunities offered by the Houston program 
and the interests and backgrounds of program participants.
The findings of the WAD projects regarding the relative effectiveness 
of ISA and retraining services are buttressed by results obtained from 
two federally-funded projects the Downriver dislocated worker pro 
ject and the Buffalo project of the national Dislocated Worker 
Demonstration. Both projects permit a comparison of the outcomes for 
treatment and control groups, although neither involved random 
assignment.
All participants in the Downriver project were required to participate 
in a ISA program and about 60 percent of participants also were enrolled 
in classroom training. The evaluation report by Kulik, Smith, and 
Stromsdorfer (1984) indicates that the program significantly improved 
workers© reemployment rates and postlayoff weekly earnings. It also 
increased their access to retraining opportunities. However, program 
training is not found to yield a significant incremental gain in participants© 
employment prospects above that resulting from ISA services only. 
Kulik, Smith, and Stromsdorfer qualify this negative finding by noting 
problems of small sample sizes and the absence of random assignment 
of workers to training as opposed to ISA.
Like the Downriver project, all participants in the Buffalo program 
were provided ISA services and about 45 percent also went through 
a classroom training or OJT program. Despite the low rate of participa-
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tion (less than 20 percent of displaced workers recruited for the pro 
gram chose to participate), Corson, Long, and Maynard (1985) report 
that the program had a favorable effect on the proportion of time spent 
in the labor force, the proportion of time employed, and average weekly 
earnings. Among the three main program services, ISA and classroom 
training are estimated to have impacts of about the same size on workers© 
labor market experience. In view of the substantially higher cost of 
classroom training, only ISA services thus appear to be cost effective. 
Corson, Long, and Maynard note, however, that many classroom train 
ing participants completed their training near the end of the demonstration 
period and consequently received relatively little placement assistance. 
Interestingly, on-the-job training is not found by the authors to have 
a discernible impact on employment.
The reemployment bonus concept is another important labor market 
initiative for which evidence is available from random-assignment ex 
periments. As discussed in chapter 3, results from the completed ex 
periments in Illinois indicate that a $500 reemployment bonus paid to 
workers (but not to employers) has the effect of reducing the length 
of unemployment spells and associated UI outlays. Woodbury and 
Spiegelman (1987) calculate a benefit-cost ratio for the Claimant Bonus 
Experiment with the very favorable result that state regular UI benefit 
payments are reduced by $2.32 for each $1.00 of bonus payments made.
Preliminary findings of the New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstra 
tion Project also provide evidence on the effectiveness of a reemploy 
ment bonus program as well as of ISA and retraining services. Corson 
and Kerachsky (1987) report that the ISA-only treatment reduces length 
of UI benefits by slightly over half a week and the amount of benefits 
by nearly $88. Adding the reemployment bonus to JSA services fur 
ther decreases both length and amount of benefits. In view of the size 
of the average bonus payment (about $1,300), however, the incremen 
tal effect of the bonus program does not appear to be large enough to 
make this treatment cost effective.
Consistent with the results of the Texas WAD projects and the 
Downriver and Buffalo demonstrations, the New Jersey experiment in 
dicates that the incremental impact of retraining (above that of JSA ser 
vices only) on length and amount of UI benefits is essentially zero.
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In interpreting this result, Corson and Kerachsky stress that their 
estimates are likely to understate the true impact of retraining since in 
dividuals enrolled in training programs continue to collect UI. The 
benefits of training in terms of reducing UI expenditures are thus ex 
pected to occur in the longer run as retrained workers enjoy more stable 
employment.
In summary, the available quantitative evidence strongly supports the 
inclusion of JSA in the spectrum of reemployment services that should 
be offered to displaced workers. The evidence is not nearly as strong 
concerning the net impact of training programs; and, given their relative 
ly high cost, the cost effectiveness of retraining is open to question. 
Nevertheless, the authors of the evaluation reports reviewed are 
unanimous in cautioning that the impact of training programs may be 
understated in their empirical analyses.
Because of the limited number of quantitative evaluations available 
and the uncertainties in interpreting the results of those that do exist, 
particularly with respect to retraining, this study has devoted considerable 
attention to a "process analysis" of the initiatives examined. Rather 
than attempting to measure program outcomes, process analysis involves 
a qualitative evaluation of how well the program is operating. The opera 
tion of a particular program, in turn, is determined to a substantial ex 
tent by its design; and the discussion now turns to a consideration of 
several important design issues.
Question 3: How should particular adjustment assistance services be 
provided?
Chapter 2 introduced two related design issues involved in the pro 
vision of retraining services. The first of these concerns the use of 
performance-based contracting, and the second involves the extent of 
employer participation in reemployment programs. The main advan 
tage of performance-based contracting is that program planners, once 
they have established their performance standards, can shift to training 
providers the burden of making sure that trainees acquire marketable 
skills. Performance-based contracting thus eliminates, at least for pro 
gram planners, the necessity of forecasting the occupational demand 
for labor in order to select retraining curricula appropriately.
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Among the state-level programs considered, California©s Employment 
Training Panel program has gone the furthest in establishing stringent 
performance standards and in basing the reimbursement of training ven 
dors solely on their performance in satisfactorily meeting these stan 
dards. As described in chapter 2, the Panel withholds the full negotiated 
payment per person until trainees have completed their training pro 
grams, are placed in training-related jobs at wage rates stipulated in 
the contract, and are retained in those jobs for at least 90 days.
An assessment of the California ETP program reveals, nonetheless, 
certain disadvantages of insisting on high performance standards. One 
of these is the incentive for training vendors to cream off the most able 
of those eligible for retraining assistance in order to satisfy placement 
rate requirements. A second disadvantage is that by withholding pay 
ment until after trainees have been placed in jobs for 90 days, external 
training providers such as community colleges and vocational-technical 
institutes may be discouraged from program participation (see Cyert 
and Mowery 1987:152). To the extent that educational institutions opt 
not to participate, Panel officials are restricted to employers for pro 
viding training; and employers have a natural incentive to seek pro 
gram funding for the retraining of current employees. If in the absence 
of the program these employees would have been retrained anyway, 
there is no net increase in the delivery of training services and employers 
receive a windfall gain at the expense of taxpayers.
Although employers may serve as training providers in the ETP pro 
gram, their broader role includes initiating the retraining process by 
requesting funding for a particular project. Once a project has received 
ETP approval, in addition, the employer determines criteria for select 
ing trainees, helps to select the curricula, and sets performance stan 
dards. In return, participating employers must make a good-faith com 
mitment to hire program graduates. Tailoring retraining programs in 
this way clearly helps to solve the problem of workers being trained 
in skills not in demand. Moreover, tailored retraining is also important 
in meeting the twin goals of most states of encouraging economic 
development and reducing UI expenditures.
From a social perspective, the disavantages of tailored training pro 
grams, as noted, include creaming in the trainee-selection process and
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committing public funds to retraining individuals who might otherwise 
have been retrained at the employer©s own expense. The discussion of 
the Minnesota Employment and Economic Development wage-subsidy 
program indicated that it is possible to take the opposite approach of 
targeting assistance to specific groups of hard-to-employ persons and 
still enjoy widespread business support. MEED offers employers who 
hire targeted workers a subsidy of up to $4 per hour in wages and up 
to $1 per hour in fringe benefits for a period not to exceed six months. 
In return, Minnesota employers agree to retain program participants 
on their payrolls for at least 12 months beyond the subsidy period. The 
support of the business community enjoyed by the MEED program is 
particularly interesting in view of unfavorable evidence from the Dayton 
wage-subsidy experiment showing that the placement rates of the two 
treatment groups are lower than the placement rate of the control group. 
Burtless© (1985) explanation for this unexpected result is that program 
vouchers were primarily viewed by employers as a signal of potential 
ly poor job performance.
While chapter 2 emphasized that it is critical for a retraining pro 
gram to enjoy the support of employers, chapters 3 and 4 brought out 
that employers© approval is equally important in the provision of other 
reemployment services. A case in point is the delivery of services at 
the site of facilities slated for a mass layoff or closure.
Question 4: What are the best time and place to provide assistance?
Most analysts take the position that reemployment assistance programs 
are most successful if they are located on-site and are in place before 
workers lose their jobs. Workers can be readily contacted at the 
workplace, and early adjustment assistance helps to avoid the discourage 
ment and loss of self-respect that often goes along with an unexpected 
job loss. The involvement of employers in such on-site programs in 
cludes, at a minimum, supplying advance notice of planned layoffs and 
plant closures, making space available to program staff members within 
plant gates, and providing workers time off to attend presentations detail 
ing available services.
Beginning with the issue of advance notification, chapter 4 provided 
an overview of mandatory advance notice laws on the books in three
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states, federal plant closing regulation enacted in the Worker Adjust 
ment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, and the limited empirical 
evidence currently available on the effect of notification on length of 
unemployment spells and subsequent earnings upon reemployment. 
Although the empirical evidence discussed is subject to a number of 
qualifications, it does seem to indicate that advance notice is effective 
in speeding up the transition of displaced workers to new jobs, primarily 
by encouraging workers to locate employment prior to scheduled ter 
mination dates. Thus advance notice appears to reduce both the private 
and social costs of adjustment associated with worker displacement.
What makes mandatory advance notice legislation controversial is the 
question of whether the benefit to workers and to society as a whole 
is sufficient to offset the private costs to employers. These private costs 
include increased inflexibility in adjusting workforce size and a possi 
ble negative effect on worker productivity. The inflexibility argument 
is usually made by associating the much slower rate of employment 
growth in Western Europe than in the U.S. since 1970 to restrictions 
many European countries place on firms© ability to carry out layoffs. 
Whatever the merits of this argument, it should be noted that the failure 
of employers to provide advance notice imposes costs (or "externalities") 
on workers and communities that are not shared by the firms making 
the layoffs. Regarding the impact on labor productivity, what evidence 
is available does not support the argument that productivity is adverse 
ly affected during the period of notification.
The most common on-site assistance program in this country takes 
the form of rapid-response teams. As implemented by various states, 
employer involvement in rapid-response team programs ranges from 
a minimum level of cooperation (i.e., giving advance notice, providing 
space, and offering workers time off) to active participation in helping 
to place workers in new jobs. At the extreme of minimal employer in 
volvement, the rapid-response team consists of representatives of rele 
vant state agencies; team members make on-site presentations to af 
fected workers on the details of registering for UI benefits, requirements 
for continued UI eligibility, and available ES and Tide HI JTPA retrain 
ing and job search assistance services.
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At the other extreme of employer involvement, the model usually 
pointed to is the Canadian Industrial Adjustment Service program. The 
thrust of the LAS is to encourage the employer and, where present, the 
union or unions representing the displaced workers to utilize their in 
formal labor market contacts to place workers in suitable job openings. 
Placement rather than retraining, relocation, or counseling is emphasized. 
The primary role of the LAS is a limited one of securing from the par 
ties a commitment of time and financial resources in the formation of 
a joint labor-management adjustment committee. It is the adjustment 
committee©s job to organize and put into effect the placement process. 
Worth noting in the recent report of the Secretary of Labor©s Task Force 
on Economic Adjustment and Worker Dislocation (1986:28-33) is the 
recommendation that state-level Displaced Worker Units be formed to 
play an LAS-like role in mobilizing the resources of labor and manage 
ment to respond rapidly to worker displacement.
An important advantage of on-site adjustment assistance is that pro 
grams can be appropriately targeted to workers displaced by a plant 
closing or permanent layoff. As noted earlier in this chapter, however, 
the ripple effect of the closing of a large plant will generate additional 
displacement among employees of suppliers to the closed plant and local 
retail and service outlets. The question then arises whether workers 
displaced by the secondary effects of a plant closure can be distinguished 
from other unemployed workers in the local labor market. From a policy 
perspective, the answer to this question is important to avoid providing 
reemployment services to unemployed workers expected to experience 
little difficulty in finding new jobs or likely to return to their previous 
employers.
Chapter 3 pointed out that one of the two main objectives of the New 
Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration is to determine whether it is 
possible to identify by the fifth week of the claim period unemployed 
workers who are likely to exhaust UI benefits but are unlikely to return 
to their old or similar jobs. (The other main objective, as noted earlier, 
is to measure the effectiveness of alternative reemployment services, 
including the reemployment bonus.) The methodological approach taken 
in the demonstration is to screen UI claimants using five eligibility re 
quirements, the most important of which are three years of tenure with
Summary & Policy Implications 147
the pre-UI employer and absence of a definite recall date. Preliminary 
results provided by Corson and Kerachsky (1987) indicate that the five 
screens do seem to restrict the demonstration-eligible population to per 
sons whose attributes are usually associated with displaced workers and 
reemployment difficulty. Nevertheless, the eligible population is also 
found to include claimants previously employed in growing sectors of 
the economy, such as the service industry, as well as claimants who 
eventually returned to their former employers.
Question 5: Is there a role for initiatives designed to keep existing 
plants open?
In the case of a plant closing or mass layoff, most of the initiatives 
discussed in this monograph are designed to ease the adjustment of laid- 
off workers into jobs with new employers. The main question raised 
in chapter 5, in contrast, is the appropriateness of policy intervention 
to enable existing firms or plants to remain open in local labor markets 
that are sufficiently depressed that alternative employment opportunities 
are limited to low-wage jobs offering little potential for advancement. 
Possible forms of intervention are (1) assistance to allow current owners 
to continue operating or to attract new owners from outside the firm,
(2) assistance to encourage employee buyouts of existing facilities, and
(3) assistance to enable displaced workers to start up their own small 
businesses. Unfortunately, the available evidence on these categories 
of assistance is limited to a handful of qualitative studies.
Assistance to current or new owners of established facilities is com 
monly embodied in "enterprise zone" programs, and 21 states have 
passed some form of enterprise zone legislation. The basic idea underly 
ing enterprise zones is to target special opportunities and benefits to 
firms and residents of distressed areas within the state (including blighted 
inner-city neighborhoods). As originally conceived, the enterprise zone 
was envisioned as a tool to stimulate economic development by lifting 
the twin burdens of government regulation and high tax rates, both of 
which serve to reduce individual work effort and entrepreneurial 
initiative.
As described by Bendick and Rasmussen (1986), however, state enter 
prise zone laws have little to do with creating islands of unfettered free
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enterprise. Rather, the major features of zone programs are (1) a reduc 
tion in total tax burdens, as opposed to reduced marginal tax rates, and 
(2) extensive government activity within zones. The latter feature in 
cludes such activities as land-use planning, infrastructure development, 
improvements in public services, provision of loans and technical 
assistance to businesses, and training programs directed toward disad- 
vantaged workers. The high level of government activity within zones 
often imposes on businessmen excessively burdensome red tape and 
operating requirements as conditions for receiving benefits. Bendick 
and Rasmussen (1986:118-19) note that a number of states are likely 
soon to revise their legislation, and that future zone programs will prob 
ably reflect a greater awareness of the needs of small and indigenous 
firms, as opposed to those of large in-migrants. Key problems general 
ly thought to adversely affect the survival of small businesses are lack 
of access to affordable financing, lack of experience in running a 
business, and lack of predictable demand for the goods or services pro 
duced. State support to small business incubator programs represents 
one approach to dealing with the first and second of these problems.
Turning to the topic of employee buyouts, about one-third of the states 
have on their books legislation specifically promoting employee owner 
ship of troubled enterprises. The interest of policymakers in employee- 
ownership initiatives appears to stem largely from two factors: (1) the 
series of tax incentives embodied in Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs), and (2) reports of a favorable impact on labor productivity 
and profits of giving workers a stake in their companies and participa 
tion in decisionmaking. Case studies of particular companies (e.g., Weir- 
ton Steel) suggest that employee buyout programs may indeed increase 
labor productivity to an extent permitting the survival of firms that would 
otherwise have closed. Surveys carried out by the National Center for 
Employee Ownership also indicate that ESOP firms exhibit faster sales 
and employment growth than conventional firms.
Nevertheless, current discussions of ESOPs emphasize their role as 
a low-cost strategy used by existing managements to finance corporate 
restructurings and to fend off corporate raiders. Relatively uncommon 
is the use of ESOPs to save jobs that would otherwise be lost to plant 
closings. In addition, employee ownership is often found to involve little
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participation in decisionmaking; and employees shoulder increased risk 
in those cases in which company stock is substituted for diversified sav 
ings and pension plans. It seems reasonable to conclude, as do Rosen, 
Klein, and Young (1986), that ESOPs can operate to motivate workers 
and increase job satisfaction only if employers are (1) willing to make 
significant financial contributions to the plan, (2) strongly committed 
to the philosophy of employee ownership, and (3) ready to develop an 
active program to educate employees about the ESOP.
Although programs to assist unemployed workers to become self- 
employed have yet to be implemented in this country, both state and 
federal policymakers are currently exhibiting a strong interest in the 
unemployed entrepreneur concept. Accounting for this interest is 
evidence showing that small firms contribute disproportionately to 
creating new jobs, and that many independent small businesses are suc 
cessful attempts at self-employment. Also important is the belief of pro 
gram advocates that many displaced workers possess marketable skills 
and entrepreneurial talent that can be effectively utilized in their own 
small businesses once they have received assistance in getting started.
Several European countries have established programs that provide 
financial and limited training assistance to would-be entrepreneurs. The 
best known of these initiatives are the French Unemployed Entrepreneurs 
Program and the British Enterprise Allowance Scheme. While the French 
program provides participants with a lump-sum payment, the British 
program supplies monthly payments for a maximum of 52 weeks. Both 
programs are currently funded by general tax revenues. In France, 
however, funding was obtained prior to April 1984 from the unemploy 
ment insurance trust fund.
Although neither the French nor the British program has been sub 
jected to a formal evaluation involving a control group comparison, re 
cent studies of the two programs by Bendick and Egan (1987) and the 
USDOL (1986) are helpful in assessing the potential of the unemployed 
entrepreneur concept for returning the unemployed to work and creating 
additional jobs. Both studies reach pessimistic conclusions. The major 
concerns about the concept are threefold. The first is the question of 
whether new businesses started by program participants would have taken 
place in the absence of the program. If the answer is "yes," participants
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receive a windfall gain at the expense of taxpayers. The available 
evidence suggests that about 50 percent of British program participants 
would have set up their businesses without program assistance.
A second concern is the possibility that subsidized firms will com 
pete against and possibly displace existing firms in the same local pro 
duct markets. British government estimates reported by Bendick and 
Egan (1987:535) suggest that because of displacement, about one worker 
is thrown into unemployment for every two workers employed. It might 
be noted parenthetically that the problem of displacement exists for all 
of the initiatives examined in this study, and even the random-assignment 
experiments that have been carried out shed little or no light on the severi 
ty of the problem.
Finally, there is a concern about how many new jobs self-employment 
programs would actually generate. The USDOL report (1986:63) sug 
gests that subsidies to encourage start-ups by unemployed workers with 
no previous entrepreneurial experience and little initial capital to in 
vest may exacerbate already high rates of small business failure. In ad 
dition, Bendick and Egan (1987:536-37) indicate for both the British 
and French programs that only a small subset of subsidized firms sur 
viving three years are likely to provide employment opportunities in 
addition to the job held by the proprietor.
Adding to the uncertainty about the wisdom of implementing the 
unemployed entrepreneur concept in this country is experience provid 
ed by the Entrepreneurial Training Pilot Project carried out in Ohio 
in 1985-86. This small-scale project used JTPA Title ffl funds to supply 
self-employment training to 200 displaced workers. In their evaluation 
of the project, Mangum and Tansky (1987) conclude that entrepreneurial 
training is likely to result in viable small businesses only for those displac 
ed workers with the rare combination of substantial savings or equity 
in their homes, prior management experience obtained from previous 
jobs, and a relatively short period of joblessness.
Question 6: How should reemployment asistance to displaced workers 
be funded?
Most of the state-level displaced worker programs examined in this 
study are funded by state general tax revenues. The main alternative
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source of funding is state UI trust funds. At present, however, federal 
UI regulations prohibit the use of trust funds for purposes other than 
providing workers a partial replacement of earnings during short spells 
of involuntary unemployment. To be eligible for UI income-maintenance 
benefits, unemployed workers must meet a "work test;" that is, they 
must be available for and actively seeking employment. The one case 
in which the work test is waived is when a UI claimant is enrolled in 
a training program approved by the state©s employment security agen 
cy. States are prohibited from using trust funds to pay directly for the 
costs of training.
The underlying premise of the present UI system is that unemploy 
ment is basically a temporary experience best dealt with by maintain 
ing workers© incomes while they engage in job search or wait to be 
recalled. Critics of restricting the use of UI trust funds to income- 
maintenance benefits argue, however, that the main reemployment prob 
lem faced by many displaced workers is not one of riding out a tem 
porary spell of unemployment until a cyclical upturn occurs. These critics 
suggest, rather, that what is needed is labor market adjustment assistance 
initiatives including retraining to qualify workers for vacant jobs and 
programs to subsidize reemployment. The implication that follows is 
that UI trust funds should be opened up to fund innovative programs 
which are aimed more directly at solving fundamental problems hinder 
ing the reemployment of displaced workers.
As an additional indication of the inadequacy of the present UI system, 
critics point out that UI benefits are reaching a diminishing percentage 
of the jobless. Burtless (1983) reports that the fraction of unemployed 
workers receiving regular, extended, and supplemental UI benefits was 
lower in the 1981-82 recession than in any other postwar recession.
The possibility of using UI trust funds to pay for adjustment assistance 
programs has been considered at two places in this monograph. In chapter 
2, the pioneering approach of California to diverting a small part of 
regular UI tax revenues to finance its ETP program was examined. A 
surplus in California©s trust fund permitted the state©s legislature in 1983 
to create an earmarked fund financed by a 0.1 percent payroll tax, while 
at the same time employers were given a 0.1 percent reduction in their 
regular UI tax rates. Delaware and Washington state have subsequent-
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ly funded permanent retraining and job search assistance programs us 
ing the diversion approach.
The second mention of an alternative use of UI trust funds occurred 
in chapter 5 in connection with the funding of unemployed entrepreneur 
initiatives. Advocates of this concept argue that rather than offering a 
subsidy not to work, UI trust funds could be put to better use by sup 
plying an incentive for the unemployed to use their skills and en 
trepreneurial talent to create jobs for themselves and for others.
It should be emphasized, nevertheless, that the present policy restrict 
ing the use of UI trust funds has many adherents. Organized labor and 
a number of business organizations have consistently taken the posi 
tion that UI trust funds should continue to be used only to fund tem 
porary income-maintenance benefits. There are two main arguments 
supporting this position. The first is based on the issue of trust fund 
solvency, and the second involves conformity to the basic insurance 
principles underlying the financing of the UI system. To anticipate the 
discussion that follows, these two arguments appear to carry sufficient 
weight that any basic departure from the current concept of unemploy 
ment insurance should be approached cautiously.
As noted in chapter 1, the UI system has served for over 50 years 
as the first line of defense against temporary income losses due to 
unemployment. Advocates of the present system express concern that 
should UI trust funds be opened up to fund alternative initiatives, the 
ability of the system to provide traditional income-maintenance benefits 
would be jeopardized. Vroman (1986) documents the series of reces 
sions from 1970 through the early 1980s that severely depleted the trust 
funds of a number of states, causing them to borrow heavily from the 
federal government. Many of these states have been able to reduce their 
indebtedness during the improved economic climate of the mid-1980s. 
From an actuarial perspective, nevertheless, the condition of the UI 
system is still weak; and the onset of a new recession would be likely 
to trigger a repetition of heavy borrowing and debt accumulation.
An assessment of just how much of a drain adjustment assistance in 
itiatives would impose on trust fund balances is difficult for two reasons. 
The first is the uncertainty regarding the longer-run effectiveness of 
these initiatives. In principle, short-run trust fund withdrawals might be
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more than offset by longer-run inflows as the initiatives pay off in a 
workforce that is less susceptible to unemployment. The available 
evidence, however, provides very little insight into the likely trade-off 
between initial costs and longer-term benefits.
The second reason, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is that displaced 
workers are not easily distinguished from workers unemployed for fric- 
tional, seasonal, or cyclical reasons. Thus there is considerable uncer 
tainty as to the number of unemployed workers who should be counted 
as displaced from their jobs at any particular point in time. This uncer 
tainty is important because it is displaced workers who are expected 
to benefit from alternative forms of labor market adjustment asistance, 
while short-term income maintenance is more appropriate for other 
categories of the unemployed. Excessive costs are incurred if services 
are provided to unemployed workers who will get their former jobs 
back or who can easily locate new jobs when the economy recovers. 
Such excessive costs threaten the ability of the UI system to supply tradi 
tional wage-replacement benefits, particularly during recessions. On 
the other hand, a significant equity problem is raised by the denial of 
alternative services to individuals who would benefit from them but who 
do not happen to satisfy a particular displaced worker definition.
Next consider the insurance-based argument for remaining faithful 
to the present policy of restricting the use of UI trust funds. To under 
stand this argument, it should first be emphasized that the UI system 
is intended to be fully self-financing by a payroll tax imposed on 
employers. The underlying philosophy of this method of financing is 
that the individual employer has a responsibility for former employees. 
It is this philosophy that gives the program its insurance character. 
Employers are assessed insurance "premiums" in the form of payroll 
taxes, which are used to create state trust funds. Covered employees 
who have been laid off are then eligible to draw on these funds. States 
are free to determine the payroll taxes they assess; and tax rate schedules 
are said to be "experienced rated," which simply means that tax rates 
vary depending on the employer©s layoff rates and on the fraction of 
former employees receiving benefits. The "moral hazard" prob 
lem associated with the incentive for insured individuals to decide on 
a course of action that makes them eligible for insurance benefits is
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dealt with by restricting UI payments to workers who are involuntarily 
unemployed and by providing a relatively low replacement rate for lost 
earnings.
Hansen and Byers (1986) observe that the payment of income- 
maintenance benefits to workers enrolled in training programs represents 
a significant weakening of the insurance philosophy underpinning the 
UI system because these workers are not actively seeking employment. 
The essential point is that the UI system was designed to provide a 
minimum number of weekly benefit checks necessary to find a job by 
ensuring that eligible unemployed workers will act in their own self- 
interest to end their unemployment. The present practice of waiving 
the work test for claimants undergoing retraining implies receipt of a 
fixed stream of benefits depending on the length of the program. Since 
eligible workers may have some choice among retraining options, they 
are in effect being given a "right" or "entitlement" to receive the max 
imum number of payments allowable under state law. Trust fund financ 
ing of adjustment assistance initiatives including directly paying the cost 
of training programs, wage subsidies, and unemployed entrepreneur 
programs clearly has the impact of expanding worker choice, thereby 
further undermining the philosophical basis of the system. With the ex 
perience rating of UI taxes, an additional equity issue that arises is 
whether it is still reasonable to expect employers hi declining industries 
to subsidize the retraining or reemployment of workers who will more 
than likely locate jobs in the industries that are expanding.
Among the reemployment initiatives described in this study, ISA is 
the one that is conceptually most consistent with the objective of pro 
viding assistance for only the minimum period of time necessary to find 
a job. Moreover, the available empirical evidence summarized earlier 
strongly indicates that ISA programs reduce the length of unemploy 
ment spells. The results of the Illinois experiments also suggest that 
the reemployment bonus concept offers considerable promise in terms 
of stimulating the intensity of job search effort.
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An Ideal Adjustment Assistance System
Drawing on the discussion of the six policy questions just considered, 
a final issue that remains to be dealt with involves the ideal mix of ad 
justment assistance services to meet the needs of displaced workers. 
The point that comes out most strongly from the discussion is that ISA 
should be the core service provided in the ideal system. JSA has been 
shown empirically to be effective in speeding up the reemployment pro 
cess, it allows for quick intervention before workers disperse after layoffs 
or plant closings, and it is relatively cheap. In view of the practical 
difficulties of distinguishing displaced workers from other unemployed 
workers, the low cost of JSA services is particularly attractive because 
it makes it feasible to supply assistance even to those unemployed 
workers who turn out ex post to have little difficulty in locating new 
jobs or are recalled to their old jobs.
The roles of retraining and remedial education programs are not as 
clear cut. Vocational training programs are substantially more expen 
sive than JSA, and the empirical evidence summarized here indicates 
that retraining has little or no impact on labor market outcomes as typical 
ly measured. However, there is an important caveat to consider with 
respect to this evidence. This is the issue of whether the training pro 
grams examined provided workers with skills that were appropriate to 
their backgrounds and interests and at the same time were salable in 
the marketplace. Process analyses of the California ETP program sug 
gest that direct employer involvement in the training process is critical 
in supplying marketable skills, and Minnesota©s MEED program in 
dicates that employer support can be enlisted even for programs targeted 
to hard-to-employ persons. It seems reasonable to conclude, along with 
Bloom and Kulik (1986:181), that in the ideal system skill training should 
be offered sparingly for well-specified needs and only where adequate 
local training resources are present.
Most analysts agree that at least 20 percent of the displaced worker 
population is seriously deficient in basic reading and problem-solving 
skills. As noted earlier in this chapter, remedial education has received 
little attention in this study because of the emphasis of most states on 
economic development rather than human capital investment. Never-
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theless, a typical finding in the empirical literature is that displaced 
workers with low levels of formal education are much more likely than 
other displaced workers to experience lengthy spells of unemployment 
and low earnings upon reemployment. In other words, these are precisely 
the displaced workers who should be targeted for assistance. Remedial 
education thus appears to be an essential service to be offered to the 
minority of displaced workers determined in the assessment and testing 
phase of ISA programs to lack basic skills.
At the present time, there is simply not enough information available 
to justify including in the ideal system initiatives offering direct assistance 
to employers in order to retain or replace jobs. The three categories 
of employer-assistance programs examined in this study involved aid 
to current owners to stay in business, employee buyout assistance, and 
aid to unemployed workers to start up their own small businesses. 
Perhaps the best qualitative evidence on the effectiveness of these pro 
grams is available for unemployed entrepreneur programs. This evidence 
suggests quite strongly that the individuals most likely to create and 
operate a viable small business successfully possess personal attributes 
that exclude them from the minority of displaced workers who face the 
most severe adjustment problems.
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